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INDIANA’S SOUTHERN SENATOR: 
JESSE BRIGHT AND THE HOOSIER DEMOCRACY 
 
Without northern doughface Democrats, and northern states like Indiana, 
the South could not have held dominance in American politics during the 
sectional crisis. Anchoring the extreme end of the doughface North was Indiana’s 
slaveholding senator Jesse Bright (his holdings were in Kentucky). Yet, he was 
no flailing radical pushed to the margins of northern politics. Bright was the chief 
party boss who by the mid to late 1850s controlled the state of Indiana. He was 
one of the most influential leaders getting James Buchanan into the presidency. 
He did this, in part, because Indiana was a conservative state that disliked anti- 
slavery agitators. Still, most Hoosiers were not partisans in favor of slavery. 
 
Bright was able to lead Indiana politics during the 1850s because he had 
become a powerful political boss. American politics in the 1840s and 1850s was 
built around state level organizations. With elections going through constant and 
irregular cycles, hopeful candidates needed a strong organization capable of 
providing money, press literature and mobilization of voters. They needed 
someone with grit, savvy and energy to organize various groups, and no one was 
more successful at this in Indiana than Bright. Bright did this, in part, by 
understanding the baser motives of men, and more importantly, could satisfy 
these wants with graft, bribery, patronage and other inducements. If that was not 
enough to motivation, he used fear, bullying and good old fashioned steam rolling 
tactics to bludgeon his enemies into submission. Bright’s extreme doughface 
attitudes did not make him popular, but his organizing skills made him a powerful 
leader. He helped prop the slave-power in American politics through the 1850s, 
but his efforts also alienated a wide swath of northerners, especially in Indiana. 
 
By 1860, a northern Republican Party took control of American politics, as 
northerners came to reject the slave-masters and the slave-power.  This 
dissertation argues that Bright played a pivotal role in propping the slave-power. 
But ultimately Bright’s political downfall was part of a larger rejection of southern 
politics. 
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Introduction 
 
 
 
In early 1862, Massachusetts Senator Charles Sumner led the charge to 
expel Indiana’s Democratic Senator Jesse Bright from the United States Senate. 
Over the previous year, thirteen southern senators had been expelled for 
supporting the rebellion. During that time, Union officials had captured a letter 
from Bright addressed to Confederate President Jefferson Davis recommending 
to Davis a fire-arms dealer. Most Republicans had suspected the Indiana  
Senator harbored disloyal sympathies, and here they had the proof. Bright, who 
had been Indiana’s senator for about seventeen years, was a rarity among 
northern senators because he owned slaves (in Kentucky) and he ardently 
defended the institution. In calling for expulsion, Sumner claimed that the letter 
was “flat treason” according to the constitutional definition of treason. He charged 
that Bright had given “aid and comfort” in the Confederacy’s efforts to prepare for 
war, and furthermore he had confessed his authorship openly to the Senate.1 
 
Bright offered his own defense. In a letter presented to the Senate, he 
explained that he merely opposed the coercive actions of the government. He 
furiously rejected the policy of “Abolitionism, which is seeking by every means in 
its power to ‘crush out’ every man who dares dissent from the policy it 
prescribes…” Bright insisted that he favored the maintenance of the Union, but it 
was the “unconstitutional doctrine” of the Abolitionists who were at work to 
“render disruption permanent and incurable.”2 As for the letter, he later claimed it 
 
 
1 Congressional Globe, January 21, 1862, 37th Congress, 2nd Session, 214. 
2 Congressional Globe, December 16, 1861, 37th Congress, 2nd Session, 89. 
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was merely a “matter of course” to a “friend who asked for it.” He insisted that he 
had not aided and abetted the enemy as the letter was written prior to the 
outbreak of war, and he had no “prophetic knowledge” that the United States 
could be at war with the Confederacy.3 Why Davis and the Confederacy might 
need arms, Bright did not explain. Some Republicans, like Pennsylvania Senator 
Edgar Cowan, were convinced that Bright’s actions did not “technically” rise to 
the level of treason since war had not been “imminent.” Cowan curiously added: 
“it will be observed” that Bright “gives no opinion upon” the nature of the firearms. 
“He does not allege that it is an improved fire-arm, he does not allege that he has 
any knowledge of it whatever,” but merely that “the bearer of the letter, thinks it is 
an improved fire-arm.” Apparently this splitting of hairs was to show that “to 
recommend a man having an improved fire-arm to the president of a new 
republic was quite as innocent as to recommend to him a new cotton-gin, or a 
new threshing machine.”4 The Senate Judiciary Committee apparently shared 
Cowan’s views and voted 6 to 1 against expulsion.5 
 
Senate Republicans, however, pressed on. Bright, they insisted, should 
have recognized that conflict was imminent. In their minds, he had committed 
treason, but rather than debate what constituted a treasonous act, they opted to 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
3 Congressional Globe, December 16, 1861, February 5, 1862, 37th Congress, 2nd Session, 89, 
651-654. 
4 Congressional Globe, 37th Congress, 2nd Session, January 24, 1862, 471-473. 
5 Congressional Globe, 37th Congress, 2nd Session, January 13, 1862, 287. 
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charge him with disloyalty. On February 5, 1862, the United States Senate voted 
to expel Jesse Bright 32 to 14.6 
 
Moments before the vote, spectators witnessed a remarkable sight. The 
man who had wielded enormous power in the Senate gathered his personal 
belongings and left the chamber. Defiantly, Bright strode powerfully through the 
halls. He was an imposing man, full of girth, and was “imperious in…manner.” He 
“brooked no opposition…friend or foe.”7   Upon reaching a back room where his 
wife awaited, however, “the actor’s costume fell. The ruined politician sat down, 
and haggard and crushed, contemplated the wreck he had made of his 
fortunes.”8 He returned to Indiana and remained quietly at his home for “some 
time.”9 
 
Humiliated in Washington, Bright still hoped for a return to power. When 
the state legislature convened to fill his seat in early 1863, he traveled to 
Indianapolis determined to win it back. Once the state’s most powerful Democrat, 
now, however, he found that politicians no longer feared him.10   His inducements 
no longer won him votes. Even his closest political friends kept their distance. Of 
the eighty-nine members of the legislature’s Democratic caucus, only twelve 
voted for Bright. Defeated, he left not just Indianapolis, but Indiana. He crossed 
 
 
6 Ethan Lewis, “The Expulsion of Senator Jesse Bright.” Ethan Lewis <www.ethanlewis.org> 
(August 1, 2013). Congressional Globe, 37th Congress, 2nd Session, February 5, 1862, 655.  
7 William Woollen, Biographical and Historical Sketches of Early Indiana (Indinanapolis: 
Hammond & Co., 1883), 223. 
8 Madison Courier, February 8, 1862 quoted in Wayne Van Der Weele, “Jesse David Bright: 
Master Politician from the Old Northwest” (Ph.D. diss., Indiana University, 1958), 288. 
9 Woollen, 229. 
10 William Woollen, Biographical and Historical Sketches of Early Indiana (Indinanapolis: 
Hammond & Co., 1883), 223. 
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the Ohio River to his Kentucky farm, where he knew his slaves would still bow to 
his orders. A month later, still stewing, he declared Indiana’s legislators a bunch 
of “miserable dogs” who were a “rotten class of Douglas Democrats & 
Abolitionists.”11 
Of the fourteen senators who were expelled in 1861 and 1862, all were 
from southern slave states or the border slave state of Missouri except for Bright. 
He alone was from a northern free-state, but Sumner and the Republicans knew 
that Bright was a southerner at heart. He had acquired through marriage a 
Kentucky farm with slaves and over the years he had added steadily to the 
number of men and women whom he owned. In the Senate, his closest allies and 
friends were hardline southern senators such as John Slidell (Louisiana), John 
Breckinridge (Kentucky), and Jefferson Davis (Mississippi). Starting with the  
battle over the Wilmot Proviso, Bright had consistently sided with his southern 
Democratic brethren in each of the nation’s great sectional crises. Northern 
Democrats who aligned with or appeased southern interests were known as 
doughfaces, and of all the northern doughface political leaders, no one was as 
pro-Southern and as pro-slavery as Jesse Bright. He was a conditional unionist 
who wanted a union that protected the rights of slave owners in the southern 
states and in newly formed territories if possible. 
Bright had entered Indiana politics in the 1830s and his rise to political 
power coincided with the Democratic triumph over the Whigs in Indiana in the 
1840s. He was crude, ambitious, virulently racist, but also highly intelligent.  The 
 
11 Jesse Bright to William English, January 27, 1863, William English Family Papers, Indiana 
Historical Society. 
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latter quality was usually dressed in a rough sort of way. He was elected to the 
 
U.S. Senate in 1845 and he quickly began using his Senate office to advance his 
personal and his political fortunes. He expertly wielded the patronage that came 
his way to build a loyal base of men and newspapers within Indiana’s Democratic 
Party. By 1853 or 1854, Bright was the acknowledged “boss” of a faction-ridden 
Indiana Democratic Party. His base of power in a key northern border state made 
him an important, if shadowy, figure nationally. In 1856, for instance, he was one 
of four Senate Democrats instrumental in securing the Democratic presidential 
nomination for James Buchanan. 
Bright was a talented political manager, a self-serving opportunist, and a 
key figure of the “plundering generation.”12 He found no shame in padding his 
pockets or bribing fellow politicians. This was part of the political game, and 
better for him to benefit than others. In his early political career, he used his 
brother Michael Bright’s savvy business skills and connections to gain financial 
resources and make money through investments. When Jesse was lieutenant 
governor, he had secured a position for Michael as Agent of the State, which 
enabled him to organize the state’s finances. His brother was also personally 
invested in railroads, a gas company and the state bank. When Indiana 
established a state bank in 1855, Michael, Jesse and their cronies controlled 
about a third of its shares.13 
Additionally, Jesse Bright used his position in the Senate to gain access to 
larger investments. As a member of the Committee on Territories, he had inside 
 
12 Mark Summers, The Plundering Generation: Corruption and the Crisis of the Union 1849-1861 
(New York: Oxford University Press, 1987), xi-xv. 
13 Van Der Weele, 40-41. 
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information on the best land speculations. At the center of many deals was 
Bright’s close friend William Corcoran. The pro-southern New York banker 
regularly provided Bright with initial investments where Bright could use his 
power to make money. Beginning around 1852, Corcoran began his financial 
relationship with Bright by helping him make $35,000 through Texas bond 
speculation. Corcoran also gave Bright a $5,000 front for a Lake Superior land 
speculation deal.14   As the Indianapolis Journal, a Republican paper, remarked in 
1857, “It is generally understood that when J.D. Bright went to the U.S. Senate  
he was poor and about a third rate country lawyer…His friends now represent 
him to be worth about half a million of dollars. We’d like to know how his pockets 
have been lined…”15 
 
Bright was a northern doughface, but his relationships with other 
doughface Democrats were, at best, complicated. Jesse Bright and Stephen 
Douglas were sometimes partners, but more often rivals. They were both young 
and ambitious northwestern senators, yet both were partisan Democrats who 
sometimes engaged in common causes. They worked together to promote 
popular sovereignty, particularly in 1850 and 1854. Douglas eventually aligned 
with Bright’s Indiana rivals, but the two could still collaborate on land 
speculations. Bright, however, undermined Douglas’s quest for the 1856 
presidential nomination. (Although a few months later, he introduced Douglas to 
his second wife.) The bitterness generated by the nomination fight lingered, and 
 
 
14 Henry Cohen, Business and Politics in America from the Age of Jackson to the Civil War: The 
Career Biography of W.W. Corcoran (Westport: Greenwood Publishing, 1971), 136, 163. 
15 Indianapolis Journal, January 26, 1857. 
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Douglas voted against seating Bright in 1857 when Bright’s irregular re-election 
to the Senate was contested. Finally, differences over sectional issues in 1858 
obliterated any kind of working relationship. When Douglas broke with the 
Buchanan administration over the Lecompton Constitution, he was, in Bright’s 
mind, no better than an abolitionist. The two men came to hate one another. 
Bright privately supported Abraham Lincoln over Douglas in 1858, and fought 
Douglas’s campaign to win the Democratic nomination in 1860.16 
 
Bright was closer to James Buchanan, but even this relationship was not 
always as straightforward as it seemed. His alliance with Buchanan was mainly a 
strategic one. Both men sympathized with and aligned with the South. They also 
both distrusted Douglas. Yet, Buchanan also feared that Bright would betray him 
should he find it advantageous to do so.17 
 
When Bright entered the Senate in 1845, American politics was divided 
largely along partisan rather than sectional lines, and the fault lines of these 
partisan battles were shaped largely by differing views on economic policy and 
the role of the federal government in encouraging economic development. 
Generally, Democrats opposed centralized authority. Yet, they were not always 
in agreement about precisely what they opposed. For some it was federal 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
16 Robert Johannsen, Stephen A. Douglas (New York: Oxford University Press, 1973),436, 509- 
510, 540, 649. 
17 Michael Morrison, “President James Buchanan: Executive Leadership and Democracy.” James 
Buchanan and the Coming of the Civil War, eds. John Quist and Michael Birkner (Gainesville: 
University Press of Florida, 2013), 161. 
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meddling in the economy, whether by federal banking, internal improvements, or 
tariffs. Some were leery of centralized money interests.18 
 
John Tyler’s efforts to annex Texas and then James K. Polk’s decision to 
battle Mexico over the Texas boundary and the discovery of gold in California 
shifted the focus of American politics to sectional issues and especially the 
question as to whether new western states would permit slavery. Beginning with 
the debate over the Wilmot Proviso, the Whigs and Democrats increasingly 
divided into sectional wings. Border States such as Indiana mirrored the national 
divisions. In Indiana, Bright built a political base among the state’s southern- 
leaning Democrats who despised anti-slavery agitators. All along, however, he 
faced challenges from the state’s free-soil-leaning Democrats who were led by 
Joseph Wright, Indiana’s governor from 1849 to 1857. The two men detested one 
another, and the two sides fought for years for control of the Indiana Democratic 
Party. In time, Wright and his supporters allied with Stephen Douglas and they 
embraced his proposal to resolve the fate of slavery’s extension by way of 
popular sovereignty. As one Indiana senator loyal to Bright confessed, “[Douglas] 
has, perhaps, more influence among my people than I have myself.”19 Bright 
initially tolerated popular sovereignty, but his was entirely a political 
accommodation. 
 
 
 
 
18 Roy Nichols, The Democratic Machine 1850-1854 (New York: Columbia University, 1923), 13; 
Joel Silbey, Party Over Section: The Rough and Ready Presidential Election of 1848 (Lawrence: 
University Press of Kansas, 2009), 6-8; Joel Silbey, The Partisan Imperative (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1985), 38-39; Jonathan Earle, Jacksonian Antislavery & the Politics of Free Soil, 
1824-1854 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2004), 6-8. 
19 Congressional Globe, 35th Congress, 1st Session, December 22, 1857, 139. 
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Many Indiana Democrats also came to share the fears of northern voters 
about the southern “slave-power.” They feared the corrosive, aristocratic 
influence of southern extremists who demanded that slavery expand to the west. 
These fears intensified with each of the sectional crises—from the debate over 
the Wilmot Proviso to the crisis of 1850 to the battle over the Kansas-Nebraska 
Act to the furor over the Lecompton constitution. And yet after 1850, and 
especially from 1853 to 1857, the slave-owning Bright tightened his hold on 
Indiana politics.20 His influence culminated in 1856-1857 when he first denied 
Stephen Douglas Indiana’s convention votes and then engineered his own re- 
election through a divided state legislature and also the election of a loyal 
subordinate to Indiana’s other Senate seat. And a few months later he happily 
exiled Joseph Wright out of the country by securing him a ministerial position. 
By the mid-1850s, Bright was in control of the Indiana Democracy even 
though he seemed to embody some of the worst features of the slave-power. He 
was corrupt, authoritarian, and ruthless.21 He was a slave-master who demanded 
subservience from one and all. Stephen Douglas, at least until 1857, might 
placate southerners, but Bright fully allied with them. But if Indiana’s Democrats 
favored Douglas and believed in popular sovereignty, and if they feared the 
slave-power, then how and why was Jesse Bright able to gain control of the party 
and, for a time, bend it to his will? This dissertation will explore this question. The 
dissertation is not a formal biography but a study of Bright’s relationship to 
 
 
20 Leonard Richards, The Slave Power: The Free North and Southern Domination, 1780-1860 
(Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 2000), 175. 
21 Mark Summers, The Plundering Generation: Corruption and the Crisis of the Union 1849-1861 
(New York: Oxford University Press, 1987), 203-204. 
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Indiana’s Democratic Party. It aims to examine the nature of politics in a key 
northern border state, to shed some light on the ruptures within the northern 
Democratic Party after 1845, and to help explain how a political figure like Bright 
could ally northern Democrats to southern interests. 
Here I briefly suggest the major reasons for Bright’s ability to command 
the Democratic organization in Indiana. First of all, there was Bright himself. He 
is often labeled a doughface Democrat (a term synonymous with weak-willed 
northerners), but there was nothing weak about him. He was a skilled political 
warrior who kept to the backrooms, where he excelled at winning his way. He 
rarely made public speeches, but he won a loyal following by handing out 
patronage, distributing favors, and aiding his supporters while punishing his 
enemies. Occasionally, he might compromise or tolerate dissent, but more often 
he treated disagreement as disloyalty. It was a crude sort of politics, but it was a 
sort of politics at which Bright was a master. 
 
A second reason was the nature of the Indiana electorate, and especially 
its Democratic voters. Bright lived in Madison, which was in southern Indiana 
near the Ohio River. This region had been settled by southerners from Virginia 
and Kentucky. They may not have cared for slavery, but they were sympathetic 
to the South and they despised antislavery agitators. The northern region of 
Indiana was much different, with a smattering of Quaker communities and its 
Yankee settlers. These Hoosiers were far more conflicted about the morality of 
slavery and far more fearful of the intentions of the slave-power. 
10  
A third factor was the state’s pervasive racism. Bright was a man of 
visceral racial prejudices. He could be amused playing “civilities” with his “niggers 
and dogs” as long as his Kentucky slaves remained slaves.22   Slavery, he 
believed, was a means to maintain control over a people who were perceived as 
racially inferior. Many, perhaps most, Indiana Democrats harbored similar racial 
views. They wanted no interaction with blacks—either slaves or free-blacks—, 
and they detested the idea of racial egalitarianism. Theirs was a white man’s 
democracy—pure and simple. The fear of racial mixing, for much of the 1850s, 
far exceeded their fear of slavery or the slave-power.23 
 
Finally, the nature of American politics in the 1850s was also critical to 
explaining Bright’s commanding position. The very different political calendar of 
the mid-nineteenth century, with elections and conventions almost every year, 
demanded party machinery, which in turn required political professionals. Bright 
was most certainly a professional party man. His version of politics was serious 
business mixed with lucrative rewards. It was a type of politics that demanded 
loyalty and fostered a closed organization. It was also a political system rooted in 
an intense partisanship. This intensely partisan political environment meant that 
however much the rank-and-file might dislike a party leader, they were still likely 
to follow his lead. Bright knew this; he expected it, and he exploited it for years.24 
 
 
 
 
22 Jesse Bright to William Corcoran, May 5, 1857, W.W. Corcoran Papers, Library of Congress. 
23 G.R. Tredway, Democratic Opposition to the Lincoln Administration in Indiana (Indianapolis: 
Indiana Historical Bureau, 1973), 1-5. 
24 Joel Silbey, The Partisan Imperative: The Dynamics of American Politics Before the Civil War 
(New York: Oxford University Press, 1985), 50-68. Joel Silbey, The American Political Nation, 
1838-1893 (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1991), 46-71. 
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By understanding Bright and the Indiana Democratic Party, we can 
appreciate how the South was able to dominate national politics up until the Civil 
War. His efforts to bully newspaper editors, bribe politicians, steamroll his 
opposition, and protect slavery made him a feared, respected, and hated political 
figure. Both his political style and his determined support of the South and of 
slavery, however, reveal an important side of northern border state politics in the 
1840s and 1850s. 
 
One of the difficulties in examining Bright was his secretive nature. While 
he regularly spoke on the Senate floor on procedural and other mundane  
matters, he rarely gave extended remarks shedding light on his views. Also, 
relatively few of his letters have survived. The Lilly Library in Bloomington, 
Indiana contains some copies of his letters from scattered collections, but there is 
no major collection of his papers. Deeply distrustful by nature, Bright went to 
unusual lengths to keep his correspondence from circulating. Many of his letters 
were marked “private” and “confidential,” but sometimes he commanded his 
recipient to “burn this.” Once, at least, but probably more often, he commanded a 
recipient to “remail [the letter] to me” as he was “afraid of letters out.” 
(Fortunately, the recipient complied, but not before making a “literal copy.”)25 The 
best sources for investigating Bright are Indiana’s newspapers. When Bright’s 
machinations came to light, certainly his rivals—Whig/Republican or 
Democratic—were not shy about reporting on them. Additionally, Bright often 
 
 
 
25 Jesse Bright to William English, December 21, 1850, November 21, 1852, William English 
Family Papers, Indiana Historical Society. 
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promoted his positions through the pens of loyal editors, and hence their 
editorials reflect his views. 
 
In historical accounts of American politics in the 1840s and 1850s, Bright 
is rarely a central figure. Sean Wilentz, for instance, ignores him entirely in his 
massive account of the Democratic Party up until the Civil War. Older accounts 
such as Disruption of American Democracy by Roy Nichols pay more attention to 
Bright. But clearly historians who write about northern Democrats have devoted 
more attention to Stephen Douglas, James Buchanan and Lewis Cass. When 
historians focus on Bright, they often emphasize “his career as a bully” and 
“belligerent personality.”26 
 
While Bright is frequently mentioned in general works on Indiana politics, 
there are no published works devoted to his life. Indiana Republicans like George 
Julian and Schuyler Colfax have garnered more attention. When they have 
studied Bright, historians of Indiana politics have tended to portray him in one of 
two ways. One of these first appeared in Logan Esarey’s A History of Indiana 
from 1850 to the Present in 1918. Esarey emphasized the divisions between 
“pro-slavery Democrats” lead by Bright, and the state’s more numerous “anti- 
slavery Democrats.”27 Bright, he emphasized, was very much the leader of the 
state’s pro-southern, pro-slavery Democrats. Some years later Kenneth 
Stampp’s Indiana Politics During the Civil War (1949) seemed to accept this view 
26 William Gienapp, The Origins of the Republican Party, 1852-1856 (New York: Oxford University 
Press, 1987), 107; Roy Nichols, The Disruption of American Democracy (New York: MacMillan 
Co., 1948); Sean Wilentz, The Rise of American Democracy: Jefferson to Lincoln (New York: 
W.W. Norton & Co., 2005). 
27 Logan Esarey, A History of Indiana from 1850 to Present Vol. 2 (Indianapolis: B.F. Bowen, 
1918), 652. 
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by arguing that in 1861 Indiana Democrats had grown tired of their party’s 
“prosouthern” leadership. Elmer Elbert’s “Southern Indiana Politics on the Eve of 
the Civil War: 1858-1861” (1967) argued that Bright’s “southern sympathy was 
notorious.”  Beyond this, Elbert focused more on a conflict of personalities 
struggling for personal political power than providing an ideological context for 
their differences.28 
 
Other Indiana historians portrayed Bright in light of the “blundering 
generation” argument about extremist politics. These scholars glorified moderate 
political leaders, and criticized both pro-slavery and anti-slavery agitators. Two 
older and unpublished works on Bright, Charles’s Murphy’s “Jesse D. Bright” 
(1927), and Wayne Van Der Weele’s “Jesse David Bright: Master Politician from 
the Old Northwest” (1958), were part of this tradition. 29   For these scholars, 
Bright was less a pro-slavery partisan than a compromising hero, who resisted 
the extremist politics of both fire-eating southerners and northern abolitionists. 
Bright’s background, argued Murphy, gave “him an unusually good opportunity to 
face the great national problems” with an “ability to sympathize with, and 
understand the attitude of both sections.”30  In the case of the Lecompton 
controversy, for instance, Murphy accepts Bright’s argument that admitting 
Kansas as a state under the pro-slavery constitution was the quickest way to end 
agitation. 
28 Elmber Elbert, “Southern Indiana Politics on the Eve of the Civil War: 1858-1861,” (Ph.D. diss., 
Indiana University, 1967), 28-29; Kenneth Stampp, Indiana Politics During the Civil War 
(Indianapolis: Indiana Historical Bureau, 1949). 
29 Charles Murphy, “Jesse D. Bright” (M.A. thesis, University of Chicago, 1927); Wayne Van Der 
Weele, “Jesse David Bright: Master Politician from the Old Northwest” (Ph.D. diss., Indiana 
University, 1958). 
30 Murphy, “Jesse D. Bright,” 1. 
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Van Der Weele offered a slightly more nuanced argument. He did not take 
all of Bright’s assertions at face value, but he minimized the divisions between 
Bright and the larger Indiana Democracy. Bright’s pro-slavery views, he 
acknowledged, were at odds with those of most Indiana Democrats, who would 
leave the question of slavery to local communities. Van Der Weele, however, 
portrayed the conflict as a largely personal grudge between Bright and Douglas. 
He also argued that in 1861 and 1862, Bright was a peace Democrat who had 
been “one of the many who [were] treated rather arbitrarily by the general 
government during this period.”31 Emma Lou Thornbrough’s Indiana in the Civil 
War: 1850-1880 (1965) relied heavily on Van Der Weele to understand Bright. 
She did not explore Bright’s battle with the Douglas Democrats over Lecompton. 
Bright was expelled in 1862, she suggested, for no other reason than the manner 
in which he had addressed Jefferson Davis. Her account failed to explain Bright’s 
sympathies for slavery or the Confederacy.32 
 
More recent works focusing on Hoosier politics have downplayed the 
importance of Bright within the Indiana Democratic Party. Richard Nation’s At 
Home in the Hoosier Hills (2005) and Gregory Peek’s “Upland Southerners, 
Indiana Political Culture, and the Coming of the Civil War, 1816-1861” (2010) 
slight the conflict between Bright and his Democratic challengers.33 Both works 
focus on the influence of southern upland culture and the broad political ideology 
31 Van Der Weele, “Jesse David Bright,” 225, 289. 
32 Emma Thornbrough, Indiana in the Civil War: 1850-1880 (Indianapolis: Indiana Historical 
Bureau, 1965), 115-116. 
33 Richard Nation, At Home in the Hoosier Hills: Agriculture, Politics, and Religion in Southern 
Indiana, 1810-1870 (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2005); Gregory Peek, “Upland 
Southerners, Indiana Political Culture, and the Coming of the Civil War, 1816-1861,” (Ph.D. diss., 
University of Houston, 2010). 
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of localism on Indiana’s Democratic Party. In emphasizing the importance of 
common cultural and ideological values, these works tend to minimize the 
divisions over sectional issues among Indiana Democrats, and instead, 
emphasize the conflict between Whig/Republicans and Democrats. Bright plays 
only a relatively minor role in the narratives. 
 
Scholars who have dealt with sectional politics, and the Democratic Party 
in general, have also mentioned Bright in their accounts. Some of these earlier 
works also insisted that a “blundering generation” of politicians chose political 
calculation over statesmanship. Roy Nichols’s The Democratic Machine, 1850- 
1854 (1923) and The Disruption of American Democracy (1948) represented this 
view when he juxtaposed moderate conservative leaders of the Democratic Party 
with radicals on both sides. He argued that the Democratic Party in the 1850s 
consisted of three factions: radical southerners like John C. Calhoun who wished 
to expand slavery, free soilers like Martin Van Buren who wished to contain 
slavery, and conservatives like Stephen Douglas who desired an end to agitation 
over slavery. The vast majority of Democrats, from both sections, he argued, 
were conservatives who loved the union. According to Nichols, James Buchanan 
and Stephen Douglas were both conservatives, and he probably saw Bright as 
one as well. Nichols argued that Bright’s willingness to work with southerners 
earned him enmity from northern “agitators.”34 His works suggests that the 
differences that eventually developed between the Buchanan and Douglas 
factions over Lecompton were merely political calculations by Douglas to 
 
34 Roy Nichols, The Disruption of American Democracy, 5. 
16  
maintain power.35   Stampp’s later work, America in 1857 A Nation on the Brink 
(1990), explicitly described Bright as an “ardent Southerner.” He juxtaposed 
Bright as a “pro-southern party boss” in his rivalry with the anti-slavery 
expansionist Governor Joseph Wright.36 
 
More recent works of the national Democratic Party have not appreciated 
the depth of the divisions in states such as Indiana. Joel Silbey’s The Partisan 
Imperative (1985) argued there was broad agreement among Democrats. While 
some northern Democrats occasionally engaged in “tactical” “rhetorical 
flourishes” against slavery, “mainstream Democrats” were less concerned about 
the slave-power than they were with anti-slavery Republicans.37 Northern dough- 
faced Democrats play a significant role in Leonard Richards’s The Slave Power: 
The Free North and Southern Domination 1780-1860 (2000), but Bright plays 
only a small part. Richard’s repeatedly endorses Lincoln’s view that Stephen 
Douglas was “the worst doughface of them all.”38 But certainly Bright ought to be 
a larger contender for that title. 
 
Others have emphasized divisions among the northern Democrats. 
Jonathan Earle, in Jacksonian Antislavery and the Politics of Freesoil (2004), 
suggested that antislavery Jacksonians were a significant faction among northern 
Democrats. But he pits these Democrats against the broad northern conservative 
Democrats, without distinguishing conservative Democrats like Douglas from 
 
35 Nichols, Democratic Machine, 17-18; Nichols, Disruption of American Democracy, 173-174. 
36 Kenneth Stampp, Indiana Politics, 16; Kenneth Stampp, America in 1857: A Nation on the Brink 
(New York: Oxford University Press, 1990), 47, 51. 
37 Silbey, The Partisan Imperative, 113. 
38 Richards, The Slave Power, 109, 175. 
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more ultra-northern dough-faced Democrats like Buchanan and Bright.39 
Additionally, Earle gives practically no attention to the Hoosier Democratic Party. 
Sean Wilentz’s The Rise of American Democracy (2005) divides the Democratic 
Party into even broader camps. On one side was the “southern democracy” that 
“enshrined slavery as the basis for white man’s political equality.” On the other 
were the “northern democrats” who saw “slavery as a moral abomination that 
denied the basic humanity of blacks.”40 Both John C. Calhoun and Martin Van 
Buren play central roles representing these respective factions. Conservative 
northerners such as Stephen Douglas, who had little regard for moral questions 
over slavery, play a small and perfunctory role within the story, and Jesse Bright 
is not to be found anywhere in the massive tome. 
 
One of the more recent works dealing with the Democratic Party 
unsuccessfully attempts to place Bright within the broader Democratic Party. 
Yonatan Eyal’s The Young American Movement and the Transformation of the 
Democratic Party identifies Bright as a member of the “New Democrat” 
movement. He argues that these were “progressive and forward-looking” 
Democrats who believed in “a more activist federal state” to facilitate “economic 
growth and…social reform.” His purpose was to dispel “the recurrent stereotype 
of Democrats as racists…” 41 Specifically, he argued that Bright was a 
progressive who sought “to bring order and transparency to civil 
 
 
39 Earle, 6-8. 
40 Sean Wilentz, The Rise of American Democracy: Jefferson to Lincoln (New York: W.W. Norton 
& Co., 2005), 791. 
41 Yonatan Eyal, The Young America Movement and the Tranformation of the Democratic Party, 
1828-1861 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 12-13. 
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administration.”42 Eyal is correct to suggest Bright was no advocate of laissez 
faire economics, but nor was he a reformer. Bright, in fact, ruthlessly used the 
patronage system to reward friends and punish enemies. 
 
*  *  *  * *  *  *  *  *  *  *  * *  *  *  *  *  * *  *  *  *  *  * 
 
 
 
The basic organization of this dissertation will be chronological. Chapter 
one will look at the early history of Indiana as well as the career of Jesse Bright 
up to 1845. It will examine how the state developed its racial and sectional 
outlook, and describe the Democratic Party’s rise to political dominance in 
Indiana in the 1840s. It will also examine Jesse Bright’s early life, his start in 
Indiana politics, and his rise to political prominence. 
 
Chapter two will look at how the debate over slavery and territorial 
expansion in the 1840s began to strain and divide the party system. One 
important development was the emergence of the Free Soil Party in 1848 and 
 
 
42 Eyal, 179-182. Eyal uses three examples to promote Bright as a civil service reformer. He  
notes that in 1850 Bright sought to place term limits upon assistant post-masters suggesting, 
strangely, that “term limits would reduce their political nature and make them more authoritative.” 
Secondly, Bright fought the Pierce administration and sought to require the assistant secretary of 
the Treasury, in 1853, be confirmed by the Senate. Finally, Bright attacked the Millard Fillmore 
administration for removing the territorial governor of Oregon “without cause.” Eyal concedes that 
“critics could easily ascribe Bright’s stance to his own partisanship,” but that “his action cast a 
different light when contextualized within the broader array of civil service reforms championed by 
New Democracy.” In fact, Bright’s actions should be contextualized through the prism of 
partisanship, ideology and cronyism. With the first example, certainly Bright wished to place limits 
on the appointments of a Whig administration, and requiring term limits would allow for more, and 
not less, opportunity for political spoils. With regard to the assistant secretary of the Treasury, this 
was during a Democratic administration. As this dissertation will later show, however, this was in 
the context of Bright joining hard-line southerners to oppose free-soil Democrats appointed by the 
Pierce administration. Finally, Eyal fails to note that the territorial governor of Oregon was Joseph 
Lane. Lane was a pro-southern Democrat originally from Kentucky and Indiana. Bright was close 
political friends with Lane, and loyally backed him in his bid for the presidency in 1852. His 
interest in Lane had nothing to do with civil service reform. This dissertation will show that far  
from being “progressive” on social service reform, or indeed even pretending to be such, Bright 
masterfully, and ruthlessly, used the spoils system to enhance his political power. 
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1849. Fearing defections, some Indiana Democrats embraced the free soil 
position. Bright deferred to political realities at this time to ensure that both he 
and his party could cultivate power. 
 
Chapter three examines Bright’s involvement in crafting the Compromise 
of 1850, and his efforts to commit the Indiana Democratic Party to the 
agreement. He insisted that the party support the controversial Fugitive Slave 
Act, and he set out to steamroll Democrats who opposed this provision. This 
chapter will also examine Indiana’s constitutional convention and ratification of a 
new constitution in 1850-1851. Racial issues were a crucial part of the 
convention debate. Paradoxically, the debates over excluding the immigration of 
blacks would both temper free soil politics, and strengthen resistance to the 
encroachment of slavery. In other words, Hoosiers saw exclusion from the state 
and from the western territories as a means of maintaining racial control without 
accepting slavery. 
 
Chapter four will focus on how Indiana’s Democratic Party achieved a 
dominant position as the state’s Whig Party disintegrated. As it gained power, 
however, factional divisions threatened to tear it apart. Bright fought with popular 
Democratic Governor Joseph Wright and for a time it seemed as if Wright might 
undermine his powerful position. This changed with the battle over the Kansas 
Nebraska Act. Anti-slavery-extension Democrats bolted from the party, which 
helped Bright to consolidate his control over it. Still, his position remained 
tenuous as his party sustained heavy losses during the 1854 congressional 
elections. 
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Chapter five will show how a divided opposition allowed Indiana 
Democrats to recover from the disaster of 1854. Democrats used racial prejudice 
to drive a wedge between their opponents and bring moderate Democrats back 
into the fold. Because many anti-slavery-extension Democratic leaders had left 
the party, Jesse Bright was able to work with a more conservative Democratic 
Party to build a base of support within the state. The chapter will also examine 
Bright’s role in nominating James Buchanan over Stephen Douglas for the 
presidency in 1856. 
 
Chapter six will look at how the debate over the Lecompton Constitution 
set into motion Bright’s fall from political power. Most Indiana Democrats had 
supported Stephen Douglas and popular sovereignty, and rejected James 
Buchanan’s policy to force a pro-slavery constitution on Kansas. Bright however, 
kept control of the party machine through the 1858 congressional races. Though 
a core group of anti-Lecompton Democrats remained opposed, Bright appealed 
to party loyalty to retain power. Most Indiana Democrats reluctantly returned to 
the fold. 
 
Chapter seven will focus on the ouster of Bright from party leadership. 
Douglas Democrats were able to use their vast numerical superiority to gain 
control of the party apparatus. With the national Democratic Party split, Bright 
embraced an alliance with his long time political friends John C. Breckinridge and 
Joseph Lane to support the southern Democratic ticket. Republicans were then 
able to consolidate support and win enough Democratic votes to sweep the 
statewide offices and carry the state for Lincoln. They did this by embracing a 
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moderate anti-slavery message built on fears of an encroaching despotic slave 
power. Indiana’s experience with Jesse Bright played no small part in this 
perception. 
 
Finally, this dissertation will provide a brief epilogue resolving how Bright’s 
pro-southern ideological commitments led to his expulsion from the United States 
Senate. It will also provide a brief overview of his subsequent career. 
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When clouds are seen, wise men put on cloaks; 
When great leaves fall, then winter is at hand; 
When the sun sets, who doth not look for night? 
Untimely storms make men expect a dearth. 
All may be well; but if God sorts it so, 
’Tis more than we deserve or I expect 
-Richard III Act 2, Scene 3 
 
 
 
Chapter 1 
 
 
 
Jesse Bright and Indiana Politics: 1812-1845 
 
 
 
When Indiana was admitted to the union as a state in 1816, it was part of 
the rapidly growing American West. From 1810 to 1820, the region’s population 
jumped from 25,000 to nearly 150,000, and it continued to grow in the years 
ahead. Much of Indiana’s early settlement was centered in the southern portion 
of the state along the Ohio River. Many of these settlers had arrived after having 
first settled in Kentucky and moved across the Ohio River. One famous example, 
of course, was that of Thomas and Nancy Lincoln, parents of the future 16th 
president, who left Kentucky for Indiana in 1816. A few years later in 1820, David 
Bright moved his family from northern Kentucky to Madison, Indiana, a small 
town that was situated on the river about halfway between Louisville and 
Cincinnati. Madison served as the county seat for Jefferson County, which in 
1820 had a population of about 8,000. 
 
As did other western states, Indiana faced the challenge of establishing 
systems of transportation and banking to boost its developing economy. What 
role the state and federal government should assume in developing these 
systems divided Indiana’s Whig and Democratic parties. The state also 
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contended with the question of slavery and race. Some of the settlers who had 
left Kentucky were eager to live in a state free of the institution of slavery. 
Thomas Lincoln was one such example, but other Indiana settlers had no qualms 
about slavery. What was clear, however, is that the white settlers and citizens of 
Indiana—and southern Indiana in particular—held to a deeply embedded racism. 
They wanted a state settled by white men and women and only white men and 
women. Understanding this racial context is important for understanding the 
career of Jesse Bright and the fate of Indiana’s Democratic Party in the 1840s 
and 1850s. 
 
*  *  *  * *  *  *  *  *  *  *  * *  *  *  *  *  * *  *  *  *  *  * 
 
 
 
Well before Indiana was admitted to the union as a state in 1816, its 
citizens had debated whether to accept or reject slavery, and whether to include 
or exclude blacks from settling. The region that became the state of Indiana had 
been part of the Northwest Territory. The Northwest Ordinance of 1787 had 
barred slavery in the region, but the territory’s settlers contested the prohibition. 
A few had arrived from southern states with slaves and with southern views on 
slavery. These pro-slavery settlers, who lived largely just north of the Ohio River, 
petitioned Congress to remove the ordinance’s anti-slavery provisions. Making 
slave property illegal, they argued, was a violation of the principle of ex post 
facto. Congress was acting “contrary to an express fundamental principle in all 
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free countries.”1 Later, in 1806, both houses of the territorial legislature petitioned 
Congress for repeal of the provision for ten years.2 
 
The legislature also sought to circumvent the prohibition. In 1803 it 
adopted Virginia’s legal codes, which included a provision stating, “All negroes 
and mulattoes…under contract to serve another…shall be compelled to perform 
such contract.” These codes stipulated that “any such servant being lazy, 
disorderly, guilty of misbehavior to his master or his masters family shall be 
corrected by stripes…” Two years later the legislature passed a new series of 
laws that included provisions for indentured servitude. These laws allowed a 
black bondsman to either agree to a certain period of servitude, or in cases 
where there was no consent, allowed the owner sixty days to remove the 
bondsman from the territory.3 Over the next few years, more such laws created a 
state of virtual slavery.4 
 
The campaign to lift the ban on slavery eventually fizzled. By 1809, when 
Congress created the Indiana and Illinois territories, the Indiana territory had 
been settled by easterners and Kentucky immigrants, and many of these settlers 
now hoped to avoid competition with slavery.5 Those early settlers who moved 
across the Ohio River did so for many reasons, but a desire to be free of slavery 
 
1 Slavery Petitions and Papers, ed. Jacob Dunn (Indianapolis: The Bowen-Merrill Company, 
1894), 5. 
2 Annals of Congress, January 20, 1807, 9th Congress, 2nd Session, 375-376. 
3 The Laws of Indiana Territory, 1801-1809. ed. Francis Philbrick (Springfield: Illinois State 
Historical Society, 1930), 136-138. 
4 Laws of Indiana Territory, 1809-1816. eds. Louis Ewbank and Dorothy Riker. (Indianapolis: 
Indiana Historical Bureau, 1934), 21. 
5Richard Nation, At Home in the Hoosier Hills (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2005), 187; 
Philip Schwarz, Migrants Against Slavery: Virginians and the Nation (Charlottesville: University of 
Virginia Press, 2001), 3; David Donald, Lincoln (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1995), 24. 
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was one powerful factor. In the case of Abraham Lincoln’s family, their Baptist 
congregation in Kentucky had divided over slavery, with the Lincolns joining the 
anti-slavery faction. This, and conflicts over land titles, prodded the family to  
move into southern Indiana.6 Wealthy planters in Kentucky had driven up land 
prices, which made settlement for poor whites difficult. As one migrant noted, “My 
daughters would soon be grown up. I did not see any probable means by which I 
could settle them around near us.” Beyond economic motives, the same settler 
cited his own free labor attitudes fearing “they might marry into slave families” as 
“there was a marked distinction made…between young people raised without 
work and those that had to work for their living.”7 
 
By 1810 the Indiana territory had begun to repeal most of its laws relating 
to indentured servitude.8 When Indiana achieved statehood in 1816, most 
Hoosiers wanted to enter the union as a free state. In fact, Indiana’s first 
constitution explicitly stated that since slavery “can only originate in usurpation 
and tyranny, no alteration of this constitution shall ever take place so as to 
introduce slavery or involuntary servitude in this State.”9 The white men and 
women who settled Indiana, especially southern Indiana, opposed the 
introduction of slavery. They did so, in part, because many were virulent racists 
who wanted to live in a state free of both slavery and free of blacks. 
 
 
 
6 Donald, Lincoln, 23-24. 
7 Autobiography of Peter Cartwright, ed. W.P. Strickland (New York: Carlton & Porter, 1857), 244; 
John Barnhart, “Sources of Southern Migration into the Old Northwest” Mississippi Valley 
Historical Review 22 (June, 1935), 49-62. 
8 Laws of Indiana Territory, 1809-1816, 22. 
9 Indiana Historical Bureau, “Constitution of 1816.” State of Indiana, 
http://www.in.gov/history/2875.htm (accessed November 3, 2012) 
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Throughout the state’s early years, Indiana remained predominantly white. 
Logan Esarey noted that the “predominating strain in this population is the 
English Scotch and Irish peasantry.”10 In each of the censuses from 1820 to 
1860, blacks comprised only about one percent of the population. In 1820, 190 
slaves resided in Indiana, but by 1830 the number had fallen to three and by 
1850 no slaves were listed in the census. Indiana discouraged blacks from 
settling in the state by curtailing their civil and political rights. The state’s first 
constitution allowed only white male citizens of age to vote and serve in the 
militia, and it reaffirmed this in the 1824, 1831, 1838, and 1851.11   An 1831 law 
limited blacks to testifying in court cases in which “negroes, mulattoes or Indians 
alone are parties.” It defined “mulatto” as “Every person” who had “one fourth 
part of more of negro blood, or any one of whose grandfathers or grandmothers 
shall have been a negro.”12 In 1853, the legislature voted to exclude testimony 
from persons “having one-eighth or more negro blood” in cases where a “white 
person” was “a party in interest.”13 
 
One of the persistent fears of white Indianans was “amalgamation.” Most 
whites believed that blacks were biologically inferior and hence intermixing would 
degrade the white population.14 These fears sometimes initiated ugly acts. In 
1840, for instance, John Wilson, a former slave living in Indiana, had married a 
 
 
10 Esarey, A History of Indiana, 418. 
11 The Revised Laws of Indiana, Adopted and Enacted by the General Assembly at their Eighth 
Session (Corydon: Carpenter and Douglass, 1824), 46; The Revised Laws of Indiana, 1831, 50; 
The Revised Statutes of the State, 1838, 
12 The Revised Laws of Indiana (Indianapolis: Douglas and Maguire, 1831, 407. 
13 The Statutes of the State of Indiana (Indianapolis: J.J. Bingham, 1870), 166. 
14 George Fredrickson, The Black Image in the White Mind (Hanover, NH: Wesleyan University 
Press, 1971), 321. 
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white woman. When this was discovered, a mob surrounded their home. Wilson 
barely escaped, but his bride, Sophia Speers was paraded through the streets 
and dragged over rails. She signed a petition for divorce, which the legislature 
quickly granted. The couple, to the astonishment of most white Hoosiers, had not 
violated any laws. They had, however, violated stringent social conventions. 
Even the abolitionists who courageously rescued Wilson seemed to accept these 
conventions. In tolerating the situation, Levi Coffin argued that the “mulatto 
man…was really almost white and possessed none of the negro features…” 
Coffin asserted that Wilson was “several shades lighter than” many within the 
mob who had hounded him.15 
 
The fear of miscegenation spurred legislation to prohibit interracial 
marriages. One Indiana state senator conjectured that this oversight likely owed 
to the legislature supposing “that no circumstances could arise to make 
legislation” necessary. Most of Indiana’s white citizens had assumed “that this 
subject was sufficiently controlled and regulated by public opinion.”16 Shortly after 
the Wilson incident, a bill “to prohibit the amalgamation of whites and blacks” was 
enacted, and it was reaffirmed in 1852.17   When the law was challenged, the 
State Supreme Court ruled: “Personally considered, such a marriage would be a 
mere matter of taste; but the state deems the product of such marriages…an 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
15 Levi Coffin, Reminisces of Levi Coffin (Cincinnati: Western Tract Society, 1876), 155-160. 
16 Journal of the Senate of the State of Indianan, Indianapolis: Douglass and Noel, 1839), 261. 
17 The Revised Statutes of the State of Indiana, 1:361. 
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undesirable class of persons, and will yield no clamor in favor of unalienable 
rights which shall override the public good.”18 
 
Indiana’s white citizens also sought to keep blacks from entering the state. 
Early legislation required black immigrants to post a $500 bond. Those who did 
not comply were to be hired out for six months with proceeds going to the local 
county “for the use of such negro or mulatto” as “directed by the overseers of the 
poor.” Few blacks, of course, could afford the bond. The law seems to have been 
enforced only when there was a desire to exert racial control.19 Its 
constitutionality was challenged on the grounds that it violated the United States 
Constitution’s provision that “citizens of each state shall be entitled to all 
privileges and immunities of citizens in the several states.” The Indiana State 
Supreme Court, however, ruled that it could not overturn a statute “unless its 
unconstitutionality” was “so obvious as to admit no doubt.”20   In 1851, Indiana’s 
constitutional convention sought to outlaw the further settlement of all blacks into 
the state. When this provision was submitted for ratification, 86 percent of 
Indiana voters favored it. 
 
White racial attitudes became harsher over time. A black family in  
southern Indiana noted that in the early 1820s they “had been well received and 
well treated.” Yet by the early 1830s, as the abolitionist movement attracted more 
support, blacks were “met with so much scorn and disdain” by their white 
 
18 Judicial Cases Concerning American Slavery and the Negro, ed. Helen Tunnicliff Catterall 
(Washington D.C.: Carnegie Institution of Washington, 1937), 39. 
19 The Revised Laws of Indiana (Indianapolis: Douglas and Maguire, 1831), 375-376. 
20 Quoted in Emma Thornbrough, The Negro in Indiana: A Study of a Minority. (Indianapolis: 
Indiana Historical Society, 1957), 59. 
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neighbors who were constantly inducing them to colonize to Liberia, less they 
should “increase so much faster than” the whites and “eat” them “out soon.”21 In 
time, blacks who settled in the state chose to live in or near the state’s Quaker 
settlements. In these communities, recently freed slaves often found men and 
women willing to offer charitable assistance.22 
 
Eventually, the state developed a regional division over race and slavery. 
In southern Indiana, racial attitudes hardened but the northeastern settlers who 
dominated the northern portion of the state tended to be milder in their racial 
views.  These Yankee settlers began arriving in large numbers in the 1830s and 
1840s. One Indiana politician noted the regional divide when he observed that in 
northern Indiana the “enterprising Yankee” held “patriotic sentiments” about the 
universality of liberty which those in the southern portion of the state equated  
with fanaticism and foolishness.23 This may have overstated the divisions. Few in 
the north were racial egalitarians. Most white Hoosiers wanted Indiana free of 
both slavery and blacks. 
 
By the 1840s colonization to Liberia had become a popular cause in 
Indiana. Yet, it was not until the state constitutional convention in 1850-1851 that 
Indiana seriously sought to encourage it as an official policy. The state’s 
exclusion article included a provision whereby the fines generated by the law 
would go into a fund that would promote colonization. Indeed, Governor Joseph 
 
21 Edward Adby, A Journal of a Residence and Tour of the United States of North America 3 
Volumes, (London: John Murray, 1835), 2:366. 
22 Thornbrough, The Negro in Indiana, 31-54. 
23 Godlove Orth to Schuyler Colfax, August 16, 1845, in Schauinger “The Letters of Godlove Orth: 
Hoosier Whig,” 367. 
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Wright became a vocal champion of the cause, and couched his advocacy in the 
typical mixture of prejudice and benevolence. In 1853, Indiana created a state 
board of colonization. The state thus became directly involved in the 
management—including authorizations to purchase of land in Liberia—of 
colonization. From 1853 to 1854, only 47 black Hoosiers immigrated to Liberia. 
Afterwards, the state had difficulty finding blacks willing to emigrate, and when 
they did, the state had trouble providing money for the endeavor.24 
 
*  *  *  * *  *  *  *  *  *  *  * *  *  *  *  *  * *  *  *  *  *  * 
 
 
 
Jesse Bright’s family settled in southern Indiana in 1820 when Jesse was 
seven-years-old. Born in upstate New York on December 18, 1812, he was the 
son of David Bright, a Virginian who had moved to New York.  David Bright was 
politically active and he had close friendships with Governor Dewitt Clinton and 
Thurlow Weed, which helped him secure various local appointments.25 According 
to family lore, David also provided the funds that allowed Thurlow Weed, the 
future Whig and Republican boss, to establish his first newspaper.26 The two 
men became close friends, and Weed later wrote: “I passed many leisure hours 
pleasantly with Mr. Bright, who had seen a good deal of life, and was an 
intelligent, close observer of men and things.”27   These long hours of 
conversations between David Bright and Weed, one of the nation’s foremost 
 
 
24 Eugene H. Berwager, The Frontier Against Slavery: Western Anti-Negro Prejudice and the 
Slavery Extension Controversy (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1967), 55-58. 
25 Wayne Van Der Weele, “Jesse David Bright: Master Politician from the Old Northwest” (Ph.D. 
diss., Indiana University, 1958), 1; Charles Murphy, “Jesse D. Bright” (Ph.D. diss., University of 
Chicago, 1927), 1. 
26 Murphy, “Jesse D. Bright,” 1. 
27 Autobiography of Thurlow Weed (Boston: Houghton, Mifflin and Co., 1884), 79. 
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political organizers, suggest that the family had a strong background in 
understanding the art of politics. 
 
In his youth Jesse Bright was exposed to both ambition and slaveholding 
culture. In 1819, when he was six, his family moved to Kentucky and lived there a 
year before moving across the Ohio River to Madison. His father worked as a hat 
maker, but he also secured political appointments and had various investments 
that may have included land in Kentucky.28 Jesse’s boyhood friendship with 
Norvin Green, a young entrepreneur and future president of Western Union 
Telegraph, would suggest that Bright’s earliest inclinations were to associate with 
those who were talented and ambitious.29   As a young man, Bright studied law 
and was admitted to the bar in 1833. He soon secured a position as a junior law 
partner to United States Senator and former governor William Hendricks. 
 
In 1835, Bright married Mary Turpin of Kentucky. She came from “a rather 
distinguished family” with slave holdings in Gallatin County. A biographer has 
indicated that Bright likely met his bride while managing property owned by his 
father in Kentucky. In marrying Turpin, Bright acquired 448 acres of land and five 
slaves. Over many years Bright would come to own twenty-one slaves.30 
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Bright’s passion was not the law but politics. Unlike his father and his 
senior law partner, who were both Whigs, Jesse was a devoted Democrat.31 
Bright’s decision to join the Democratic Party is curious. While the Whigs tended 
to represent capital investment, banking and internal improvements, Democrats 
largely eschewed the centralized use of the government to support these 
activities. They desired a limited government, opposed federal internal 
improvement projects, and distrusted the money interests. Bright was an unlikely 
Democrat in many of these respects. Yet in the age of Jackson, many young 
men saw the Democratic Party as a stronger vehicle to pursue personal 
ambitions. Additionally, a new faction emerged within the party to challenge the 
Jacksonian orthodoxy of laissez-faire and simple agrarian economic policies. A 
large number of Democrats, notably Bright and Stephen Douglas, were born 
around the War of 1812 and came to embrace the market revolution and the role 
of the federal government in helping to promote commercial development.32 By 
1853, Bright was closely associated with William Corcoran, a powerful New York 
banker who helped Bright make handsome profits from different financial 
schemes. Indeed, Bright’s daughter eventually married the brother of George 
Riggs, Corcoran’s banking partner. He was also a strong supporter of federally 
financed internal improvement projects for his home state. Bright’s signature 
even once found its way onto a petition calling for the renewal of the United 
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States national bank charter, which was anathema to most Democrats.33 Beyond 
sectional questions, another issue that would fuel the rivalry between Bright and 
Joseph Wright would be the state bank. Wright represented the simple agrarian 
wing of the party that opposed state banking, while Bright battled for it.34 
 
During the 1830s, the Whigs dominated Indiana politics. Indiana was an 
underdeveloped frontier state, and Whig policies seemed to promise economic 
growth. Settlers from Virginia, Kentucky and the Carolinas moved into the river 
regions of southern Indiana. The early economy almost exclusively revolved 
around agriculture. Surplus agricultural goods were transported down the Ohio 
and Mississippi River. The bulk of these goods came in the form of corn, pork 
and other livestock. Hoosiers needed reliable roads, river improvements—and 
eventually canals and railroads—to promote further settlement and economic 
opportunities.35 Whigs were especially popular in Bright’s hometown of Madison. 
With the town’s Democrats in the minority and disorganized, Bright quickly 
established himself as their local leader. Yet he remained personally popular with 
local Whigs, and was elected probate judge in 1834.36 
 
Internal improvements played a key role in reelecting the Whig incumbent 
governor Noah Noble in 1834. Whig fortunes continued to rise as Indiana voters 
gave their enthusiastic support to William Henry Harrison, the hero of 
Tippecanoe, in both the 1836 and 1840 presidential elections. During the 1836 
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election, Whigs also gained decisive majorities in both houses of the Indiana 
legislature. Bright’s personal ties to Hendricks served him well as the Whig 
senator recommended his junior partner for the post of United States marshal to 
the Democratic administration of Martin Van Buren. Bright, Hendricks wrote, was 
“in every respect well qualified and would in my opinion make an excellent officer 
and one acceptable to the people.”37 
 
Bright used this appointment as marshal to travel the state making political 
contacts. Unfortunately for the ambitious lawyer, Martin Van Buren lost his bid for 
reelection to William Harrison, which meant that Bright lost his federal 
appointment when the Whigs took over in 1841. But as would often characterize 
Bright’s political life, good timing, luck, and his own skills advanced his career. 
The Whigs in Madison had nominated Williamson Dunn for a state senate seat, 
but divisions among the Whigs over Sunday mail delivery caused some of the 
less religious and more business-minded Whigs to support Shadrach Wilber as 
an independent candidate. With the Whigs divided, Bright organized his partisans 
and won the seat.38 
 
When Bright arrived in Indianapolis, the state Democratic Party was in 
turmoil. The Democrats had largely been swept from power as a result of 
Harrison’s 1840 “hard cider” campaign and the appeal of Whig proposals for 
internal improvements and economic development. But Whig success depended 
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on a stable economy, and when the panic of 1837 struck, the Whigs faced 
political disaster.39 Democrats seized on mismanagement and massive state 
debt and near bankruptcy to take power. Bright quickly threw himself into the mix 
and was a crucial figure in rebuilding his party. During this time, political parties 
required strong organizing talent. As Joel Silbey has noted, “The fragmented 
calendar…ensured that Americans were caught up in semi-permanent and 
unstinting partisan warfare somewhere throughout the year.” As such, parties 
desperately needed “increasingly elaborate organizational structures to manage 
their affairs and to mobilize voters and legislators and instruct them in their 
partisan duty.”40 Bright proved especially adept at this process. His efforts were 
rewarded in 1843 when he was selected as a nominee for lieutenant governor 
along with gubernatorial candidate James Whitcomb (D). 
 
In the campaign, Whitcomb and Bright charged the Whigs with corruption 
and fiscal irresponsibility. Democrats ran on a platform strongly condemning the 
national bank as a “Bankrupt Law,” and supported tariffs for revenue purposes 
only.41 With the economy struggling, Whitcomb and Bright were elected.42 
Bright’s position as lieutenant governor gave him new opportunities. The state 
senate was divided equally between Whigs and Democrats, which meant that 
Bright would cast tie-breaking votes. No less important, Bright proved to be a 
loyal and industrious party operative. He helped finance the printing of campaign 
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materials and knew how to draw upon the strengths of others to organize political 
mobilization efforts. During this era, campaigns needed structure and “close-knit, 
partisan networks.” They needed men at the precinct level who could ensure that 
fellow party members got to the polls. Bright was an expert at making sure the 
system worked smoothly.43 
 
*  *  *  * *  *  *  *  *  *  *  * *  *  *  *  *  * *  *  *  *  *  * 
 
 
 
The triumph of Whitcomb and Bright in Indiana’s 1843 gubernatorial 
election came at a time when nationally the Democratic Party was struggling and 
torn by divisions. The collapse of the economy in 1837 and Martin Van Buren’s 
defeat to William Henry Harrison in 1840 had undermined the party’s dynamic 
strength derived from the Jacksonian presidency. The old issues of tariffs and 
national banking had grown old and stale. Issues of western expansion, 
especially Texas annexation, now generated new excitement. But it exacerbated 
divisions.44 
 
When Texas declared itself an independent republic in 1837, many 
Americans wanted it to become part of the United States. Andrew Jackson and 
Martin Van Buren, however, realized that southern territorial expansion might 
reopen sectional divisions, especially in light of the growing anti-slavery 
sentiment in the North. Harrison, a loyal Whig, was committed to internal 
improvements and had little interest in expansion. When Harrison died shortly 
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into his term, Vice President John Tyler (Virginia), a nominal Whig, assumed the 
presidency. Tyler abandoned Whig orthodoxy, and soon alienated most of the 
party. This was especially the case when he pursued territorial expansion and, 
specifically Texas annexation.  Tyler was a devout nationalist who passionately 
embraced “manifest destiny.” He was also a southerner who felt little discomfort 
about the expansion of slavery. And he was closely allied with John C. Calhoun, 
who became his Secretary of State in 1844. Fearful that Great Britain might 
acquire Texas and promote abolitionism, Calhoun, as the South’s leading 
advocate of slavery, committed the Tyler administration to acquiring Texas and 
promoting slavery’s western expansion.45 
 
Tyler hoped to use the Texas issue to build a coalition—either of 
Democrats or a third party—to gain another presidential term. Southern 
Democrats quickly embraced Texas annexation, but in the northeast, especially 
once Calhoun linked Texas to slavery, it created bitter opposition. New York’s 
Martin Van Buren had long battled Calhoun and he had grown weary of pro- 
slavery expansionists. He declared his opposition to acquiring Texas as a slave 
state. The fissures that would eventually destroy the American party system were 
just beginning to emerge.46 
 
Western Democrats were just as devoutly committed to expansion as 
were southern Democrats.  They feared that an isolated Texas might succumb to 
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British influence.47 Expansion in Oregon, meanwhile, offered settlers new 
economic and social opportunities. The idea of the west as a source of 
opportunity resonated with voters in western states like Indiana. For the most 
part, the western Democrats assumed that region would remain free of slavery.48 
Though they placed greater emphasis on Oregon than Texas, they wanted to 
acquire both. Indiana Democrats were among the region’s most committed 
expansionists, leading the Oregon fight were Indiana Democrats such as Edward 
Hannegan. Hannegan believed that the Oregon territory, from 42 degrees 
latitude up through 54º 40”, “indisputably” belonged to the United States, and he 
was prepared to battle Britain for it. If “war must come, let it come; it will not find 
us unprepared.”  This was more than “a question of dollars and cents” but “a 
question of national honor or national shame.”49 
 
As territorial questions re-opened sectional debate, the Democratic Party 
worked to unify itself for the 1844 presidential election. It could not alienate its 
southern wing, but it also had to rally northern Democrats. While some northern 
Democrats, particularly those allied with Van Buren, opposed Texas annexation, 
western and southern Democrats favored annexation. To these wings of the 
party, Martin Van Buren was a problematic candidate, despite his popularity with 
northern Democrats.50 Western Democrats, including Bright and most of the 
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Hoosier Democracy, supported instead the pro-expansionist candidacy of Lewis 
Cass (D) the senator from Michigan. Cass not only favored expansion but he was 
friendly to commercial interests.51 
As lieutenant governor from 1843 to 1845, Bright emerged as both a state 
and national political organizer by the 1844 convention. Silas Wright, a New York 
supporter of Van Buren and a respected figure in the party, observed of Bright 
that his political talents for “mischief” made him an attractive leader for the Cass 
campaign. In fact, the Cass men wanted Bright to be made chairman of the 
Democrat’s national Baltimore Convention. Instead, he was named a member of 
the rules committee.52 In Wright’s view, Bright was the leader of “the ‘madmen’ 
from Indiana” who were “loud” and “impassioned” for Cass.53 Wright’s comments 
may have been inspired by Bright’s willingness to work with southern Democrats 
to thwart Van Buren’s candidacy by re-establishing the famous two-thirds rule. 
This required a Democratic nominee to garner two-thirds of the convention’s 
delegates, and it in effect gave the South a veto over the party’s nominating 
process. As a member of the rules committee, Bright supported the change, 
which marked the beginning of a collaboration with southern Democrats that 
continued for the rest of his political career. The Indiana delegates fell in line 
behind both Cass and the cause of expansion. Indeed, Edward Hannegan 
inserted in the party platform a provision calling for “the whole of the Territory of 
Oregon,” and “no portion…ought to be ceded to England…” During the 
presidential balloting, nine of Indiana’s delegates supported Cass and three 
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supported Van Buren. Eventually, all twelve voted by acclamation for 
Tennessee’s James Polk.54 
Polk was the first “dark horse” candidate in American political history, and 
he won the nomination because he was the only candidate who could unite all 
the party’s factions. He was a southern slaveholder who favored western 
expansion, but he also shared the economic views of the Van Buren 
Democrats.55 
 
The Whig Party, meanwhile, nominated Kentucky Senator Henry Clay for 
the presidency. Although a slaveholder from Kentucky, Clay was uneasy about 
slavery, and in his 1844 campaign he courted northern voters. Years later, 
Abraham Lincoln would refer to Clay as his “beau-ideal of a statesman.” Clay 
opposed Texas annexation, believing it likely to provoke sectional agitation. He 
would support annexation only on the condition that it receive “general 
concurrence” from both sections. As William Freehling has observed, this was 
the “gospel” of Calhoun turned toward the benefit of the North.56 Clay was also 
less hawkish on the Oregon question, hoping to compromise with Britain. Such 
views made it more difficult for Clay to carry a pro-expansionist western state like 
Indiana. 
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Democrats were able to forge a united party over Texas annexation. 
Michael Holt has noted: “[p]arty affiliation, not section, dictated the stands of 
newspapers and politicians on the expansion issue.”57 While some Democrats 
had initially objected to annexation, many began to fall in line behind Polk and  
the party platform. One example was Jacob Chapman, the editor of the Indiana 
State Sentinel, the state’s main Democratic Party organ. Formerly from 
Massachusetts, he was among the Democrats in the state who opposed  
slavery’s expansion. Chapman was no radical, but he was decidedly against the 
expansion of slavery, and he had supported Martin Van Buren in his opposition  
to annexation. The Sentinel initially suggested that annexation was merely a 
“New Theme for Agitation” and blamed the nominally Whig Tyler administration 
for stirring up trouble. Chapman wanted Congress to focus on the “Oregon 
question,” which was more popular with Democrats, rather than “agitating” on 
Texas.58   With Polk’s nomination, however, the Sentinel began to reexamine its 
stand. It had hoped to minimize the differences between Van Buren and the rest 
of the party. It printed a Robert Owen speech indicating that Van Buren was open 
to considering Texas annexation. It was possible that “time and circumstances” 
might allow for annexation. Finally, the paper acquiesced to the pro-expansionist 
forces, noting that Texas was a region of 318,000 square miles. “This is worth 
having” especially as “Uncle Sam” can get it “offered to him for nothing...”59 
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In 1844, Texas annexation played a prominent role in the Indiana 
campaign. Bright tried to allay fears that annexation might provoke a war with 
Mexico. Bright desired the expansion of territory into Oregon, Texas or wherever; 
he was not especially choosey, and he was certain of the capacity of the United 
States to accomplish it. He also assured voters that annexation could be 
accomplished peacefully. Bright believed Mexico was weak and he had no 
inhibitions about war. The United States, Bright declared, would “undertake to 
clean out Mexico with a regiment of women armed with broomsticks.” When 
actual war broke out, a friend poked fun at Bright’s statement in print with mild 
humor, but went to lengths to conceal his identify fearing the senator’s wrath.60 
War was not the only concern. Many Indiana Democrats worried that annexing 
Texas was merely a means to expand slave-holding territory. The Sentinel 
sought to dispel such fears by reprinting an article that challenged Calhoun’s 
expectations. “So far from perpetuating slavery in the United States, the 
annexation of Texas,” the article contended, “gives the only well-grounded 
hope…for its ultimate extinction.” This “paradox” was the “sober truth,” as slavery 
could more easily evanescent when it was spread, or diffused, so as to lower the 
concentration of slaves, making eventual emancipation possible.61 
 
Indiana Democrats also tried to place expansionist policies in a national 
context. As Joel Silbey observed, “western Democrats” believed that the 
acquisition of both Texas and Oregon was a “quid pro quo” action to promote 
 
 
 
60 Woollen, Biographical and Historical Sketches, 370. 
61 Indiana State Sentinel, July 18, 1844. 
43  
sectional harmony.62 The Sentinel charged that Clay would give “Great Britain all 
that portion of Oregon Territory” north of 49 degrees, and his “doctrines in  
relation to Texas will lose us command of the Gulf of Mexico, and bound our 
country on every side by British territory.”63 Polk, meanwhile, implied that the 
United States would claim all of the Oregon territory, and many Democrats 
assumed he meant to acquire all the land up to the 54° 40’.  This helped Polk win 
a narrow 2,000-vote majority in Indiana.64 
 
*  *  *  * *  *  *  *  *  *  *  * *  *  *  *  *  * *  *  *  *  *  * 
 
 
 
The ambitious Bright was eager to use his post as lieutenant governor to 
seek a higher office, and he soon aimed for a U.S. Senate seat. In December 
1844 the legislature met to fill the state’s open seat. With the state senate split 
evenly and Whigs having a majority in the House, a joint session would have 
elected a Whig. The House voted for a joint session, but the senate vote was a 
tie, which allowed Bright to cast the deciding vote against a joint session.  As a 
result of the deadlock, the seat went unfilled for a year. When Indiana held 
legislative elections in August 1845, the Democrats gained a majority in the 
House.  While Governor Whitcomb had ambitions for the seat, he was stymied by 
internal party divisions. These divisions were an extension of the Barnburners 
and Hunkers feud centered in New York, which had broken out in the early 1840s 
when New York’s Democratic Party split over economic policy. The Hunkers 
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supported modest state sponsored internal improvements, while the Barnburners 
wanted to restrict these projects. Eventually slavery would also divide the two 
factions, with the Barnburners opposing its expansion and the Hunkers tending to 
oppose anti-slavery agitation.65 As somewhat of a Barnburner, Whitcomb 
represented the wing of the Democratic Party that sought to restrict state- 
sponsored enterprises. The governor had also antagonized some Democrats 
when he refused to re-nominate old-guard Democratic judges. Bright, on the 
other hand, represented the attitudes of the Hunkers. He supported banking and 
internal improvements. Most importantly, Bright’s Hunker position was based on 
his pro-slavery attitudes. Hence, he opposed Whitcomb’s nomination because  
the governor represented Indiana’s free soil Democrats who desired to contain 
slavery’s expansion.66 
 
Bright delicately navigated these feuds by making political friends. He did 
this in part through his financial resources and the help of his brother Michael 
who had large financial assets and who used them to advance Jesse’s rise in 
politics. In 1843, while running with Whitcomb, Bright had financed a Whitcomb 
pamphlet opposing protective tariffs with a hefty $200 donation. As William 
Woollen, a Bright contemporary and future Indiana historian, recounted that, “his 
two hundred dollars contribution brought its reward” two years later when Bright 
sought the Senate nomination.67 It appears that Bright also made promises for 
unspecified favors. One member of the legislature wrote privately after the 
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election: “Our new Senator Bright will do all in his power to aid us…he owes 
much to me for his election but this in confidence.”68 Bright proved adept at 
outmaneuvering his rival. The Democratic caucus voted in his favor over 
Whitcomb by a margin of 24-16. This time when the House voted for a joint 
session, Bright cast the tie-breaking vote in the Indiana Senate. On December 6, 
1845, just shy of thirty-three, Jesse Bright was elected to the United States 
Senate.69 
 
*  *  *  * *  *  *  *  *  *  *  * *  *  *  *  *  * *  *  *  *  *  * 
 
 
 
Bright’s rapid climb to power owed to his well-connected family and his 
talents as a political organizer. He knew how to build and mobilize political 
support. At the precise moment he sought federal office, Bright found the nation 
just beginning to enter into a frenzy of sectional conflict. Questions over how to 
handle the issue of slavery in the western territories vexed the nation. 
Northerners would grow concerned that the expansion of southern territory 
merely served slave-holding interests, and sought to restrict slavery in the 
territories. Southerners, meanwhile, came to resent northern meddling on the 
issue. Bright would play an important role in trying to shape how the Democratic 
Party and the nation would come to terms with this volatile issue. 
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Dive, thoughts, down to my soul. Here Clarence comes. 
Richard III, Act 1 Scene 1 
 
Chapter 2 
 
 
 
The Rise of Sectional Divisions: 1845-1849 
 
 
 
At the close of 1845, Jesse Bright became a newly elected slave-owning 
senator from a free state. When he entered the Senate, the most pressing 
matters facing the nation were questions of territorial expansion. These included 
the annexation of Texas, the Oregon question, and the dispute with Mexico over 
the Texas boundary that led to war. Expansion inevitably raised the divisive issue 
of whether slavery would be allowed into the western territories. Bright and his 
home-state Democrats were reluctant participants in this fight. Most Indiana 
Democrats were mild opponents of the expansion of slavery, but they detested 
radical abolitionists. They found in the election of 1848, however, that they could 
not avoid the issue of slavery in the territories. 
 
*  *  *  * *  *  *  *  *  *  *  * *  *  *  *  *  * *  *  *  *  *  * 
 
 
 
James Polk had come into office with a broad base of Democratic 
supporters. He had gained support from southern expansionists by his 
commitment to Texas annexation and his endorsement from Andrew Jackson. 
He had also gained the support of Martin Van Buren’s followers for his anti-bank 
views. Additionally, he had promised Pennsylvanians that he would promote 
protectionism, while promising southerners the opposite. Once elected, however, 
Polk alienated Van Burenites by appointing their hated enemies to the cabinet, 
47  
and he disappointed Pennsylvania Democrats by siding with southerners to lower 
tariff rates with the Walker Tariff.1 
 
Territorial expansion worsened the divisions. In late 1844 and early 1845, 
outgoing president John Tyler lobbied Congress to admit Texas by way of a joint 
resolution rather than a formal treaty. In order to gain support from some  
northern Democrats and Whigs, the Texas annexation resolution was amended 
to allow the president the choice of either admitting the whole of Texas as a state 
or admitting a smaller portion, with the remaining territory free of slavery. Many 
northern Democrats, led by Martin Van Buren, believed Polk would choose the 
latter option. They were wrong. When Polk entered office, he pushed ahead with 
Tyler’s annexation policies, which infuriated the Van Buren wing of the party.2 
 
Polk secured Texas’s admission to the Union in December 1845, but this 
was just the beginning of his grand ambitions for national expansion. He wanted 
to establish the Texas boundary at the Rio Grande River—even at the expense 
of a war with Mexico. He also wanted the territories west of Texas—New Mexico 
and California. The situation grew tense as Polk ordered troops to cross the 
Nueces and camp along the Rio Grande. On April 25, 1846 Mexican troops 
crossed the Rio Grande and attacked a United States detachment. This enabled 
Polk on May 11 to call for a declaration of war.3 
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As Polk agitated for war with Mexico, he also negotiated with Great Britain 
over the Oregon territory. The British desired to divide the territory between the 
United States and Britain at the Columbia River. Polk was willing to compromise, 
but he wanted a division at the 49th parallel to ensure U.S. possession of the 
deep water ports of the Puget Sound around present-day Seattle. He threatened 
war, but in June of 1846 he backed down and agreed to divide the territory at the 
49th parallel. This compromise outraged many western Democrats, who believed 
that Polk had employed a double standard. He had compromised over Oregon, 
yet he was willing to go to war with Mexico over Texas. Michael Holt has noted 
that the “false belief that Polk was the puppet of the Southern slave power would 
have serious consequences for his presidency.”4 
 
Polk aroused further suspicion about his motives when he directed the 
military into New Mexico and to ports along the California coast. It became clear 
that Polk hoped to control large parts of these areas before subduing Mexican 
forces and then negotiating for peace with a strengthened hand. This became 
especially clear by August of 1846 when Polk sent a request to Congress for $2 
million to negotiate peace. Few doubted that he intended to compel Mexico to 
sell New Mexico and California to the United States as a part of the settlement. 
Many northerners saw this as a means to bolster the southern slave-power and 
expand slavery.5 
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Polk was an aggressive nationalist with an expansive vision of an 
American empire stretching from the Atlantic to the Pacific. But by compromising 
with Oregon while pursuing war with Mexico over Texas and seeking the New 
Mexico and California territories, Polk alienated many northern Democrats. The 
Van Burenites in particular feared a backlash from northern voters, but they were 
also angry at Calhoun and the southerners who seemed determined to push 
slavery into the western territories. Angry with what they saw as Polk’s duplicity 
and determined to separate western expansion and the extension of slavery, the 
northern Democrats, led by first term Congressman David Wilmot of 
Pennsylvania, responded by attaching a proviso to Polk’s request for a $2 million 
appropriation. The proviso called for banning slavery from all territory acquired 
from Mexico. 6 Such a measure, its proponents insisted, was a legitimate use of 
congressional power. It would apply to the western territories the principle 
established by the Northwest Ordinance of 1787. 
 
Wilmot himself was no abolitionist. He and most of the other northern 
Democrats who supported what became known as the Wilmot Proviso did not 
object to slavery where it existed. But they objected strongly to slavery’s 
extension. Their aim was to sustain the west for the white working class and 
white farmers. Wilmot referred to his measure as the “White Man’s Proviso” and 
made clear that its aim was to “preserve for free white labor a fair country, a rich 
inheritance, where the sons of toil, of my own race and color, can live without the 
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disgrace which association with Negro slavery brings upon free labor.”7 Slavery, 
they thought, had rendered the south a backward, even feudal society, and they 
were determined to stem its westward advance.8 
 
Southerners, again led by Calhoun, were bitterly hostile to the measure. 
Even though slavery did not exist in the southwestern region, Calhoun argued 
that the constitution guaranteed the right to own slaves in the western territories. 
Slaveholders had as much a right to the new lands as non-slaveholders and they 
should not have to forfeit their property in order to settle in the territories. The 
proviso would also establish the ability of Congress to regulate slavery, which set 
off furious alarms.9 It incited intense competition between Whigs and Democrats 
as the two parties vied to claim which party could protect slavery from northern 
abolitionists. For southern Whigs, who had been tarnished by their opposition to 
Texas annexation, the Wilmot Proviso allowed them to pillory Democrats as the 
party of abolition. Southern Democrats, as a result, had to demonstrate their own 
opposition to any control of slavery in the territories. Regardless of party, 
however, southerners saw the attempt to regulate slavery as an attack on 
southern honor. Even if only symbolic, they would never tolerate it.10 
 
When Wilmot’s amendment was first voted on in August of 1846 (in the 
first session of the 29th Congress), it carried in the House of Representatives by a 
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largely sectional vote. Southern Whigs and Democrats voted no, while northern 
Whigs and Democrats largely voted yes. In the Senate, however, the measure 
was filibustered by a sympathetic northern Whig who did not want the 
appropriation returned to the House stripped of the ban on slavery. In 1846, the 
legislative battle attracted little attention in the party newspapers, but when a 
similar measure was introduced in the second session of the 29th Congress in 
1847, it incensed southerners and emboldened northerners who opposed 
slavery’s extension. The House again approved it, but in the Senate, where slave 
states outnumbered free-states 15 to 14 and where some conservative or 
“doughface” Democrats sided with their southern brethren, the Wilmot proviso 
had no chance. Eventually, Congress approved Polk’s request for an 
appropriation to settle the Mexican War without the Wilmot Proviso. But by the 
time it did, the debate over whether to allow slavery’s extension to the west was 
fully joined and bitterly inflamed.11 
The debate incited by the Wilmot Proviso had many consequences for 
northern Democrats. These Democrats, but especially those allied with Van 
Buren, had come to resent the power of the party’s southern wing and to believe 
that any expansion of slavery was immoral. But some northern Democrats were 
pro-southern doughfaces who were loath to alienate southern Democrats. And 
most northern Democrats were also overwhelmingly white racists who wanted to 
work and farm in communities of white men and women. Most northern 
Democrats also wanted to extend the nation’s western boundaries as far as 
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possible to the west. These conflicting tensions strained party loyalties, but they 
also prompted a search for compromise and alternatives that might sustain the 
Democratic Party at the state and national level. This was the case in Indiana 
where Jesse Bright had just begun his career in the Senate. 
 
 
 
*  *  *  * *  *  *  *  *  *  *  * *  *  *  *  *  * *  *  *  *  *  * 
 
 
 
In the months before Jesse Bright took his Senate seat in December of 
1845, the Polk administration had pressed ahead with the annexation of Texas 
and on December 29, 1845 Texas became the nation’s twenty-eighth state. 
Meanwhile, western Democrats, led by Indiana’s Hannegan and Michigan’s 
Lewis Cass, demanded that Polk battle Britain for all of the Oregon territory. The 
call for “Fifty-Four Forty or Fight” briefly inspired a war scare in early 1846, but 
Polk eventually compromised on the 49th parallel and the Senate accepted the 
agreement in June. 
The Hoosier Democrats were nationalists who saw western lands as a 
source of economic opportunity and democratic promise. In the case of Oregon, 
they were furious at what they saw as Polk’s betrayal over the disputed 
boundary. Hannegan tried to thwart the agreement, but few senators supported 
him. On the final vote, Bright joined Hannegan and a few other western 
Democrats in voting no. 
The outcome of the Oregon fight also generated some bitterness among 
Indiana Democrats over the willingness of southerners to compromise over 
Oregon while they supported war with Mexico over the Texas-Mexico boundary. 
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Democrats such as Hannegan had believed that Polk had committed himself to a 
Texas-Oregon quid pro quo, which meant that if Texas entered the union as a 
slave state, the administration would demand that Britain cede to the U.S. the 
whole of the Oregon territory. Hannegan railed against the “peculiar friends of 
Texas” who hand “turned, and were doing all they could to strangle Oregon!” He 
was bemused that John C. Calhoun had been willing to risk going to war with 
Mexico to acquire Texas but wanted to conciliate the British over Oregon. 
Oregon, of course, was likely to be a free territory and Hannegan declared that 
the country was “not blind, or deaf. The people see, they comprehend” and “they 
would speak.”12 
 
Inevitably, Texas annexation and the Oregon fight raised for Indiana 
Democrats the question of slavery’s extension. As early as February 1845, many 
Indiana representatives in Congress had voted to bar slavery in the Oregon 
territory. William J. Brown, a congressman from Indianapolis, voted against it, not 
because he was a partisan for slavery, but because he disliked anti-slavery 
agitation and wanted to avoid alienating southerners with a federal prohibition.13 
In the case of Texas, however, Congressman Robert Owen from southern 
Indiana, argued that annexation would not “reduce a single human being” to 
bondage. While it would certainly add to the number of slaves within the United 
States, Owen noted that in “this world of imperfections,” the “practical question” 
was “whether the good” of annexation would “preponderate over the evils.” For 
whites in Texas, joining the Union would bring “peace and safety under the 
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shelter of our republican institutions” with “its prospective extension to millions 
more yet to live.” As for the slaves, Owen suggested that territorial expansion 
would reduce the number of slaves in the upper South as they would become 
diffused into Texas. This would mean, of course, shifting slaves away from 
Indiana’s borders.14 
 
In the case of the supposed Oregon betrayal, Democratic editors such as 
Jacob Chapman of the Indiana State Sentinel blasted Calhoun for his apparent 
“zeal to give away all of Oregon.” Calhoun, he charged, was only willing to accept 
lands that would be “subjected to the extension of negro slavery!” Indeed, the 
slave driver was back to his old game of shouting “disunion” to further “his policy, 
his interests, and his ambitious projects,” placing the interest of the South over 
that of “the nation.” Chapman assured his readers that he had no sympathy with 
abolitionism, but he likened Calhoun’s sectional fanaticism to those of the “ultra 
abolitionist fanatics.” Both groups, the organ insisted, were diametrically opposed 
to the nation’s interests.15 
 
The reaction of Indiana’s Democrats to the Wilmot Proviso ranged from 
committed opposition to ambivalent support. Jesse Bright and Edward Hannegan 
consistently voted against it in the Senate. In the House, the conservative 
Democrat William Wick opposed it as well. When Wilmot first submitted his 
amendment in 1846, Wick labeled it premature and “arrogant” on the grounds 
that the U.S. did not control the disputed territories with the war underway. He 
14 Congressional Globe, January 8th, 1845 28th Congress, 2nd Session, Appendix, 100. 
15 Indiana State Sentinel, March 4, 1847. 
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also tried to substitute for it a proposal calling for extending the Missouri 
Compromise line further west, but this was rejected by an 89-54 vote.16 Robert 
Owen had been present the steamy Saturday night where Wilmot and other 
northern Democrats had debated whether to submit the proviso. He had agreed 
with the principle of the measure, but he had also warned that it would endanger 
party unity. Still, on the first Wilmot Proviso vote in the House, he had voted for it. 
But later he changed to a “no” vote. This changing of positions on the Wilmot 
Proviso by Indiana’s Democrats was not unusual. In early 1847, five Indiana 
Democratic congressmen voted in favor of the Wilmot Proviso. A month later on 
another vote only three did. A year later on yet another vote not a single Indiana 
Democrat in Congress voted for it.17 
Rather than embrace or oppose the Wilmot Proviso, many Indiana 
Democrats argued the measure was unnecessary because the new territories 
should be organized to allow the legal precedents established by Mexico to 
continue in place. And since Mexico had prohibited slavery, this would keep the 
region free once it became part of the United States. The Sentinel established 
this argument with a reprinted article on August of 1846 that declared that the 
proviso was “wholly unnecessary, as slavery did not exist in any part of 
Mexico.”18 In addition, both Robert Owen and Governor James Whitcomb 
advanced a similar argument. The appeal of this argument, of course, was that it 
side-stepped the question of whether Congress could or should regulate slavery 
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in the territories while also appeasing northerners who opposed slavery’s 
extension. 
Initially, the Indiana newspapers paid little attention to the Wilmot Proviso. 
In 1846, in particular, the state’s newspapers were far more excited about Polk’s 
decision to compromise on the Oregon boundary. The Logansport Democratic 
Pharos expressed its befuddlement that “we have yet to see the evidence which 
proves the claim of Great Britain, north of 49, as good as that of our 
Government.” Indiana’s Democratic senators, the paper noted, had both voted 
against the treaty.19 Its Whig rival, Logansport Telegraph, taunted the Polk 
administration over “the amount of American territory surrendered” in Oregon. 
The Whig paper continued, “If the people wish to preserve the national faith, 
truth, and dignity pure, let them hereafter beware of the promises of the leaders 
of the ‘Democratic’ party.”20 
In 1847, the Wilmot Proviso gained more attention, especially from the 
Whig papers. The Register, led by the younger and more idealistic Schuyler 
Colfax, was a bit more enthusiastic, declaring that regardless of whether the 
measure was merely abstract in its practical application, the Proviso was still 
“True to the impulses of freedom.” It was a “manly stand” for “those who hope yet 
to see the day when the chain of human bondage shall be broken.”21   The 
Logansport Telegraph, another Whig paper, rebuked Bright and Hannegan for 
opposing the Wilmot Proviso, and asserted that even though it had appeared the 
“northern branch [of Democrats] had broken the chain that enslaved them to the 
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present administration,” it was clear that Indiana’s senators were under “the 
influence of John C. Calhoun.”22 
 
*  *  *  * *  *  *  *  *  *  *  * *  *  *  *  *  * *  *  *  *  *  * 
 
 
 
The larger consequences of the Wilmot Proviso debate were soon evident 
as the Polk administration and congress tried to secure the legislation necessary 
to organize the Oregon territory. The effort to resolve this issue marked Jesse 
Bright’s first major involvement at the national level in the politics of slavery. 
 
Polk had requested from Congress the legislation necessary to organize a 
territorial government as early as August of 1846, and the House had produced a 
bill that also imposed restrictions regarding slavery. It was unlikely, of course, 
that slavery would ever take root in the Pacific Northwest, but now the need to 
codify an antislavery position was increasingly important for some northern 
members of Congress. The bill languished in the Senate, but in early 1847  
James Buchanan put forth the compromise position of extending the Missouri 
Compromise line to the West, which would have permitted the organization of 
territory without creating any precedents for the southwest territories. But 
southerners in the House objected that any restrictions on slavery were 
unconstitutional, and the measure died.23 
 
In the Senate, responsibility for territorial legislation fell to the territorial 
committee, which was chaired by the ambitious senator from Illinois Stephen 
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Douglas. Bright, however, was the committee’s second-ranking Democrat, and 
during one of Douglas’s absences, he seized the moment to send forth his own 
bill. Realizing that it was pointless to defend the principle of slavery for a territory 
that would never admit slaves, Bright tried to sidestep the question of accepting 
or rejecting slavery in the Oregon territory. Senators from both the South and the 
North, however, came forth with amendments that pressed the issue. John Hale 
of New Hampshire proposed to bar slavery from the territory. Predictably, 
Calhoun objected. Like the hated Wilmot Proviso, Hale’s amendment would 
establish the precedent that Congress possessed the authority to regulate 
slavery in the territories. Bright made clear to Calhoun that he would “most 
assuredly vote against the amendment,” but this could not salvage the bill.24 
 
Eager to resolve the issue, President Polk met with Bright to suggest an 
alternative. Polk now embraced the idea of extending the Missouri Compromise 
to the West.25 But what had worked in 1820 was no longer viable. Northern 
senators would not be party to an agreement that tolerated slavery in the 
southwest and southern members of Congress wanted to insist on legislation 
guaranteeing the right to own slaves where slavery would never be. Meanwhile, 
settlers in Oregon had raced ahead without congressional sanction and formed a 
rudimentary territorial government that outlawed slavery.26 The Senate then 
moved to create what became known as the Clayton Committee with equal 
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representation from both sections to work out a compromise. Bright was one of 
the eight members, and he worked with Calhoun to produce a bill that would 
accept the laws of the provisional government. Such a strategy avoided 
establishing Congress’s power to regulate slavery in the territories. The measure 
passed the Senate, but it was tabled in the House as southern Whigs sought to 
establish their pro-slavery credentials.27 
 
Eventually, the question of the Oregon territory was resolved by the House 
of Representatives, which sent forth a bill organizing the territory and barring 
slavery. The bill passed in the Senate with Bright voting for it. Undoubtedly, he 
realized that slavery would never take hold in Oregon and it was pointless to fight 
over the issue.28 
 
California and New Mexico remained vexing issues. Polk had hoped to 
bring California in as a state, and organize the New Mexico territorial 
governments. In February 1849, grasping for a way to avoid sectional agitation, 
Senator Isaac Walker of Wisconsin inserted an amendment to give the president 
broad powers to regulate territorial laws of the southwest. Southerners generally 
supported it, and it barely passed the Senate. Interestingly, Bright voted against 
most of his southern colleagues, while Hannegan voted in favor. The House, 
however, insisted on attaching the Wilmot Proviso to the New Mexican territory 
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proposal, and voted down the Walker Amendment. As a result, the southern- 
dominated Senate and northern-dominated House remained deadlocked over 
organizing the southwest territories.29 
 
*  *  *  * *  *  *  *  *  *  *  * *  *  *  *  *  * *  *  *  *  *  * 
 
 
 
At the start of 1848, northern Democrats faced a difficult presidential 
contest. The Mexican War had dragged on longer than Polk (or Bright) had 
foreseen, and hence it had become a far less popular cause. Indiana’s 
Democrats, however, remained committed to expansion and they rallied in 
support of the war. At one local Democratic event, party members praised the 
president and brought forward a “veteran and soldier in the cause of his country” 
who spoke of the gallantry of his fellow soldiers in the Mexican War. In their 
platform resolutions, Bartholomew County Democrats reasserted that Mexico 
was the aggressor in the conflict, and that it had been the duty of the United 
States to protect its sovereign territory.30   Traditional Democratic issues also 
worked to unite the party. It championed repeal of the 1842 protective tariff and 
touted the success of the revenue-generating Walker Tariff. Democrats also 
reiterated their opposition to a national bank and insisted on “the sovereignty of 
the States, against Centralization.”31 
 
The Wilmot Proviso, however, was a more contentious matter.  At the 
January 1848 state convention, the party platform, while it offered mild planks 
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against slavery’s expansion, opposed the Wilmot Proviso on the grounds that it 
would “foment local or personal jealousies” and “array the people of one section 
of the Union in an attitude hostile to those of any other section.”32 Any kind of 
proviso, they insisted, would not “make these territories more free…”33 
Democratic Congressional candidate Graham Fitch, from the northern-most 
section of the state, declared the Proviso “would weaken, if not impair, the Union 
of the States; and would sow the seeds of future discord.” As for fears that 
slavery still might not be contained, Fitch suggested that the “diffusion” of slavery 
would not create an additional slave, nor would its restriction free any chattel.34 
 
Some Indiana Democrats opposed the Wilmot Proviso but also spoke out 
against slavery. For example, the Goshen Democrat’s E.W. Ellis disliked slavery 
and declared “It ought to be got[ten] rid of,” he also believed that the Wilmot 
Proviso was too radical and unnecessary.35  Others were determined to maintain 
a white man’s world. Speaking in Congress in April of 1848, William Wick 
observed that “an increase of area of slavery” would not “of necessity, increase 
its volume.” The congressman understood that Hoosiers “dread[ed] the presence 
of a numerous colored population among us.” Having masses of slaves  
populated closely “together in a small compass,” Wick observed, might 
“accelerate emancipation” and “bring upon us…an avalanche of colored 
population.” Like many Indiana Democrats, Wick believed that the “continuance 
of slavery” was an evil to be feared.  But he also insisted on the sanctity of limited 
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government and states’ rights.  The federal government, he said, had no 
“constitutional power…to legislate [the] prevention of that evil.”36 
 
As the 1848 presidential campaign neared, the Democrats realized that a 
candidate who endorsed the Wilmot Proviso would face massive southern 
defections. But a candidate who demanded slavery’s extension to the West 
would face northern defections. Polk had been unable to win acceptance of his 
preferred solution to extend the Missouri Compromise to the West. Was there 
another alternative? Lewis Cass, Michigan’s doughface senator and ardent 
expansionist, offered one. The answer, he said, was to embrace popular 
sovereignty. By this he meant that the decision to accept or prohibit slavery 
should be a local one. In a series of letters, Cass denied the right of Congress to 
legislate over slavery in the territories. Instead, he was in “favor of leaving to the 
people of any territory…the right to regulate it for themselves, under the general 
principles of the constitution.” There was, however, some ambiguity in how to 
interpret popular sovereignty. For northerners, it meant that locals could exclude 
slavery as soon as they gained territorial status. The southern interpretation 
suggested that slavery could not be decided until the territory convened a 
constitutional convention. Cass, of course, deliberately kept vague his 
interpretation of popular sovereignty.37 
 
Cass’s embrace of popular sovereignty enabled him to win the 1848 
Democratic nomination. The Whigs responded by trying to straddle the slavery 
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issue in their own way. They nominated Zachary Taylor, the Mexican war hero 
and owner of a Louisiana plantation with as many as 300 slaves. Taylor, who 
until 1847 had never identified with a political party, was a Whig of uncertain 
principles on nearly every issue, including the extension of slavery. For Whigs 
seeking an attractive candidate, however, Taylor’s lack of any clear record was 
an asset. They gambled that as a slave-owner he would appeal to southerners 
and as a war hero he would appeal to northern nationalists. In addition, Taylor 
refused to take a clear stand on the Wilmot Proviso, which raised the hopes of 
some northern Whigs that he would accept it should Congress approve it. 
 
Initially, it appeared that the campaign would pit a northern Democrat who 
opposed the Wilmot Proviso against a southern Whig who owned slaves. This 
changed, however, when Martin Van Buren bolted from the Democratic Party. 
Fearing that the southern slave power intended to use western expansion to 
create new slaveholding states, Van Buren and his followers met in Buffalo 
where they formed the Free Soil Party.38 The new party was dedicated to 
maintaining “the rights of free labor against the aggression of the slave power.” It 
opposed allowing more slave states or territories to enter the union, believing the 
federal government could not deny “any person of life, liberty, or property...”39 
 
In Indiana, Van Buren’s Free Soil candidacy posed a difficult challenge to 
the two major parties. Four years earlier, James Polk had barely carried the 
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state for the Democrats and any significant loss of the party base would doom 
Cass’s hopes of winning the state’s twelve electoral votes. 
 
In Indiana, Democrats could turn Taylor’s war record against him because 
of an incident at the Battle of Buena Vista involving the Indiana Second regiment. 
The state’s sense of honor had been wounded when the general issued a report 
on the Battle of Buena Vista during the Mexican War that suggested that the 
regiment had behaved cowardly. In the battle, four hundred Indiana volunteers 
had faced four thousand Mexican soldiers. At a critical point, General Joseph 
Lane had ordered some artillery to be repositioned, but in the confusion, the 
regiment’s commander assumed that this signaled a retreat, and therefore 
ordered his men to withdraw. Lane rushed to the scene and had 200 men reform 
to fight. But he also sent a report to Taylor highly critical of the “disorder” among 
his retreating soldiers. In Taylor’s official report, he observed that “The 2d Indiana 
regiment, which had fallen back, could not be rallied, and took no further part in 
the action, except a handful of men…”40   Lane subsequently investigated the 
matter further, and eventually offered a more sympathetic account, but this 
clarification was never made official. As such, Taylor did not amend his own 
report.41 
 
During the fall campaign, Democrats exploited the issue. The state 
Democratic Party declared: “That notwithstanding the stigma attempted by Gen. 
Taylor…the conduct, skill, and bravery displayed by her volunteers, both officers 
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and privates, showed them not inferior to those of any other State.”42 Senator 
Edward Hannegan addressed an Indianapolis crowd, with the flag of the  
regiment waving and asked “Could this standard, rent and tattered in the fight 
have been born and sustained by cowards and fugitives?” The Western 
Republican, added: “Many of the audience wept like children, and a simultaneous 
shout went up to heaven.”43 
 
A no less troubling issue for Indiana Whigs was Taylor’s “supposed 
devotion to the interests of the slaveholders.”44 Indeed, Indiana’s few avowedly 
antislavery editors and political figures were quick to make the point. The editor 
of the Free Territorial Sentinel, a former Democrat, asked rhetorically, “Will [the 
Whigs] consent to entrust the power to decide the question [of slavery] to 
doubtful hands?”45 George Washington Julian, a former Whig with radical anti- 
slavery convictions, was even blunter, claiming the party’s nomination of Taylor 
was “an exhibition of shameless political prostitution.”46 Democrats made this 
charge as well. The Sentinel mocked the Whigs for allowing themselves “to be 
lashed back to the support” of the slaveholding candidate “by the negro whip of 
the slave driver.”47   The Logansport Democratic Pharos remarked that “with a 
southerner and a slaveholder for the Whig Candidate” the party was “no more for 
the Wilmot Proviso than the Democrats.”48 The Goshen Democrat hammered 
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away at the inconsistency of Whigs who supported the Proviso while backing 
Taylor, who wanted the votes of anti-Proviso southerners.49 
 
Whigs  tried to counter these charges by alleging that Cass would push 
slavery further West. When Democrat Graham Fitch of northern Indiana 
suggested that Cass was “friendly to the principles of [the] Wilmot Proviso,” the 
Register countered that “there is no foundation in truth for his assertion…”50 They 
also argued that Taylor was above all a nationalist not beholden to region. 
Initially, they declared Taylor a “Southern man with Northern principles,” but an 
editor suggested that a better tact would be to describe him as “Southern man 
with National Whig principles.”51 Eventually, the message was further refined to 
read: a “southern man with broad and liberal national principles.” 52  Sectional 
partisanship, as one editor privately noted, was purely a manifestation of the 
“encroaching and exacting demands of the South.”53 
 
If the Democrats battled Taylor, they detested the Free Soil challenge.  As 
one conservative Democrat explained, no one with a “spark of patriotism left” 
would rally to the free soil forces.54  In fending off the Free Soilers, Bright’s 
passionate partisanship was obvious. The editor of Bright’s hometown paper, the 
Madison Courier, complained to Bright that “lethargy and apathy” prevailed 
among the ranks of local Democrats. Bright advised: “Despair not, appeal to their 
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love of principle, and duty to Country and Party. A little thumbing & gouging, with 
some coaxing, will bring them up to fever heat…”to guard against complacency 
and warning that the Whigs were making a stronger than usual push to win the 
state.55  The editor did just this. He attacked Taylor as a slanderer of Indiana’s 
veterans. Appealing to Indiana’s Irish voters, the Courier observed that Cass 
had supported a bill for Irish relief. Scratching for something, it listed all the ways 
in which the Whigs and their nominee were antagonistic to foreigners.56 
 
The Whig newspapers, particularly in the northern sections of Indiana, 
made Bright a target as they defended Taylor. Bright, they noted, held “a large 
slave interest in Kentucky” and had ably “represented the slave interests, to the 
detriment of those of his own State.”57 Bright paid them little attention. He 
campaigned in the critical state of New York, where Democratic defections to 
Van Buren threatened to hand the state to the Whigs. Cass, Bright said, was a 
man who stood “pledged to a set of certain measures.” (But if these “certain 
measures” included Cass’s position on slavery, Bright did not say.) He touted 
Democratic opposition to the national bank (something he had once supported) 
and the revenue-generating Walker Tariff of 1846.58 
 
He attacked Taylor as “a man who is himself among the largest 
slaveholders within the limits of the union”—without mentioning his own slaves in 
Kentucky. In attacking Van Buren, Bright made the dubious, if not completely 
55 Jesse Bright to S.F. Covington, July 4, 8, 1848 quoted in Van Der Weele, “Jesse David Bright,” 
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false claim, that he had “voted for him in the Convention of ’44, when others 
deserted him. He was then my model of a Democrat…” Bright continued, “Mr. 
Van Buren was my choice for the Presidency; but a majority of the Convention of 
that year declared that another individual should be the nominee.” By suggesting 
that he supported Van Buren, Bright could claim that he made noble efforts to 
“yield to the majority of the party…”59 The contrast with Van Buren’s defection 
was obvious. As Bright finished his speech the purple prose grew stronger as he 
suggested “It was within the limits of New York that the light of Heaven first 
beamed upon my eye. I naturally feel no small degree of attachment to my native 
State and the Democratic citizens.” Though his father was a Whig and he had 
moved to Kentucky at the age of seven, Bright claimed “It was here that I 
received my early impressions of the truth and value of Democratic principles.” 60 
 
Bright’s partisanship permeated his being, and he especially made it 
known by his presence overseeing Madison voters as they went to the polls. 
Watching in dismay at the disloyalty of Democrats who cast Free Soil ballots, he 
snarled: “G-d damn you—I wish you and they were in Hell…If I had the power I’d 
send you there.”61 
 
On election day, Taylor carried the electoral college by a comfortable 
margin. He won a similar number of northern and southern states, mostly located 
in the East. Cass won nearly all of the western states of both sections. These 
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western states, however, were less populated and not enough to swing the 
election. Taylor won the popular vote by roughly five percentage points.  Taylor 
easily won New York’s massive thirty-six electoral votes, with Cass finishing just 
behind Van Buren. 
 
Despite losing the national election to Taylor, Cass had carried Indiana 
with 49 percent of the vote, to Taylor’s 46 percent. Van Buren and the Free Soil 
Party won about five percent.62 
 
*  *  *  * *  *  *  *  *  *  *  * *  *  *  *  *  * *  *  *  *  *  * 
 
 
 
In Indiana in 1848, Jesse Bright and the state’s Democrats had defeated 
Taylor and the Whigs and the Free Soil threat. But in the aftermath of the 
election, they faced difficult challenges. Taylor’s election, of course, would mean 
less in the way of patronage for Bright and statewide Democratic officeholders. A 
more serious matter was the frustration of many Indiana Democrats with the 
South. It galled Hoosier Democrats that some party members in the South had 
betrayed the Democratic cause to vote for a slaveholder. Graham Fitch spoke for 
many when he explained that he now supported the Wilmot Proviso because he 
felt less beholden to “professed Democrats” in the South who had “deserted us 
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by the thousands” during the presidential election.63 The Goshen Democrat 
added that southern “zeal for the institution of slavery” had allowed the Whigs to 
take the presidency.  Indiana Democrats were miffed they had carried so much 
water to protect the “just rights of the South” only to be betrayed.  Southerners in 
the party had “made their own bed” and were “welcome to occupy it.”64 Even the 
New Albany Democrat, a paper just across the river from Louisville, asserted that 
the Democratic Party of the North had “yielded much to the south,” but in spite of 
their compromises, the editor explained, southern Democrats had completely 
failed to do their equal part.65 
 
Meanwhile, there was the Free Soil Party danger. Van Buren may have 
thrown New York’s thirty-six electoral votes to Taylor, which rankled northern 
Democrats. The Free Soilers were also attempting to build a permanent party in 
Indiana and with this in mind they nominated James H. Cravens for the 1849 
gubernatorial race. Both the Democrats and the Whigs knew that a third party 
would destabilize Indiana politics, and hence both parties moved to win back 
voters who had supported Van Buren in 1848. 
 
The Whigs grappled with these issues by presenting themselves as pro- 
union, anti-slavery advocates. When they met at their state convention on 
January 3rd, 1849 the delegates voted unanimously for a platform denouncing 
slavery, but they were careful to express “affections” for “the glorious American 
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Union.” Their platform quoted George Washington’s call to frown on “every 
attempt to alienate any portion of our country from the rest, or to enfeeble the 
sacred ties which now link together the various parts.” Most Indiana Whigs saw 
their opposition to slavery as part of “the great interests of the whole Union” 
rather than as a way to imperil it.66 According to Colfax, the Whigs were for “The 
Union, however bounded, now and forever, one and inseparable.”67 For the next 
five months the South Bend paper emblazoned atop its editorial page the fervent 
quote, “The UNION in any event to the last drop of my blood, and the last beat of 
my heart.”68 
 
Indiana Democrats responded as well and they quickly began to embrace 
the cause of opposing the extension of slavery. The Indiana State Sentinel began 
to distance itself from Lewis Cass’s principle of popular sovereignty.69   Another 
Democratic paper played upon northern Whig fears that Taylor would “veto the 
Wilmot Proviso.”70   Democrats in the state legislature bolstered their anti-slavery 
credentials by declaring to Indiana’s congressional delegates that slavery should 
be prohibited in the southwest because of previous Mexican law. This was 
problematic as there was no guarantee that Mexican law carried over into the 
territories.71 The state party platform became decidedly more anti-slavery. The 
previous year’s statement of principles had appealed to preserving the union, but 
the 1849 platform stated: “That the institution of slavery ought not to be 
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introduced into any territory where it does not now exist.” It also declared: “That 
inasmuch as New Mexico and California are, in fact and in law, free territories, it 
is the duty of Congress to prevent the introduction of slavery within their limits.”72 
 
Indiana’s House Democrats reversed course on the Wilmot Proviso. On 
December 13, 1848, four of six Hoosier Democrats voted in support of the 
proviso on a procedural vote, while John Pettit and William Wick abstained.73 
Indiana Congressman John Robinson explained that he felt “compelled” to switch 
his vote as he feared southerners would otherwise disregard the territories’ free 
status.74 Graham Fitch, the Democratic congressional candidate for one of the 
state’s northern districts, became a supporter of the proviso as well.75 Some 
Hoosier Democrats also came to support Whig Congressman Daniel Gott’s 
resolution to abolish the slave trade in the nation’s capital. Among Indiana’s U.S. 
House delegation, five Democrats supported the bill, while William Wick refused 
to vote.76 
 
The response to Wick’s action reveals much about how the Indiana 
Democrats were determined to beat back the Free Soil challenge. Wick’s 
opposition to the Gott resolution left him too unpopular to run for reelection.77 
Still, Indiana Democrats did not want to be identified with the Free Soil Party. 
When the Baltimore Sun referred to James Whitcomb as a Free Soil Party 
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member, the New Albany Democrat quickly set the record straight about his 
Democratic loyalties.78 
 
Edward Hannegan’s term had expired, and the legislature had to decide 
whether to return Hannegan or send former Governor James Whitcomb instead. 
The legislature required the two men to disclose their position on slavery in the 
new territories. Each agreed that Congress had the power to prohibit slavery in 
newly acquired territories. On whether he would support such a restriction, 
Hannegan hedged. “Upon all questions of this character,” he said, “I have ever 
held my final action open and liable to the control of circumstances.”79  
Meanwhile, Whitcomb asserted “that every constitutional and legal means should 
be adopted to continue” the preservation of freedom in the territories.80  
Ultimately, this helped ensure Whitcomb’s selection. 
 
Whig and Democratic papers began sniping at each other over which side 
was more authentically anti-slavery. The Sentinel assured its readers that it had 
always supported “Cass and free soil,” and it attacked Taylor as “confessedly in 
favor of slavery extension.”81 Indiana Whigs, meanwhile, asserted they were the 
party with the “doctrine” of preventing the “extension of slavery.” The Democratic 
leaders, they charged, “will not deceive all the rank and file of the Democracy” 
about their refusal to exclude slavery from the territories.82 
 
 
 
78 Daily New Albany Democrat, March 12, 1849. 
79 Van Bolt, The Hoosers and the ‘Eternal Agitation,’ 339. 
80 Journal of the House of Representatives of the State of Indiana, During the Thirty Third 
Session, (Indianapolis: John Defrees, 1849), 19 
81 Indiana State Journal, July, 16, 23, 30, August 10, 1849; Indiana State Sentinel, July 19, 1849. 
82 Indiana State Journal, July 23, 1849. 
74  
The efforts of the two parties to fend off the Free Soil challenge shaped 
the 1849 governor’s race. The two parties both sought to nominate candidates 
who had free-soil records. The Whigs tried to nominate Elisha Embree, a 
congressman from southwest Indiana who had voted for the Gott resolution. He 
was, one Whig editor claimed, “as good a free-soil men as can be found in the 
State.”83 But Embree declined to accept, and the party instead settled on Joel 
Matson, a candidate whose early advocacy for Taylor did not appeal to Free 
Soilers.84 At the same time, the Taylor administration had not explained how it 
would deal with slavery in the recently acquired territories, which made it difficult 
for Indiana Whigs to take an aggressive antislavery stand.85 
 
On the Democratic side, two candidates with antislavery records sought 
the nomination. One was Joseph Wright, a former Indiana congressman who had 
built a popular following within the party as a charismatic orator. He had also long 
opposed the extension of slavery in the territories. In 1844 Wright had supported 
Cass over Van Buren because of western expansion, but he was the only  
Indiana Democratic congressmen to vote against tabling a petition for gradual 
emancipation in federally controlled lands.86 The second candidate was  
Ebenezer Chamberlain, who was originally from Maine and who opposed 
slavery’s extension. 
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For Jesse Bright, the embrace of free soil-leaning candidates may have 
been necessary for the Indiana Democratic Party, but it was also distasteful for 
Bright personally. In the Senate race, he supported Hannegan, but conceded that 
Whitcomb “having been fairly chosen, all ought to acquiesce to his selection.”87 In 
the gubernatorial race, he backed Chamberlain, perhaps because Chamberlain 
was a pliable candidate who, as a biographer of Joseph Wright put it, could 
“recognize an indebtedness” to Bright.88 Unfortunately for Bright, Wright was 
simply too popular to be denied the nomination. For Bright, this was to prove a 
major misfortune. He soon came to despise Wright, and the two men and their 
respective factions would struggle to control the Indiana party for the next eight 
years. 
 
In the campaign the Whigs tried to assert that Wright had vacillated on the 
Wilmot Proviso. The Journal needled the Sentinel for trying to “play the Joe 
Wright game” of obfuscating its position.89 The issue of the Wilmot Proviso was 
still controversial. The Logansport Pharos was indignant that the Logansport 
Journal, its Whig competitor, should demand its opinion on the proviso and 
ambiguously replied, “democrats are opposed to the extension of slavery into 
free-territory—and that we hope to see freedom extending into slave territory— 
and that we ‘train in that company.’”90 
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Wright won a decisive victory with 77,000 votes to 67,000 for Matson. No 
less important, James Cravens the Free Soil candidate won just 3,000 votes. By 
nominating candidates such as Wright and by vocally taking up the cause of 
opposing the extension of slavery, the Indiana Democrats kept their party base 
intact. As one historian has observed, with both parties “firmly committed to non- 
extension and the divorce of slavery from government as any Free Soiler…many 
third party men slipped quietly back into the traditional organizations.”91 
Partisanship had prevailed. 
 
In the congressional campaign of 1849, both parties tried to appeal to 
voters opposed to the extension of slavery. Democrats sometimes battled to out- 
free soil each other for party nominations. In the 8th congressional district, for 
instance, a candidate named Daniel Mace was vulnerable because he had 
supported Cass and popular sovereighty in 1848 and had refused to endorse the 
Wilmot Proviso. His opponent Joseph McDonald declared his full support for the 
proviso and went on to win the nomination and election.92 
 
In other districts, Democrats outmaneuvered Whigs. In the 4th district, 
which Whigs usually dominated, the Democrats threw their support behind Free 
Soil candidate George Julian.  The Whig candidate Samuel Parker was a relative 
of the Whig Congressman Caleb Smith, who had refused to vote for the Gott 
resolution. The Free Territorial Sentinel, Indiana’s major Free Soil Party organ, 
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wrote there was “no evidence that [Parker] is any more honest or any less Selfish 
than was Mr. Smith.”93   It also questioned Parker’s commitment to anti-slavery 
principles since he had supported Zachary Taylor. Julian eked out a narrow win  
in the Quaker-dominated district by 150 votes. 
 
Even Graham Fitch, one of Bright’s political allies, embraced free soil 
tactics. Facing William Wright, a staunch anti-slavery Whig, Fitch sought to 
assure free soilers that he supported the Wilmot Proviso. As the election 
approached Whig leaders in the district grew worried that Free Soil Party 
supporters with old Democratic ties were being won back over.94 In spite of Whig 
taunts over his pandering, Fitch was able to consolidate Democratic support by 
minimizing divisions over slavery. Whig party observers lamented that “Our Free 
Soil friends [up] north, it seems, went over body and breeches for” Fitch.95 
 
Indiana Democrats won a substantial victory in the 1849 elections. In the 
gubernatorial race, the party increased its margin of victory over the previous 
year’s presidential contest, and in the congressional races, the Democrats 
captured all but one seat. James Whitcomb was ecstatic. He noted that “while 
other states have been changing to every point in the compass,” Indiana 
Democrats had grown stronger.96 They did this by co-opting the slavery issue 
from their opponents. Whigs were further weakened because they controlled the 
presidency, which out of necessity required ambiguity over slavery at the national 
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level. Slavery alone did not propel Indiana Democrats. They dominated the 
debate on economic issues, and their position on the Mexican War excited a 
western population that believed in the virtues of an expanding a democratic 
nation.97 However, beginning with their general support for the Gott Resolution 
and greater emphasis on free soil principles, Democrats were able to present 
themselves as legitimate opponents to the expansion of slavery. They were thus 
able to undercut the one issue that might otherwise have allowed a Whig 
triumph. 
 
*  *  *  * *  *  *  *  *  *  *  * *  *  *  *  *  * *  *  *  *  *  * 
 
 
 
How involved Jesse Bright was in the political skirmishes of 1849 is 
difficult to say. His few surviving letters pertain to matters of patronage and his 
business ventures. Still, his support for Edward Hannegan and Ebenezer 
Chamberlain suggests that he favored a more conservative set of candidates. 
Undoubtedly he realized, however, the need to fend off the Free Soil challenge 
and to protect the place of the Democratic Party in Indiana. Very likely, he hoped 
to put to rest the divisive politics of territorial expansion. The events of 1850, 
however, only intensified the bitter nature of the sectional divisions. 
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O Buckingham, take heed of yonder dog! 
Look when he fawns, he bites; and when he bites, 
His venom tooth will rankle to the death. 
Have not to do with him. Beware of him. 
Sin, death, and hell have set their marks on him, 
And all their ministers attend on him. 
-Richard III, Act 1, Scene 3. 
 
 
 
 
Chapter 3 
 
 
 
The Border-State: Jesse Bright and Democratic Politics in 1850-1851 
 
 
 
Sectional issues had risen to the forefront of American politics in the 
1840s. The annexation of Texas, war with Mexico, the debate over the Wilmot 
Proviso and the rise of the Free Soil Party had all intensified sectional tensions. 
At the national level, the candidates for the two parties had tried to finesse these 
issues in 1848, but questions remained about the Texas boundary. California, 
meanwhile, wanted to enter the union as a free state. The New Mexico territory 
had yet to be organized, which again raised the question of the expansion of 
slavery. Increasingly, southerners of both parties perceived an anti-slavery North 
eager to deny southern rights and northerners of both parties came to fear the 
existence of an undemocratic, even malignant, southern slave-power. Such 
divisions made compromise difficult and threatened to tear the nation apart. 
 
Indiana Democrats were divided between those who feared the slave- 
power and wanted to end slavery’s expansion and those who sympathized with 
the South. Most Indiana Democrats, however, shared a racist desire to keep the 
state overwhelmingly white. In 1849, both major Indiana parties had courted free 
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soil elements by co-opting a number of their issues. This trend began to reverse 
in 1850.  In 1850, as the sectional crisis intensified, Indiana Democrats—even 
those opposed to the expansion of slavery—rallied to a new cause: the 
preservation of the union. 
 
The crisis of 1850 placed Jesse Bright in a good strategic position in 
national politics, but it also placed him in a difficult position in Indiana. A 
southern-sympathizing senator from a northern border state, Bright assumed an 
important role in pressing for passage of what became known as the 
“Compromise of 1850.” Bright detested anti-slavery agitators of all kinds and he 
wanted to end the sectional debates, but he also knew that appearing to ally 
completely with the southern slave-power might leave him vulnerable to 
challenges from Joseph Wright and from Democrats in the northern half of 
Indiana. Hence, he had to exercise some political caution on controversial 
issues. 
 
This chapter begins by examining Bright’s role in the Compromise of 1850 
and also the response among Indiana Democrats to the compromise measures. 
But it also examines Bright’s efforts to make the compromise a test of party 
loyalty, and his efforts to bully and coerce Democratic editors who dared to 
question the compromise package. In addition, it explores Indiana’s pervasive 
racism by studying the state’s constitutional convention of 1850-1851 and the 
outcomes of Bright’s reelection bid and the congressional elections of 1851. 
 
*  *  *  * *  *  *  *  *  *  *  * *  *  *  *  *  * *  *  *  *  *  * 
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Sectional divisions intensified in 1849 and in early 1850. One reason for 
this was the discovery of gold in California, which set off a rush of settlers who 
provided a population large enough for statehood. Most came from the north and 
wanted California to enter the union as a free-state, which would tip the balance 
of power in the Senate against the South.1   There were other divisive issues as 
well. Texas’s boundaries were ill-defined, and southerners wanted its border to 
include present day New Mexico and Colorado. Others hoped to reduce its size, 
and proposed to assume some of its debts in exchange for less territory. The 
nation’s capital was another issue. Some northern anti-slavery advocates wanted 
Congress to abolish slavery in the District of Columbia. Moderate voices called 
for ending the district’s slave-trade instead. Finally, there was the issue of fugitive 
slaves. The Supreme Court’s Prigg vs. Pennsylvania (1842) ruling made the 
capturing of fugitive slaves a prerogative of the federal government. While the 
ruling seemingly favored southern interests, northern states realized they could 
use this principle to deny state resources in the capturing of fugitives. Many 
southerners, therefore, demanded that Congress expand the powers of the 
federal government to enforce the fugitive slave clause of the Constitution.2 
 
Zachary Taylor hoped to find a way around sectional agitation. Taylor was 
a wealthy slaveholder from Louisiana, but his experience in the military had 
made him an ardent nationalist. He desired to settle the issue of slavery with 
minimal controversy. His solution, known as the no territory plan, was for newly 
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acquired territories such as California and New Mexico to be admitted 
immediately as states, which in turn would allow state constitutional conventions 
to decide the fate of slavery rather than Congress. His proposal, however, 
angered southerners and provoked threats of disunion. Few southern 
slaveholders desired to take slaves into New Mexico or California where the legal 
status of slaves remained uncertain. Consequently, Taylor’s plan, the South 
feared, would almost certainly guarantee the creation of two new free-states. 
 
Angry southerners responded by debating how best to protect southern 
rights. They met at the Mississippi Slaveholders Convention to debate how to 
respond to the sectional controversies. Previously, such conventions had found 
little appeal outside of South Carolina. Now southerners from across the south 
and from different parties drew together. The issue was not merely California. 
Other territories, Oregon and Minnesota among them, were likely to become 
free-states soon. Southerners worried they would lose their balance of power in 
the Senate for good. Among the topics discussed was disunion. Nothing 
definitive was decided at the gathering, but an agreement to meet later at 
Nashville raised new concerns about the nation’s future.3 
 
In Congress, Taylor’s plan was pushed aside as an aging Henry Clay 
sought to resolve the sectional tensions on his own. Clay proposed eight 
compromise resolutions. He ignored the president’s no territory plan, and 
proposed instead a series of measures that he hoped would appeal to both 
sections. California would enter the union as a free state. New Mexico would be 
3 Freehling, Road to Disunion: Secessionists at Bay, 480-481. 
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organized without “restriction or condition on the subject of slavery.” While the 
wording was ambiguous, this meant, most assumed, that popular sovereignty 
(the will of the voting population as determined by the territorial legislature) would 
decide the fate of slavery. Clay further proposed trimming the borders of Texas, 
in return for the assumption of some of its debts. He proposed a resolution 
declaring the abolition of slavery in D.C. “inexpedient,” but agreed to compromise 
and support the abolition of the slave-trade in the capital.  Finally, Clay offered a 
federal fugitive slave law that declared Congress could not interfere with the 
interstate slave-trade.4 
 
For the next several months, Clay’s proposals faced opposition from both 
sections. Southerners, led by John C. Calhoun, opposed the admission of 
California, desired federal protection for slave property in the territories, and 
opposed the abolition of the D.C. slave-trade. William Seward, speaking for the 
northern free soil elements, objected to the fugitive slave law and desired the 
federal government prohibit slavery in the territories. Since the resolutions were 
not presented as formal bills, Clay formed a Select Committee in hopes of 
building broader support. Clay would chair the committee, which was made up of 
six Whigs and six Democrats and also divided by six southerners and six 
northerners. Jesse Bright secured a seat on the committee. 
 
As a member of the Committee of Thirteen, Bright played a prominent role 
in helping shape the compromise package. The Committee was formed on April 
18th, and completed its work by the end of the month. The plan had been agreed 
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upon by a majority of the Committee, and on May 8 Clay presented its work to 
the Senate. It contained three measures; one became known as the “omnibus” 
because it incorporated the issues of California, New Mexico and Texas into a 
single bill. Separate bills dealt with fugitive slaves and the D.C. slave-trade. 
Against the objections of Clay, a majority of the committee agreed to bar the New 
Mexico territorial legislature from prohibiting slavery.5 Bright’s role in shaping this 
portion is not known, although to gain a majority the committee needed at least 
one northern vote. 
 
Bright strongly supported the compromise measures, but in doing so he 
had to violate the instructions of the Indiana legislature. In January 1850, shortly 
after the free-soil dominated 1849 elections, Joseph Wright had backed a 
resolution instructing Indiana’s congressional members to support excluding 
slavery from the newly acquired Mexican territories. Bright refused to abide by 
the resolution.6 If he “pandered to this one idea,” Bright said, he would “have 
failed in the performance of [his] duty.” Voting to contain slavery would extinguish 
his “own self-respect.” There had been “much unpleasant criticism,” he 
acknowledged, from his fellow Hoosiers about his position. Perhaps because of 
this criticism, he expressed unreserved support for admitting California as a free 
state. He suggested that he did not personally agree with all the “arguments and 
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conclusions contained in the report,” but he nonetheless would “endorse it, 
broadly, distinctly, and emphatically.”7 
 
Bright’s defense of the compromise was founded on his hopes that it 
would end anti-slavery agitation and keep the union together. “All parties” in the 
western states, he said, “are tired of this eternal agitation. The public mind is 
wearied and worn out with it, and every voice that reaches my ears…confirms 
me in the opinion that it is due alike to the Union…”8 In private, he expressed 
similar views. He informed one friend, “If this bill fails, than fanaticism North and 
South, will commence their work in real earnest, and it remains for the future to 
recall [the] results.”9 
 
For the next two months, Congress debated and voted on amendments to 
the compromise packages. In the various votes, Bright sometimes sided with the 
southerners. For instance, on a vote to amend the omnibus so that the New 
Mexico territory would be allowed to prohibit slavery, Stephen Douglas and most 
northern senators (including Indiana Senator James Whitcomb) voted in favor of 
the amendment. Bright was one of the few northern senators to vote with the 
South against it. But he did not always vote with the southerners. When Jefferson 
Davis introduced an amendment allowing the New Mexico legislature to make 
laws introducing slavery, he voted against it with his northern colleagues.10 
 
 
 
 
 
7 Congressional Globe, 31st Congress, 1st Session, May 9th, 1850, 956. 
8 Congressional Globe, 31st Congress, 1st session, June 13, 1850, 1202. 
9 Jesse Bright to Caleb Lodge, June 22, 1850 (Copy), Jesse Bright Papers, Lilly Library. 
10 Congressional Globe, 31st Congress, 1st Congress, June 5, 1850, 1134-1135. 
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Bright’s purpose was to keep the omnibus bill intact as it faced opposition from 
both sections. 
 
While national party leaders struggled to craft a compromise, the situation 
in Indiana remained in flux. The Wright wing of the party was opposed to allowing 
the expansion of slavery.  The Indiana State Sentinel, edited by a Wright ally, 
expressed these views during the early debate over the compromise. The editor 
was not especially radical, but he had long maintained a commitment to free soil 
principles. With Bright seemingly in mind, he warned, “we do not mean to be 
driven from [our principles] to further the exclusive interests of the ‘South,’ or of 
any man or body of men whatever.” These principles were based on questions 
involving “human rights” emanating from “conscientious scruples” and the 
“cardinal principles of our own Declaration of Independence.”11 As was often the 
case when free-soil rhetoric might be misconstrued, the editor was sure to invoke 
racist language. He explained that the “nigger interest” belonged, and ought to 
remain, confined to the South.12 
 
For many Democrats, and especially Indiana’s conservative Democrats, 
preserving the union was the fundamental issue. Willis Gorman was typical of 
many of these Democrats. Privately he asserted, “This Union must be 
preserved!” He vowed not to foment anti-slavery agitation and provoke disunion, 
and if he did, he declared, “damn me, and my political career forever.” On the 
other hand, the Democrat assured that he would “never vote to send slavery one 
 
 
11 Indiana State Sentinel, February 14, 1850. 
12 Indiana State Sentinel, February 14, 1850. 
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foot further,” and would “never vote a pro slavery vote.” The congressman 
reasoned should slavery be “likely” to enter the territories he would “vote to arrest 
it.” Being that it was unlikely, however, he objected to joining the northern 
crusaders in applying “the incendiary torch to the magazine…”13 Many  
Democrats were turning away from free-soil politics. At the same time, they 
remained leery of the slave-power. 
 
Many Democrats feared the divisive consequences of a continued battle 
over slavery. One lamented “I fear that I have lived to see the day when my 
country begins to die.” Then through poem he expressed: 
 
Oh! Draw aside the curtain fate, 
And bid my dark forbodings flee, 
Is Anarchy to rule the State, 
Or Union and Sweet Liberty!14 
 
Another Hoosier living in Washington wrote, “There is a very bad state of feeling 
in the Capitol now, more than I have ever known: Clouds and shadows rest upon 
the future.”15 Increasingly the Wright wing of the party began to lose influence on 
the issue. Colfax’s paper noted that “Two years ago, a large minority, at least, if 
not a majority” of Democrats “insisted” upon the Wilmot Proviso. Now, “Scarcely 
a Democratic paper in the North now favors” it.16 
Cyrus Dunham, a Democratic congressman from the second 
congressional district, made similar arguments in favor of the compromise. He 
 
13 Willis Gorman to William English, January 17, 1850, William English Family Papers, Indiana 
Historical Society. 
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conceded slavery was “wrong” and “detrimental to the prosperity of any country 
where it exists.” Playing to the racial attitudes of his southern Indiana 
constituents, however, he denied having the “pharisaical piety” or “sickly 
sentimentality” that would “preach a crusade against the wickedness and 
oppression of others.” Dunham argued that the black slaves of the South were 
outsiders. Concerns for basic welfare were best reserved for whites within 
Indiana. He then criticized southerners for enslaving blacks who were legally 
freed. Above all, he feared that the Republic was in danger. “If this Union is 
destroyed,” insisted the congressman, along with it would go “the liberties of this 
people.” Dunham later elaborated, “I love this Union, not for itself, but as a 
means of securing and preserving what I hold dearer…the liberties of the 
American people; and when it shall fail to secure these, not only for the people of 
my section, but of all sections, my affection for it will cease.”17 
In Congress, however, Clay’s plan faced serious opposition. Some 
 
opponents attacked the omnibus by inserting amendments to poison it. Disaster 
struck when Senator James Pearce of Maryland sought to modify an aspect of 
the Texas boundary issue, which required removing the New Mexico provision. 
Clay objected, and both he and Bright voted against the move. The removal of 
New Mexico, however, passed. When Pearce sought to insert a modified version, 
the supporters of compromise, Bright and Clay included, supported Pearce’s 
efforts. The amendment failed. Immediately opponents of the compromise 
gathered enough southern support to remove the Texas and California provisions 
 
 
 
17 Congressional Globe, 31st Congress, 1st session, June 5, 1850 appendix, 836-839. 
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of the omnibus.18 After this, the compromise completely collapsed. Exhausted 
and ill, Henry Clay left the capital. At about the same time Zachary Taylor 
suddenly died and Millard Fillmore ascended to the presidency. At this point 
Stephen Douglas took charge of crafting the compromise provisions. 
 
Douglas wisely abandoned the omnibus and instead put forth six separate 
bills. In this way, he succeeded in restoring the popular sovereignty provision to 
the New Mexico bill. The territorial legislature would no longer be prohibited from 
legislating against slavery.19 The five other bills were to organize the Utah 
territory without restricting slavery, assume Texas debts and establish its 
territorial limits, admit California as a free state, abolish the slave-trade in the 
District of Columbia, and implement a federal fugitive slave law. Between July 31 
and September 16 the Senate voted to pass each of these bills, and the House 
followed shortly after the Senate votes. 
 
Bright did not vote on the Fugitive Slave Act. That day he had been in the 
Senate chamber, but he was apparently absent when it came time for the vote. 
Bright insisted that his absence was merely accidental. Bright had reasons to be 
in favor of the bill. Few slave owners had actually had slaves escape to the north. 
As William Freehling observed, “Only a thousand or so fugitives a year 
successfully escaped to the North, and those mostly from the Border South.” 
Bright, however, was one of them.20 Some years earlier, he had brought one of 
his Kentucky slaves to Madison, Indiana, where the slave was able to escape 
 
18 Congressional Globe, 31st Congress, 1st session, July 31, 1850, appendix, 1470-1488. 
19 Remini, At the Edge of the Precipice, 134-135. 
20 Freehling, Road to Disunion: Secessionists at Bay, 503. 
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along the underground railroad.21 Hence, along with many border state 
southerners, he saw the need for a federal fugitive slave law. Regarding his 
missed vote on the Fugitive Slave Act, he later asserted, “I supported those 
measures, each and every one of them, separately and collectively, in committee 
and before the Senate, from the beginning to the end of the controversy…”22 
Perhaps this was the case, but Bright also had reasons to worry. He 
realized that the Fugitive Slave Act was unpopular and would tie him to the 
southern slave-power.23 Voting for it might complicate his reelection bid in 1851. 
Indeed, while both Cass and Douglas were able to get their state’s Democratic 
House members behind the bill, they had more difficulty gaining the support of 
newspapers and Democratic voters.24 Of the three northern Senators who voted 
for the Fugitive Slave Act, only one returned to the Senate. Among the Indiana 
House Democrats, only two of the five voting in favor of the bill returned to 
Congress. 
 
Bright was among the few senators to vote for each of the other 
compromise bills. Only the New Mexico territory garnered majorities from both 
sections (11-10 from northern senators and 16-0 from southern senators). Every 
other bill required a majority from one section and a few cross-over votes from 
senators like Bright. He voted with most northern senators to admit California as 
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a free state and to abolish the slave-trade in D.C. Bright also voted with a 
majority of southern senators to organize the Utah territory under popular 
sovereignty. He also supported New Mexico and Texas.  All of the senators from 
Illinois and Michigan, including Douglas and Cass, followed the same pattern as 
Bright. They supported all of the compromise measures, but failed to vote on the 
Fugitive Slave Act. In all, four senators, two from each section, voted aye on 
each of the compromise bills. The northern senators were Democrats from 
Pennsylvania and Iowa. Bright was one of seven senators (six from the north) to 
support five of six bills. The two northern senators who voted aye on all the 
measures did not return to the Senate for another term.25 
Democrats in the Indiana congressional delegation had mostly supported 
the compromise.  Indiana Senator James Whitcomb was one example.  
Whitcomb had won his seat by taking a free-soil position. Once Bright’s rival in 
the 1840s, he now supported Bright on the compromise. Part of this evolution, it 
seems, came from Bright’s willing to deal in “some money matters” with 
Whitcomb.26  He abstained from the Fugitive Slave Act and the Utah territory 
question, but voted in favor of the other bills. Indiana’s House members generally 
supported the compromise as well. Every Indiana House member—Democrat, 
Whig and Free Soil—voted to admit California as a free state and abolish the 
slave trade in D.C. On Texas, six Indiana Democrats voted in favor, a northern 
Indiana Democrat voted against, and another abstained. On the bill to form the 
Utah territory, six Democrats voted in favor, and the two northern Indiana 
 
25 Holman Hamilton, Prologue to Conflict: The Crisis and Compromise of 1850 (Lexington: 
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Democrats voted nay. On the most controversial measure, the Fugitive Slave 
Act, five Indiana Democrats voted in favor, and three voted against. Two of the 
no votes came from northern Indiana. In spite of the early hesitation by Indiana 
Democrats, generally all but the northern-most Democrats fell in line.27 
 
The passage of the compromise bills received mix reactions. For 
moderates who hoped to end the agitation, the moment was cathartic. The issue 
of slavery in the territories had seemingly been settled. On the other hand, this 
was a limited “compromise” at best. Relatively few in either section supported the 
entire package. Indeed, some historians have referred to it as the “Armistice of 
1850.” At the very least, serious threats of disunion were held at bay, but clearly 
the sectional differences remained.28 
In Indiana, many Hoosiers were relieved. The Indiana State Sentinel 
declared the “struggle ended.” It now believed that “peace and harmony will  
again reign triumphant in this land of freedom…”29 Though the Madison Courier 
had qualms about the Fugitive Slave Act, it hailed the compromise as something 
to satisfy “all reasonable men in every section, and give peace and quiet to the 
country.” The Fort Wayne Sentinel, a moderate northern Indiana Democratic 
paper, did not “fully approve” of the compromise measures as they “conceded 
more to the South than it was entitled to in justice.” Nonetheless, it spoke for 
most Indiana Democrats when it expressed relief that “the matter [was] settled.”30 
The political situation in Washington had produced a dramatic shift in attitudes 
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among Indiana Democrats. Most opposed the expansion of slavery, but they 
were now increasingly fearful of agitation. On this issue, they shared a common 
bond with Jesse Bright. 
 
*  *  *  * *  *  *  *  *  *  *  * *  *  *  *  *  * *  *  *  *  *  * 
 
 
 
The battle over the compromise package—particularly the Fugitive Slave 
Act—had other important consequences for Bright. By 1850 and 1851 he had 
established a base of power within Indiana’s Democratic Party. He was not yet 
the party’s boss, but he was one of its most powerful figures, and he was 
determined to use his influence to make support for the compromise a test of 
party loyalty. Bright particularly sought to silence editors of the state’s Democratic 
newspapers who objected to the Fugitive Slave Act and who expressed free soil 
sympathies. Gaining control of these papers would both solidify Bright’s influence 
and impose a consensus within the state in favor of the Compromise of 1850. 
 
One of Bright’s targets was the Indiana State Sentinel, the state’s leading 
Democratic organ. Its editor Jacob Chapman had infuriated Bright by challenging 
the compromise measures. In Bright’s mind, Chapman’s free soil leanings made 
him an abolitionist who could not be tolerated. Possibly working with Michigan’s 
Lewis Cass (or so it was rumored), Bright arranged for the takeover of the 
Sentinel by Indiana congressman William Brown and Brown’s son Austin. William 
Brown was a somewhat curious choice to run the paper as he had ties to free soil 
congressmen and in his 1849 campaign for the House speakership he pledged to 
name Free Soilers to House committees. He was also leery of what he saw as 
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the fanaticism of southern Democrats.31 Still, in 1850 he had supported the 
compromise package and he tended to get along with all sides. 
 
From the start, however, the Browns faced suspicions about whether 
Bright actually ran the Sentinel. Brown tried to assure readers that the paper 
would “be the organ of the party and not any man, clique, or faction.”32 There 
were many who thought otherwise. The Whig Journal seized upon this, 
suggesting the Democratic organ had been taken over by the slaveholding 
interests.33   Indeed, William Brown spent much time assuring his readers that 
Jesse Bright had no financial interest in the paper. Whether Bright’s own money 
was involved in the transaction, clearly his influence was important.34 
 
Brown hoped to convince his readers that the paper met “the approval of 
the Democratic party and the people,” but his ties to Bright resulted in large 
numbers of canceled subscriptions.35 The Fort Wayne Sentinel, a local 
Democratic paper, suggested the organ had become “a little too southern in its 
tone and feelings.”36 William Brown privately confided that he was “anxious” to 
“get out of the hards” as his paper was “loosing 20 subscribers a day.” Brown 
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was also worried over rumors that a statewide free-soil Democratic paper would 
be established.37 
 
Meanwhile, Bright was trying to silence the editor of the Goshen 
Democrat, which was a northern Indiana paper with a strong free soil bent. Its 
editor Erastus Ellis railed against “Bill Brown and his masters,” and took special 
note of “Jesse D. Bright” as “a slaveholder of Kentucky.” In order to silence Ellis, 
Indiana Democratic leaders found him a lucrative position as state auditor, and 
then arranged for a new editor to take over the Goshen Democrat. In his 
inaugural edition, the editor remarked that “there are some things that, of late 
years, have crept into the party…which are calculated to destroy its harmony, 
and sacrifice, upon a fanatical altar its identity.”38 
 
Erastus Ellis, however, did not remain silent for long.  Shortly after moving 
to Indianapolis, he began publishing the Indiana Statesman, which was 
established to challenge the Sentinel and Jesse Bright. In the inaugural edition, 
the Statesman declared its fidelity to the Democratic Party, but rejected “blind 
submission” to “any man.” The main issue of contention, Ellis noted, was slavery. 
The editor believed that “while a northern Democrat may vote in Congress or 
advocate at home the surrender of a portion of our territory to the institution of 
slavery, without losing caste, so may another contend that such territory shall 
forever remain free and pure.”39 The paper was free soil but not radical in its 
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advocacy. It could tolerate slavery, but not what it believed to be the authoritarian 
dictates of a party boss who was going to infringe on their rights to speak and 
believe. Many of the Democratic papers in the state agreed. 
 
Ellis was a loyal supporter to Governor Joseph Wright. Judging by the 
patronage he received, the governor must have reciprocated the friendship.40 
With Wright’s backing, the Statesman soon had 2,000 subscribers and it would 
challenge Bright for the next two years.41 Bright would later groan over the 
prospects of having to swallow “such a dose as Jos A. Wright & Dr. Ellis,” and 
implored William English, an up-and-coming member of the state legislature, “For 
Heavens sake English, do all in your power to save me, and those of our Party 
who know these Creatures, as well as you and I do; from passing such an 
ordeal.”42 Eventually, Ellis was silenced when the party denied him re-nomination 
as auditor but named him instead as commissioner to the Institute for the 
Education of the Blind. In its farewell editorial, he noted that the Statesman had 
endured a “full measure of abuse” and had “been hunted and proscribed 
wantonly” in its efforts. Ellis claimed that he had sold his paper to promote the 
greater “harmony and prosperity of the democratic party.” He added, cryptically, 
that “other occupations, more congenial, presented themselves.”43 He would 
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eventually bolt the Democratic Party in 1855 in protest of the “Border Ruffian 
policy” that had become the test of “party fealty.”44 
 
Another of Bright’s newspaper wars became so heated that it nearly 
claimed the life of an unfriendly editor. When Garber took control of Bright’s 
hometown paper the Madison Courier in 1849, he and Bright professed warm 
relations, and Garber consistently endorsed him. Garber’s moderate free soil 
attitudes, however, did not sit well with Bright. Although the editor proclaimed that 
his devotion to the union was more important than agitating over slavery, he still 
hated “slavery as much as man can hate sin.”45 The Courier supported most of 
the compromise measures, but not the Fugitive Slave Act, which Garber had 
opposed because it contained no safeguards to protect those who were legally 
free. Garber, nonetheless, tried to maintain peaceful relations with Bright. “We 
differ with [Bright] on many questions of public policy,” he wrote, “yet we are 
friends—political and personal.” He added, “In all of our intercourse with Mr. 
Bright, we have ever found him careful of the rights and privileges of others.”46 
 
Garber’s efforts to defuse his differences with Bright had no impact, as 
Bright bitterly resented any kind of criticism. He retaliated by securing a 
resolution in the state legislature instructing “the Door-keeper…not to distribute 
any more numbers of the ‘Madison Courier’ to members of this House.”47 A 
furious Garber fired back. The powers of the state, he wrote, had “willfully shut 
44 Erastus Winter Hewett Ellis, “Autobiography of a Noted Pioneer” Indiana Magazine of History 
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their doors against light and truth. This body, had it the power, would establish a 
censorship over the Press of the State, and would forbid every article that in the 
least related to their ‘high mightiness,’ except in terms of praise.” Alluding to the 
outrages committed against Elijah Lovejoy, Garber declared that they could not 
summon the power to “prevent the people from reading; that they have not the 
power to send their sergeant-at-arms and doorkeeper to Madison and throw our 
press and materials into the Ohio river.”48 
 
Soon the state’s Democratic newspapers were taking sides as well. The 
Browns sided with Bright. In attacking Garber, the Sentinel declared itself part 
“the organ of [a] whole…National Democracy…broad and comprehensive as the 
Union.” Rather than being partisans of slavery, the editor insisted that it desired 
to lock “our doors against sectional animosities and local divisions.”49   Men who 
refused to toe the line on all the provisions of the compromise were “enemies of 
the Constitution, and the enemies of the Union.”50 
 
The New Albany Ledger criticized the Sentinel for raising the “wretched 
humbug” of making the Fugitive Slave Act the test of Democratic loyalty.51 The 
Rushville Jacksonian railed against the Sentinel’s “driver-ship of the whole 
democratic party.” Meanwhile, the Richmond Jeffersonian unearthed some of 
William Brown’s earlier remarks against the slave power. He quoted Brown’s 
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refusal to “bow” his “neck to the Slaveocracy of the South,” and taunted Brown 
for doing just that for Bright. In a swipe directed at the party boss, the Ledger 
noted that “people, now-a-days, don’t look to members of Congress as the only 
source of political wisdom. A caucus of Congressmen used to tell the people 
whom they should support for President.” Yet, the editor warned that such a 
politician “who would attempt such a thing now would find their position anything 
but a pleasant one.”52 
 
The war between Garber and Bright became more personal and heated. A 
letter from Bright to a William Taylor was inadvertently delivered to a Whig 
partisan of a similar name. In the letter Bright dismissed Garber’s protestations of 
personal support noting that “from his peculiar position” as editor, he had made 
“war with democratic principles over my shoulders.” Bright intended “to bring 
about a short peace,” that would “result in the expulsion of this dam’d scoundrel 
from our ranks.”53 In response, Garber began to attack Bright asking “what right 
has he to crush us? Have we no rights as citizens? Is every press and every 
publisher to be silenced because he cannot square his opinions to the standard 
of Jesse D. Bright and W. J. Brown?”54 
 
By the summer of 1851, Bright had had enough. At a July 8th meeting of 
his supporters, Garber was “read out” of the party. Bright declared that he 
wanted no part conciliating or buying up his competition. He wanted to drive 
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Garber out of business.55 To do this, he and his allies formed a rival paper, the 
Madisonian. In its inaugural edition, the Madisonian accused Garber and his 
paper “of abolitionist affinities,” and of deviating from Democratic principles.56  In 
response, Garber held his own mass meeting of Democrats who reaffirmed their 
support for him. At the meeting Garber also touted a letter from Governor Wright, 
which called the editor “a consistent Democrat.”57 
 
Garber was especially bitter at being described by Bright as an 
abolitionist. Bright had attacked him, he said, for “daring to stand erect and claim 
the attributes of freemen.” He added: “The Senator could not have taken a more 
arbitrary course on his plantation, and among his slaves in Kentucky.”58 In a 
private letter, the editor fumed: 
 
I offered him, Bright, a fight over and over but could not get it, nor 
could I find him at any time on the street. To have fought with his 
hired man would not have been very creditable, and would have 
afforded him and the press of the State a pretext for throwing me 
off by saying it is only a personal quarrel between the editors. I 
have whipped them out in their own way, and my friend, Gov. 
Wright will be renominated which will be driving the last nail into the 
political coffin of Jesse D. Bright.59 
 
Eventually, the war of words turned violent. Hamilton Hibbs, a Bright ally, 
was appointed to the welcoming committee for Louis Kossuth, a liberal  
Hungarian revolutionary. Since Garber was also appointed, Hibbs chose to 
publish a notice in the Madisonian claiming he “would rather be associated with a 
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negro than such men” as the Courier’s editor.60 This sent Garber into a rage. 
Upon passing Hibbs on the street, he spat on Hibbs’s face. A carpenter by trade, 
Hibbs had a chisel in hand and stabbed Garber several times. The attack left 
Garber close to death, but after a few weeks, he recovered and returned to the 
Courier. The shock of the incident seemed to cool passions somewhat, as even 
Hibbs appeared to display remorse over the incident. The underlying tensions, 
however, were to remain, as Garber eventually bolted the Democratic Party in 
1854. 
 
The incident enhanced interest in the Madison Courier. While Garber 
eventually reported a circulation of about five to six thousand readers, Bright’s 
mouthpiece floundered under a “sickly existence” before folding.61 Bright’s ability 
to garner popular support for himself and his pro-southern policies had 
limitations.62 
 
*  *  *  * *  *  *  *  *  *  *  * *  *  *  *  *  * *  *  *  *  *  * 
 
 
 
Indiana’s Democrats may have split over the Fugitive Slave Act, but this 
should not obscure a fundamental truth. Indiana’s Democrats were generally 
united in their racist beliefs and anxieties. In the early 1840s Indiana had been 
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among the free-states most resistant to developing an anti-slavery movement.63 
This reality provides context to understanding Indiana politics in the 1850s. 
 
The state’s racial attitudes were clearly evident when Indiana convened a 
constitutional convention in Indianapolis on October 7, 1850 to draft a new 
governing charter. The demand for a new constitution had become a major issue 
in the late 1840s. Democrats in particular objected to the 1816 constitution as 
outdated and undemocratic because it had established numerous appointed 
positions. After their sweeping win in the August 1850 elections, they pushed 
through legislation convening a constitutional convention.64 
 
Racial issues had not figured prominently in the call for the convention, but 
they gained salience when the neighboring states of Kentucky and Illinois placed 
residency restrictions on free blacks. Blacks comprised only about one percent of 
Indiana’s population, but most white Hoosiers nonetheless feared an influx of 
black immigrants. Many now looked for ways to discourage settlement. 
 
Throughout the convention, Democrats often displayed a virulent racism. 
One example of this was a cynical ploy by George Berry, a Democrat from 
central Indiana, who offered an amendment that would instruct “the committee on 
the elective franchise…to report a provision for the new Constitution, providing 
that negroes and mulattoes shall be voters at all elections in this state.” Berry  
had no intention of granting black men the right to vote. Rather, he hoped to 
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“enable gentlemen to vote on the question, in so tangible a manner, that their 
constituents could properly understand them…” Edward May, a Democrat from 
northern Indiana, did support black enfranchisement. Black Americans, he 
argued, had “the attributes of humanity” and “if not for his, for consistency’s sake, 
ever recognize him as a man and treat him as a man.”65 There were many white 
Hoosiers, particularly in northern Indiana, who sympathized with this view. They, 
however, objected to enfranchising blacks out of political expediency and fears 
that such advocacy would prejudice other rights for blacks.66 His plea had no 
impact as the delegates voted 61-1 against the proposal, with May its lone 
supporter. 67 
 
Another delegate not only voted against extending the vote, but called for 
denying the vote to any white citizen who might vote in favor of extending the 
franchise. The delegate thundered, “Sir, whenever you begin to talk about 
making negroes equal with white men, I begin to think about leaving the country.” 
His resolution stated: “That all persons voting for negro suffrage shall themselves 
be disfranchised.”68 Immediately, delegates objected. Joseph Robinson, a central 
Indiana Whig, admitted that he “never can, and never will, vote for negro 
suffrage,” but he objected to the notion that “our fellow-citizens,” merely “because 
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they entertain their sentiments honestly,” are thus to be “disfranchised and 
placed in the same condition with the African!”69 The resolution was defeated. 
 
The delegates did protect the rights of the state’s black residents in one 
instance. They opposed political and social equality, but they did believe in the 
sanctity of the right of property. This issue arose when a committee introduced a 
prohibition of “any negro or mulatto from purchasing or otherwise acquiring real 
estate hereafter.”70 Henry Thornton of Floyd County proposed to change this to 
“purchasing or holding” on the ground that such wording removed the ambiguous 
term “acquiring” and thus enabled descendents to inherit property. Thomas 
Gibson of Clark County proposed that the provision merely prohibit the 
“purchasing any real estate herafter.” The original proposal, he argued, would 
unjustly rob the heirs of property, while Thornton’s proposal would strip black 
Americans of their property. He was content to insist that if blacks were to sell 
property, they could only transact with whites so that “in the course of a very 
short time” few black Americans would hold property in Indiana.71 Another 
delegate objected to any kind of restrictions on property. He believed it “wrong in 
principle” as “many of them have been born here” and declared it to be “an 
outrage upon the feelings of the community…to deprive them of this right.”72 Still 
another found depriving black Americans of property ill-advised. He desired to 
have “inducements” for those who remained in the state “to hold property, for the 
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purpose of giving them an incentive to suppress disturbances and maintain order 
in the community.”73 
 
Jacob Chapman ridiculed the idea of protecting property rights. He denied 
any desire to “publicly kick ‘a nigger,’” but he wanted to restrict property rights in 
order to encourage blacks to settle elsewhere. As for the rights of property, 
Chapman remarked “Negroes are already divested of other rights of which 
nothing is said—they are taxed without being represented, they are deprived of 
the right to testify in our courts, they have extended to them none of the 
privileges and advantages of public schools, they cannot exercise the elective 
franchise, they are ineligible to the pettiest office; we deprive them now of all 
rights but the one of acquiring and possessing property.” Chapman queried that if 
giving property rights should create good public order, “why not grant them all” 
rights?74 
 
Some of the delegates who joined this debate demonstrated their extreme 
racism. One went so far as to declare free blacks as “vermin.” James Foster 
noted that he had observed large numbers of blacks in both Philadelphia and St. 
Domingo, and the “vast numbers of them” were “a more miserable race of 
beings” that “scarcely ever existed.” In his estimation the model example was 
“the Island of Cuba” where the slavery had produced a “much happier” 
population than where freedom existed. He contended that the “negro race” was 
“under the bane of Heaven—a curse that was pronounced upon them by 
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Almighty God…and it was declared that they should be the servants of servants. 
That curse has never been removed.”75 
 
The convention ultimately chose not to restrict property rights. It stated  
“No additional disability, not found in the old Constitution, is imposed” upon black 
Americans and “their descendants, who may be in the State at the time of the 
adoption of the amended Constitution.”76 The right to acquire property and to be 
secure in the fruits of one’s own labor was a principle the delegates would extend 
regardless of race. Indeed, the right of property was a fundamental element to 
northern free labor ideology. It was part of the economic individualism and social 
mobility that helped distinguish northerners from their southern counterparts.77 
 
The most important and revealing issue pertaining to race was whether to 
prohibit the immigration of free blacks. The demand for such a prohibition had 
become a popular cause after Illinois had done this in 1848 and Kentucky had 
adopted a law in 1850 placing severe penalties on emancipated slaves who 
remained in the state.78 Whites in Indiana feared that their state would now 
attract more black settlers.  A delegate remarked, “We were told some ten years 
ago, that no sane man would have thought of” excluding black Americans from 
Indiana. Yet there had become “a change of circumstances. The actions of the 
other States” he claimed, had compelled Indiana to act. The delegate compared 
the actions of Kentucky to that of a “neighbor” who “turns out his old horse to die” 
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by releasing it into one’s garden. The delegate reasoned that one should not 
have “any moral obligation” to “suffer him to remain there…None—none in the 
world.”79 Democrat James Read from southern Indiana claimed “great sympathy 
for the negro race.” Still, he represented a “constituency which has a stronger 
feeling, perhaps than any other in the State against the enfranchisement or even 
the immigration into the State of Negroes.” Read desired a means to provide 
“self-defense” from black settlement. He reasoned there were three ways to deal 
with the issue. One was “amalgamation.” For Read, this was no option at all. He 
said: “aye, sir, I repeat it, amalgamation.” His second option would be to “give up 
the State to the possession and rule of the black population.” Hence, the only 
reasonable option would be “to prohibit the immigration of negroes to the State, 
to give no encouragement to those that are here that they can ever enjoy equal 
social or political privileges.” He hoped, as well, that this would encourage blacks 
currently living in the state to leave.80 
 
Delegates such as Robert Owen favored exclusion on the grounds that  
the massive inequalities between blacks and whites would undermine democratic 
ideals. He did not desire to have his “children…grow up side by side with men  
like themselves, yet without the rights of freemen.” While Owen was not 
unsympathetic to granting fuller rights, he felt doing so was impractical. Owen 
declared that “those who speak as the especial friends of the African” claim that 
such prejudices “ought not to exist! So be it. But it does exist. Can you alter it?” 
He was convinced that the “prejudice” and “tyranny” of such sentiments and 
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practices could not be eradicated.  His solution was to bar further immigration of 
blacks into the state and work to colonize those that remained so they could have 
a “free home elsewhere.”81 
 
The convention’s vote to bar black immigration was a decisive 94-37. 
Delegates from southern Indiana supported exclusion by a vote of 38-2. 
Delegates in the central region favored it by a vote of 46-14. The northern 
Indiana delegates opposed it 21-9. Democrats favored exclusion by a total of 67- 
14, while Whigs narrowly favored it by a vote of 24-20. Among northern 
delegates, Democrats opposed the measure 9-8, while northern Whigs opposed 
it 11-0. 
 
More extreme delegates wanted to combine exclusion with support for the 
Fugitive Slave Act. Thomas Gibson, a southern Indiana delegate, proposed 
penalizing anyone who would harbor blacks entering the state with property 
forfeiture. Ever fearful of amalgamation, Dobson supported the proposal. He 
wanted to ensure that the “stronger race will keep itself clear of the weaker and 
thereby keep the blood pure.”82 But Othniel Clark, a northern Indiana Whig, 
objected. It was a virtuous person, he said, who would help a “sick and destitute” 
slave “trying to escape from his pursuers—fleeing from slavery” who might be 
“Worn with fatigue, fear, and hunger” and having fallen “down by the road side.”83 
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This measure was voted down 95-35, and the margin offers some basis to 
the observation that 90 percent of Hoosiers would “give a crust of bread and a 
cup of water to a weary fugitive.”84 It further suggests that many of those who 
supported exclusion did so out of fear of a broad influx of blacks. Individual 
slaves escaping from their masters evoked sympathy, even from racist 
Democrats such as Lew Wallace, who believed that “[i]n all nature there was 
nothing more natural than the yearning for freedom.”85 
 
Once approved by the convention, the exclusion provision, separately 
along with the rest of the constitution, was presented to the voters in a 
referendum held August 4, 1851. The Perrysville Eagle, an independent paper, 
suggested that many of the arguments “in favor of that clause…do utter violence 
to the spirit of freedom.” The proponents of exclusion offered arguments of mere 
“expediency.” The political class, the editors wrote, had “no heart to recognize 
those rights in others that they demand for themselves.”86 These observations 
were mostly correct. Some leaders advocated exclusion out of explicit bigotry, 
but others clearly held moral doubts. The State Sentinel likened the exclusion of 
black Americans to the situation of “two brothers” thrown from a shipwreck 
“clinging to the same plank.” If the plank “is unable to sustain the weight of both, 
the law of self-preservation, which knows no sympathy, will justify the stronger to 
break the grasp of the weaker to save himself.” Still, the editor concluded that the 
races could “never occupy the same domiciles, or stand on the same level of 
 
 
84 quoted in Thornbrough, Indiana in the Civil War Era, 50. 
85 Lew Wallace, An Autobiography, 239. 
86 quoted in the Daily Journal, April 30, 1851 
110 
 
equality.” “Amalgamation,” the Sentinel insisted, would “degrade the whites” and 
do little to improve blacks.87 
 
Racial anxieties often overrode otherwise humane attitudes. The New 
Albany Ledger typified this when it was “ready to admit” that the exclusion clause 
was against the “requirements of justice, and is a violation of the Golden Rule.” 
Still, it had a higher duty to the “law of self-defense and of self-preservation.” It 
was not the individual or intelligent black American that bothered the editor so 
much as fears that a massive influx of black populations. They feared that blacks 
would be driven out of Kentucky, barred from Illinois and possibly excluded from 
Ohio. If Indiana did not take action, proponents feared Indiana would become the 
“receptacle” of what it perceived to be the masses of “wandering, worthless, and 
corrupting negro population of the surrounding States.”88 The editors saw little 
room for reform or improvement. The idea that blacks could achieve equality was 
“perfectly futile” and the “chains” would be “drawn tighter around them” until they 
could see that colonization was their only true option.89 
 
Advocates of exclusion often coupled it with voluntary colonization. In his 
advocacy for the scheme, Samuel Parker suggested: “Our hearts bleed because 
of the thralldom in which our poor black brother is kept.” The Whig congressman 
explained that even in the North, “through the lanes and highways, the filthy 
hovels, damp cellars, and dirty sculleries of our own free land, and we will find 
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that poor, forlorn, outcast, downtrodden, disfranchised people still enslaved, and 
in a desperate thralldom, that would freeze our pure Christian blood.” While 
Parker expressed sympathy with the plight of black Americans, finding a solution 
that would allow them to remain in Indiana was out of the question: “None but 
crazy people think of amalgamation.” As if to underscore his fears of racial 
mixing, Parker declared, “We will never giver our daughters to them in 
marriage…We are of different races. God has made the difference, and we 
should act as wise men.”90 
 
Popular prejudice was indeed strong. The statewide referendum upheld 
the exclusion clause by a resounding 84 percent of the voters, which was an 
even more lopsided outcome than the 70 percent vote in Illinois three years 
earlier.91 Although support for exclusion was strong, the law itself was rarely 
enforced. Few blacks were prosecuted for entering the state. The law also 
required blacks who were already residing in the state to register, but only a 
small percentage did this. White Hoosiers, for the most part, ignored these 
violations of the law.92 By 1860, with Indiana’s overall population growing by 
nearly 400,000, Indiana’s black population grew by only 166. In discouraging 
blacks from moving into Indiana, the law had served its purpose. It also had one 
unintended consequence. By discouraging the immigration of blacks, it actually 
encouraged the free-soil movement later in the decade because Indiana’s small 
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black population reduced fears of amalgamation and of an increase in the 
number of black residents. 
 
*  *  *  * *  *  *  *  *  *  *  * *  *  *  *  *  * *  *  *  *  *  * 
 
 
 
The year following the 1850 crisis was an election year in Indiana for 
Bright and for all ten of Indiana’s members of the House of Representatives. 
These elections produced two important results. One was to solidify Bright’s 
position within the Indiana Democratic Party and the second was to make 
acceptance of the compromise package a test of party loyalty. 
 
Bright had spent much time in the fall of 1850 building, and perhaps 
buying, political support for his reelection. The key to his hold on power was his 
ability to exert leverage, even if it meant resorting to bribery with members of the 
state legislature. He was challenged by former Democratic congressman Robert 
Dale Owen. Early in the campaign, Owen raised charges of legislative vote- 
buying. A friend of Owen was aboard a steamer in late December discussing the 
upcoming senate vote with state representative George Graff of Gibson County. 
Though Owen had represented Gibson County as a member of Congress where 
an “overwhelming majority” of local Democrats favored the free-soil-leaning 
representative, the friend was mystified to learn that Graff intended to vote for 
Bright. Graff explained that he could “not expect any favors from” Owen “in way 
of appointments.” When Owen and a number of his friends confronted Graff for 
clarification, he informed them that a friend of Bright had offered him a bribe 
relating to a land speculation deal. Graff continued, “I could make more between 
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this and Saturday night by voting for Jesse D. Bright than I could by my 
profession, in a whole year.”93 
 
When Owen made these charges public, there was an immediate 
excitement. When Joseph Chapman, one of Bright’s “confidential friends,” 
questioned Graff about his statements, Graff quickly back pedaled. “No Bribe or 
other improper inducement,” he wrote, “has ever been offered or held out to me 
by any one—to vote for Mr. Bright, or to use my influence for his election.”  Graff 
now contended merely that “a friend” had convinced him that there would be 
“political advantages to myself” if he supported Bright.94   Soon he changed his 
story yet again and claimed that Owen had tried to purchase his vote. Eventually, 
Bright sought out Owen, and the whole affair, they agreed, had been a 
“misunderstanding.”95 Soon Owen wrote to the State Sentinel, rather dubiously, 
explaining that he “could not vouch for the truth of the report” he had earlier 
offered.96 When the Democratic caucus of the legislature met, it nominated Bright 
for another term. On January 11, 1851, the senator received the votes from all 
the Democratic members of the legislature as well as five Whigs from the 
southern Indiana. The five Whig votes may have been obtained through political 
favors. With wry cynicism, while discussing financial matters, Bright thanked a 
leading southern Indiana Whig organizer for his “disinterested efforts to procure 
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my reelection.”97   Following his victory, Bright and Robert Owen walked side by 
side at a dinner celebration.98 
 
Later in 1851, Bright and the Democrats prepared for the August 
congressional races. By this time, both parties largely accepted the “finality” of 
the compromise measures. In preparation for the Fourth of July celebrations, the 
Journal reprinted the Declaration of Independence. In light of the recent crisis, 
the Declaration, the Journal argued, presented “new beauties” and would “strike 
the mind with more force than on ordinary times.”99 
 
In the campaigns, Bright pressed to make a commitment to the 
compromise a test of party loyalty. The Democratic platform stated that “any 
action…that tends to weaken or estrange our high allegiance to its solemn 
provisions” are to be regarded “as faithless and treasonable.”100  In the northern 
region of the state, however, Democrats had difficulty navigating the stronger 
free-soil inclinations of the electorate. 
 
This proved especially true in the tenth congressional district. Democrats 
resolved at their district convention to secure for “the people of every State all the 
rights and privileges guaranteed” by the Constitution.  These northern Indiana 
Democrats offered hints of the conservative refrain “That every friend of the 
Union should deprecate all efforts, either North or South, tending towards 
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dissolution of this glorious Union.”101 The district convention alluded to the 
fugitive slave provision of the constitution, but made no specific mention of the 
1850 act. The nomination of James Borden, a fierce opponent of the Fugitive 
Slave Act, suggested that Democrats in this district were not entirely ready to 
surrender their free-soil views. Hoping to maintain party unity, the Indiana State 
Sentinel played a double game of opposing any candidate for Congress who 
refused to support the compromises, while feigning ignorance of Borden’s 
position on the issue. This was made somewhat plausible, as neither party made 
much mention of the sectional issues.  While both parties nominated men with 
solid free-soil credentials, judging by the extensive coverage of the campaign by 
the local party papers, one would scarcely know that slavery had ever been an 
issue.102 For Democrats this overt double game hardly inspired confidence and 
many stayed home on the day of the election. The Whigs, meanwhile, 
successfully won in the tenth by playing upon Reverend Brenton’s emphasis on 
religion and anti-party themes. These issues all seemed to signal a kindred spirit 
with the free soil element without overtly emphasizing slavery. The Fort Wayne 
Times, the district’s major Whig organ, hoped to appeal to both elements by 
emblazing on each of their editions the rallying slogan “Liberty and Union.” 103 
After Borden’s defeat, the Democratic state organ was less encumbered as it 
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charged that Borden had lost because of his “spirit of fanaticism” in opposing the 
Fugitive Slave Act.104 
 
A similar concern developed in Indiana’s ninth congressional district. Both 
candidates had strong free-soil credentials, but in the campaign they moderated 
their message. Graham Fitch, the Democratic incumbent, tended to sway with  
the political winds, and was thus a likely ally for Bright. Fitch had previously 
switched from opposing the Wilmot Proviso to supporting it and thereby had won 
over free-soil voters. Even though he had voted against the Fugitive Slave Act, 
Fitch, Bright realized, would be reliable. And indeed Fitch refused to commit in 
favor of the act’s repeal. As for the containment of slavery, he agreed to enact 
federal legislation “if such law were necessary,” but he expressed doubts that 
such laws were needed. Schuyler Colfax, the Whig nominee, was strongly 
identified with anti-slavery politics, but in the campaign he declared that while he 
had disliked the Fugitive Slave Act, he now accepted it as a means to preserve 
national harmony. On the territorial questions, Colfax backed away from his 
earlier support for the Wilmot Proviso on the grounds that slavery was unlikely to 
enter the remaining territories.  Sectional issues consequently played a minor 
factor on the stump. In one instance, Fitch briefly attacked Colfax for some of his 
more egalitarian racial attitudes. This was apparently in violation of an agreement 
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between the candidates and Fitch quickly backed off from such attacks. Both 
parties wanted to reduce sectional tensions.105 Ultimately, Fitch was reelected. 
 
In the seventh congressional district the Whigs nominated incumbent 
Edward McGaughey. In this race, however, many Whigs were dissatisfied since 
McGaughey had voted for the Fugitive Slave Act, and party leaders rightly feared 
a low Whig turnout. It was one thing to have opposed the unpopular bill and then 
to accept it, but it was entirely different to have supported it from the start.106 
Democrats nominated John G. Davis, a moderate free-soil-leaning Democrat, 
who captured the seat.107 
 
In the eighth congressional district, Democrat Joseph McDonald was 
denied re-nomination. McDonald had won the nomination in 1849 by pledging to 
support the Wilmot Proviso, but he then voted for popular sovereignty in New 
Mexico and for the Fugitive Slave Act. He lost to Daniel Mace, who had earlier 
declared the Fugitive Slave Act as an “outrage upon the statutes of heaven, and 
the rights of humanity.” Mace ultimately bowed to state party dictates and 
accepted the compromises as settled law. The key in the eight district race, as 
well as many of the others, was to have a candidate who fundamentally opposed 
strident pro-slavery measures, but who could also present himself as prudent 
and patriotic enough to accept compromise.108 
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In the fourth congressional district, Indiana Democrats repudiated George 
Julian. This was especially emblematic of the dramatic shift in how the party 
presented itself. In 1849, party leaders had acquiesced to the nomination of 
Julian so that they could expand their appeal to free soil elements. As the party 
moved toward stamping out agitation, repudiating a radical abolitionist was a 
given. The Sentinel expressed mortification that “his views and opinions would be 
regarded abroad as the sentiments of Indiana,” especially because they made 
“war on the fugitive slave law, the fugitive slave clause” and indeed nothing less 
than “the Constitution and the Union itself.” 109 Julian’s speeches, the Sentinel 
noted, talked openly of resisting the fugitive slave law. For Julian, the law itself 
was a debasement of what the American Union stood for, as it required “us to 
take side with the oppressor” and “become the miserable flunkies of a God 
forsaken Southern slave hunter.”110 Julian’s opponent, Samuel Parker, was a 
moderate free-soil Whig, who accepted the finality of the compromise.111 On 
August 14th, the Sentinel ran two pages of stories covering the defeat of Julian, 
with the second story rather insincerely asserting, “He has fallen, and we have no 
disposition to triumph.”112 
 
In southern Indiana, sectional issues were virtually non-existent. River 
harbor improvements tended to be the greatest subject of interest. Otherwise, 
there was little to separate the opposing candidates beyond personalities and 
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party identification, and Democrats easily swept the first, second and third 
districts with candidates who were all loyal to Bright.113 
 
The impact of the 1850 Compromise on the 1851 congressional elections 
was complex. On one hand, a number of congressmen who sold out to the slave- 
power by supporting the Fugitive Slave Act, namely northern Indiana Democrat 
Joseph McDonald and Whig Edward McGaughey, were punished by voters. 
Democrats Graham Fitch and John Robinson saved themselves by voting  
against it. On the other hand, both Whigs and Democrats generally accepted the 
finality of compromise. Several months later when the House decided to sustain 
the Fugitive Slave Act and “deprecate agitation on the subject,” the entire Indiana 
House delegation, except northern Indiana Whig Samuel Brenton, voted in favor. 
In Indiana politics there was a delicate balance between checking the slave- 
power and resisting anti-slavery agitation. In 1851, Indiana political leaders 
threaded a small needle. Democrats were also able to maintain their political 
dominance. Previously they held nine of ten congressional seats. Now they held 
eight of ten seats. The loss of Indiana’s fourth congressional seat was merely a 
political quirk. After Democrats jettisoned support for free soil Democrat George 
Julian, the fourth shifted back to its usual Whig dominance. 
 
 
 
 
*  *  *  * *  *  *  *  *  *  *  * *  *  *  *  *  * *  *  *  *  *  * 
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Bright was far more active in 1850-1851 than he had been in 1849. 
Perhaps the sectional crisis had emboldened conservative Democrats. In the 
aftermath of the 1851 elections it seemed that sectional issues had finally been 
resolved. Both major parties and their newspaper allies seemed to accept the 
finality of compromise. The outcome of the exclusion referendum showed that 
while Indiana was generally opposed to the extension of slavery, it also desired 
to keep Indiana free of blacks. Certainly most Hoosiers were leery of radical 
agitators. With Indiana Whigs becoming less competitive and sectional issues 
held in check by the Compromise of 1850, Bright was in a powerful position. 
While renegade Democratic newspapers continued to stir popular resentments 
against the overbearing senator, few ambitious politicians desired to cross him. 
Bright seemed ready to rule Indiana politics. 
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Clarence still breaths; Edward still lives and reigns. 
When they are gone, then must I count my gains. 
Richard III, Act 1, Scene 1 
 
 
 
 
Chapter 4 
 
 
 
Jesse Bright and the Breakdown of Party Politics: 1852-1854 
 
 
 
In the wake of the turmoil of 1850, Indiana’s political leaders in both 
parties came to accept the compromise package in hopes that it would defuse 
the bitter sectional tensions. The wobbly armistice, however, did not bring an end 
to the factional division within Indiana’s Democratic Party as Jesse Bright 
continued to battle Joseph Wright for control. The Whigs, meanwhile, struggled  
to remain a viable northern party and the Free Soil movement seemed to be 
fading away. 
 
For Bright, the immediate challenge was to control the party delegation to 
the presidential nominating convention in Baltimore in 1852. The result, he 
hoped, would be the nomination of a pro-southern Democrat who would sustain 
the compromise of 1850 and steer patronage to his supporters in Indiana. Such 
hopes, however, were not to be realized. Instead, the old Missouri Compromise 
of 1820 was ripped apart, party politics entered a period of upheaval, and the 
debate over slavery’s expansion reemerged in ways that profoundly disrupted 
American politics. 
 
*  *  *  * *  *  *  *  *  *  *  * *  *  *  *  *  * *  *  *  *  *  * 
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Following Bright’s reelection to the Senate and the near-sweep by the 
Democrats of Indiana’s congressional seats, Bright turned his attention to the 
1852 elections. Within the state, the Democrats enjoyed a commanding position. 
The new constitution had liberalized voting requirements for foreign voters, which 
made it easier for the state’s Democratic-leaning German and Irish immigrants to 
cast ballots. Meanwhile, the Whigs in Indiana suffered from the disarray of their 
national party. The state’s Free Soil movement in Indiana was weakening and 
showed no signs of regaining its strength of 1848 and 1849.1 
 
Within the Democratic Party, Bright continued to fight for control. Erastus 
Ellis still published the Statesmen and Michael Garber the Courier. And Governor 
Joseph Wright had formed an alliance with the Indiana State Sentinel. In 
February of 1852, the Indiana State Sentinel said of Wright:  “The hearts of the 
people are with him and for him.”2 Wright had previously worked with Robert Dale 
Owen to help the Browns negotiate a merger with the Statesman. The Browns 
turned down the offer claiming they objected to terms that would have made  
them “second fiddle” in the partnership.3 Still, the Sentinel had increasingly 
demonstrated its independence from Bright. When Bright supplied Whig editors 
with embarrassing information on Joseph Wright, the Sentinel defended the 
governor.4 Such independence angered Bright, who wrote his political lieutenant: 
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“You ask me if [I] get the Sentinel[,] !!! I do !!!”5 Wright hoped for a second term 
as governor, but Bright pleaded: “I do not wish to see…voters…asked 
to…swallow such as dose a Jos A Wright & Dr. Ellis at our October Elections in 
1852.” He added, “For Heavens sake English, do all in your power to save me, 
and those of our Party…from passing such an ordeal.”6 
 
The alliance between the Sentinel’s editors and Governor Wright posed 
another threat to Bright because of their support for Stephen Douglas. In April of 
1852, the Sentinel reprinted an article that described Douglas as a “gallant young 
Senator from Illinois” whose “nomination at the Baltimore Convention would be 
cordially responded to by the people.”7 Wright also hoped Douglas would win the 
Democratic nomination. Bright had other ideas. He and his supporters realized 
that if Douglas should win the presidency then Joseph Wright would obtain most 
of the state’s patronage. But Bright also questioned whether Douglas was 
sufficiently pro-southern.8 Douglas, like Bright, was a slave owner through 
marriage. Douglas’s first wife, Martha, came from a slaveholding family in North 
Carolina. Upon their marriage, Douglas’s father in-law had offered Douglas a 
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plantation with slaves. Douglas refused upon the grounds that he was a 
northerner and was ill-equipped to manage such a property. When his father-in- 
law died, Martha became owner of the slaves because Douglas, according to the 
will, “does not desire to own this kind of property.”9 Douglas, in other words, 
preferred to keep his distance from the slave-power. 
 
Bright’s first choice for the nomination was former Oregon Territorial 
Governor Joseph Lane, a southerner by birth who had served in Indiana politics 
before moving to Oregon.10 Realizing that some Democrats who publicly 
supported Lane privately favored Douglas, Bright carefully picked his delegates 
to the national convention.11   Bright’s second choice was Lewis Cass, Michigan’s 
reliably conservative doughface Democrat.12 
 
At the Baltimore convention, Bright kept Indiana behind Lane through 
about thirty ballots, but when Stephen Douglas took the lead, he switched his 
support to Cass. Eventually, the dark horse candidate Franklin Pierce won the 
nomination. Pierce’s position on slavery was ambiguous, but by accepting the 
finality of the compromise, he was able to consolidate support of Democrats from 
David Wilmot to ardent southern slaveholders.13 In the campaign that followed, 
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Pierce faced the Whig candidate Winfield Scott and John Hale, the Free-Soil 
nominee from New Hampshire who was running with Indiana’s George Julian. 
 
In the campaign in Indiana, there were three significant developments. 
One was the extent to which both major parties embraced the compromise. The 
Whigs, appealing to their “great conservative principles,” produced a platform 
that “received and acquiesced” to the Fugitive Slave Act “in principle and 
substance.” It called for strict enforcement and deprecated “all further agitation” 
that could endanger the national character of the “Whig party and of the Union.” 
On economic issues, the Whigs, merely endorsed harbor improvements that 
were “national and general in their character.” 14 
 
Speaking for Indiana’s Democrats, the Indiana State Sentinel accepted 
the 1850 Compromise as well. Throughout the fall campaign, the paper 
emblazoned above its editorials Franklin Pierce’s proclamation that there was 
“No North, no South, no East, no West under the Constitution; but a sacred 
maintenance of the common bond and true devotion to the common 
brotherhood.”15 The New Albany Ledger, a paper Bright sometimes denounced, 
supported Pierce. It rebuked “the spirit of fanaticism” that existed among “certain 
New England abolitionists.” Pierce, the Ledger said, was “sound on the 
compromise and opposed to slavery agitation.”16 
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During the campaign, in fact, rival editors squabbled over which party was 
the most conservative as they appealed for less “agitation.” John Defrees, the 
Whig editor of the Indiana State Journal, taunted: “The ‘Sentinel is still in trouble 
because the Whigs did not see proper to agitate the slavery question at their late 
State Convention.” The Sentinel jested, “Oh no! ‘the Whigs did not see proper to 
agitate the slavery question at their late State Convention.’ Whilst Defrees, 
permits the feline ‘critter’ to show only a portion of its body, he takes care not to 
let the cat quite out of the bag.”17 
 
A second development was the weakness of the Free Soil movement. In 
stark contrast to 1848 and 1849, the free soilers had almost no impact on party 
positions. Andrew Robinson, the Free Soil candidate for governor, won only two 
percent of the vote, and when he campaigned in Terre Haute, he was mobbed by 
ruffians when he tried to speak.18 
 
A third major development was the weakening of the Whig Party. Schuyler 
Colfax tried to claim that the Indiana Whigs were in the minority because of 
immigrant voting. He wrote William Seward that had Indiana been composed of 
the same voters as in the 1848 election, the state “would be safe for Scott.” 
Instead, the new constitution had “made voters” among German and Irish 
immigrants who largely voted Democratic.19 But in reality, the Whigs were in 
decline. As the election approached, Whig leaders lamented that Scott would 
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probably be “unsuccessful in our own state.”20 The Journal, sensing the 
hopelessness among its faithful, exhorted Whigs to get to the polls “whatever the 
result,” but such pleas did not work.21  In Indiana, Franklin Pierce outpolled 
Winfield Scott by nearly 15,000 votes, which was a massive increase from the 
5,000 vote margin the Democrats had enjoyed in the 1848 election. The 
gubernatorial race was even more decisive as Wright won by about 19,000 
votes. The Whig St. Joseph Valley Register lamented that its home county had 
lost to the Democrats in a presidential election for the first time. With a bit of 
ethnic tinged bitterness, the paper lamented that many voters had been “bought, 
bribed [and] drunk on hard cider or whisky.”22 The Free Soil Party earned a 
thousand fewer votes going from about 5.3 percent of the vote in 1848 to 3.8 
percent in 1852.23 
 
In the congressional elections, the Democrats gained seats. Because of 
reapportionment, Indiana now had eleven congressional districts and Democrats 
won back the northern tenth district and also the newly established eleventh to 
claim a 10-1 majority. Samuel Parker, of the Quaker dominated fifth district 
(previously drawn as the fourth), became the state’s lone Whig congressman. 
 
The commanding victories did not heal the state’s internal party divisions. 
When James Witcomb died in 1852, Wright and Bright both pushed favored 
candidates for the senate seat. Bright wanted Graham Fitch for the position, but 
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Wright pressed for John Pettit. When the legislature voted, Pettit, who was 
perceived as an opponent of the expansion of slavery, won 54-47. Initially, this 
seemed a setback for Bright, but Bright soon won Pettit to his side. Working with 
Bright, Pettit realized, could be profitable, and once in the Senate he became an 
ultra-doughface Democrat.24 
 
Bright found it more difficult to work with the new presidential 
administration. With the help of Joseph Lane and others, he pursued a cabinet 
appointment, but Pierce rebuffed his efforts. In rejecting Bright, Pierce told Lane 
that he would select his cabinet based on “Acknowledged ability—integrity— 
peculiar fitness for various positions” as well as “soundness and unity in 
principle…”25 Shortly afterward Bright wrote to Senator James Buchanan: “your 
friends have generally favored my claims,” but he also acknowledged “I have 
never felt that there was much prospect of my having a place offered me…”26 
Writing to William English, he said he was content to “dismiss the Cabinet from 
my mind.”27 
 
Bright may have claimed to have given up on the cabinet post, but he 
soon developed a strained relationship with Pierce. Bright’s growing ties to 
doughface northern and hard-line southern Democrats help to explain this. One 
of his most important allies was James Buchanan, the Pennsylvania doughface 
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who believed the key to Democratic fortunes was to court the party’s southern 
wing.  Bright also maintained close relations with Joseph Lane and John C. 
Breckinridge, the Kentucky congressman who represented the district containing 
Bright’s farm. Another important ally was northern banker, philanthropist and 
political financier William Corcoran. Corcoran, who would eventually become a 
fervent confederate sympathizer, offered Bright financial support, but reading 
through the senator’s letters, one has the sense that Bright’s attachment to 
Corcoran extended beyond the financier’s bank account. But Corcoran’s wealth 
was an important asset. In order to boost Breckinridge, Bright introduced him to 
Corcoran and he assured Breckinridge that Corcoran would supply $1,000 for his 
campaign.28 
 
Bright had become particularly close to Mississippi Senator Jefferson 
Davis. An incident early in Pierce’s presidency suggests the extent of Bright’s 
loyalty to Davis. Davis had played an important role in developing Zachary 
Taylor’s report on the Battle of Buena Vista, which glorified the role of a 
Mississippi rifle company at the expense of the Indiana volunteers. When some 
Indiana Democrats produced a petition hoping to deny the Mississippi senator a 
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cabinet position, Bright was asked to present the petition to the president. 
Instead, the Indiana senator pocketed the petition and privately showed it to 
Davis. This infuriated some Indiana Democrats, but their anger did not stop 
Bright from maintaining close ties to Davis, who became Secretary of War.29 
Bright also formed close ties to Southern Democrats such as the so-called “F 
Street mess” senators who were led by the hard-line Missourian David 
Atchison.30 
 
Early in his presidency, Pierce’s political appointments became a 
contentious issue. With the Whig Party disintegrating, the Democratic Party no 
longer faced an external foe. As a result, the Democrats found it more difficult to 
unite their many factions. These divisions were based upon ideology, local 
rivalries, and sectional issues. The president had hoped to evenly distribute 
patronage in order to foster unity. Hence he rewarded supporters of the 1850 
compromise, free soil Democrats who had opposed it, and hard-line southerners 
who had also refused to back the compromise. In the South, especially, the free 
soil appointments gave southern Whigs ammunition to claim Democrats were not 
reliable defenders of southern rights. As Michael Holt observed, “Pierce’s 
appointments…were catastrophic; by trying to please everybody, he alienated all 
factions.”31   Bright attacked the administration’s actions by introducing a 
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resolution that would have required Senate confirmation for the assistant- 
secretary of state—thereby limiting presidential control of a major appointment.32 
 
Bright was especially disdainful of the president’s attempt to appease free 
soil Democrats. This came about through Pierce’s handling of the fight within the 
New York Democratic Party. The state’s three factions included the Barnburners 
who had previously bolted to the Free Soil Party in 1848, the Softs, who 
welcomed the Barnburners back into the fold, and the Hards, who opposed all 
reconciliation with former Free Soilers. Pierce tried to curry favor with all three. 
One of the president’s more controversial appointments was John A. Dix of New 
York as assistant treasurer. The Barnburner had run for governor in 1848 as a 
Free Soil candidate. There were many Democrats who still smarted over this, 
believing he had drawn enough votes to hand the election to the Whig Party. 
Bright was contemptuous that the president would appeal to these disloyal 
elements. 
 
Almost from the start, Bright was critical of Pierce. He would later refer to 
him as “weak and imbecile.”33 But Bright’s opposition to Pierce cost him 
important sources of patronage which in turn frustrated his Indiana supporters. 
One Democrat in central Indiana observed that Bright’s early opposition to the 
administration was “a source of considerable annoyance to his friends in this part 
 
 
 
 
32 Holt, The Political Crisis of the 1850s, 142-143; Franklin Pierce: Young Hickory of the Granite 
Hills (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1931), 255; Gara, The Presidency of 
Franklin Pierce, 76. 
33 Jesse Bright to Edmund Burk, November 12, 1856 quoted in Gienapp, The Origins of the 
Republican Party, 440. 
132  
of the state.”34 While Bright alienated many Democrats, he also had difficulty 
managing the state organ. As the Indiana State Sentinel’s William Brown exerted 
more independence, Bright privately groaned, “Lord deliver me from the painful 
operations of sitting with Jos A. Wright…or Bill Brown as Colleagues.” Later he 
wrote again, “I am distinctly against any negotiations with Bill Brown. I bid him 
defiance. I would not contribute a Dime toward purchasing him out he will find his 
level soon & have to sell out or be driven out.”35 The Sentinel never directly 
challenged Bright in its pages. Still, anything short of full cooperation did not sit 
well with the Indiana senator. Bright, as always, refused to back down. Writing to 
his friend John C. Breckenridge, the senator explained that he was concerned 
that President Pierce favored Governor Wright and his allies in the distribution of 
patronage.  Bright added that he was headed back to Indiana “to make ‘the 
crooked strait’ (sic) so far as relates to Indiana, which I intend to do, or die trying. 
I have got matters about right, I think.”36 
 
*  *  *  * *  *  *  *  *  *  *  * *  *  *  *  *  * *  *  *  *  *  * 
 
 
 
Jesse Bright’s battles with the Pierce administration over patronage 
suggest how sectional issues were reshaping American politics. But as historians 
have long noted, other issues were also vital to the politics of the early 1850s. 
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Two of these were temperance and the rise of anti-Catholic nativism. Both would 
play an important role in Indiana politics. 
 
Temperance was a critical issue by the early 1850s. In 1851 Maine had 
outlawed the sale of alcohol intended for consumption, and temperance 
supporters in other states followed with similar campaigns. By 1853 it became a 
popular issue in Indiana. One estimate found that as many as one hundred of 
Indiana’s one hundred and ten newspapers supported temperance in some 
form.37   Temperance supporters held a statewide convention in August of 1852, 
and by the autumn of 1853 there were county organizations across the state 
holding meetings.38 
 
Temperance touched a reformist impulse often associated with religious 
Whigs, and drew much of its support from them. Among Democrats, however, 
temperance was a divisive issue. Key constituencies within the party, especially 
Irish and German voters, resented New England-style laws to impose moral 
values. Most party leaders opposed stringent liquor laws, but many Democrats, 
including Joseph Wright, were moderate temperance men. Wright had pledged to 
support legislation that would regulate the sale of liquor and outlaw drunkenness, 
but hoping not to offend the pro-liquor elements of the party, he urged the 
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legislators to avoid “ultra measures.”39 Many Democrats who supported 
temperance, including Wright, belonged to the Methodist Church. According to 
one account, “it appeared as if the whole Methodist Church was present at the 
convention,” and many of these Methodists also happened to be Democrats.40 
Additionally, the president of the state temperance convention in January 1854 
was Edward Ames, who was a Methodist minister and Democrat. 
 
The division over temperance posed a danger to the party. The Sentinel 
warned against the seductive machinations of the party’s enemies who “may love 
temperance some,” but it warned that this movement “hate[d] Democracy 
more.”41 The party organ emphasized that Democratic Governor Wright was a 
man of personal temperance, even if the party generally opposed stringent 
temperance legislation.42 The party had hoped to resolve the question of 
temperance laws through a popular vote or through local option laws.  True to the 
ideology of localism, the Democratic legislature had finessed the issues by 
enacting an 1853 law to prohibit the sale of intoxicating liquor in quantities  
smaller than a gallon∗, but it had also given local communities the option to 
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exempt themselves from such restrictions. This attempt to straddle the issue 
failed, however, when the Indiana Supreme Court nullified the law.43 
 
More potent and more divisive was the nativist movement that erupted in 
the early 1850s. Generally speaking, the movement opposed immigration. 
Foreigners, the nativists believed, were morally corrupt and lacked American 
democratic values. Nativists especially opposed Catholic immigrants. Nationally, 
the movement had become especially strong in 1852 and 1853, and had become 
known as the Know Nothings. The name came about when members were 
instructed to proclaim that they knew nothing about the organization when 
questioned by outsiders. It had grown as a result of concerns about the 
perceived moral vices of the new immigrants, and the fear that the immigrants 
would displace workers and bid down wage rates.44 
 
These social, economic and political forces shaped the nativist movement 
in Indiana. Recent immigrants who intended to become citizens were eligible to 
vote after residing in the state for six months. In 1850, those who were foreign 
born comprised about 5.6 percent of Indiana’s 988,416 residents. By 1860 this 
percentage had increased to about 8.8 percent of Indiana’s 1,350,428 residents, 
and these voters were overwhelmingly Democratic. Toward the end of 1853 and 
beginning of 1854, Know Nothing sentiment began grow in Indiana. In February 
1854 the first Know Nothing chapter officially formed in Dearborn County. Over 
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the next couple months, chapters sprang up throughout the state. Contemporary 
accounts estimate that between May and July 1854 Know Nothing membership 
grew from 30,000 to 60,000.45 Occasionally, nativism was connected to the 
temperance issue. When the Fort Wayne Times took up the temperance cause 
against “intoxicated rowdies on the streets,” the paper made an explicit 
connection by observing that “burley Irishmen” ruffians were assaulting 
temperance advocates.46 
 
In Indiana, nativists attitudes were directed largely at Catholic immigrants. 
Schuyler Colfax’s Whig party organ suggested that “Americanism, rightly 
interpreted, is in accordance with the genius of our Free Institutions.” The paper 
rejected “sentiment which makes distinction on account of birth place.” Instead, it 
was a “wise and beneficent” movement intending to take the foreigner “by the 
hand” and to “Let them understand our Institutions, become familiar with our 
laws, before they exercise the rights of ‘citizens.’”47   As the Register assured its 
readers, “Principles and character, not birth place” were “the true test of genuine 
Americanism.”48 Yet, Colfax declared, only “Protestant foreigners” could be 
accepted as true Americans.49 Another former Whig paper was more explicitly 
anti-Catholic. It accused the “papal system” as being a threat to “religious liberty” 
and “freedom of the individual man to think and act for himself.”50 
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The number of Democrats the Know Nothing movement drew is unknown. 
Membership generally remained a secret and few people admitted to being 
members of the organization. Most of the known members had been former 
Whigs. William Cumback, who became a Know Nothing, was among the small 
number of Democrats known to have joined the movement.51 Yet as one  
historian has suggested, most Democrats involved in temperance “likely…seized 
upon the secret society as a device to ensure a consolidated prohibitionist vote in 
October.”52 
 
With many Democrats favoring temperance and nativism, these issues 
threatened to destabilize the party system. John Defrees understood this, and 
began agitating on behalf of temperance, as this had the added benefit of 
appealing to the nativists. Rather than openly proclaiming support for any party, 
the Whig leaders within the temperance movement advised their supporters to 
vote only for candidates who committed to a strict anti-liquor law.53 The old Whig 
state organ insisted it would “rather have a Democratic Legislature” that would 
support a temperance law, “than a Whig Legislature that would not.”54 These 
Whigs also gave Democrats top leadership positions in the hopes of drawing 
more support away.55 Though the movement was largely Whig, the leaders 
realized that they could not rally voters around the old Whig Party. Previous 
attempts to court Catholics had soured nativists on the Whig Party. Additionally, 
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the Whig label was an anathema to those with Democratic ties. These leaders 
hoped to build a new political system under a different party banner. 
 
The Whigs by 1853 were in disarray nationally and in Indiana. During the 
1840s, Whig economic policies had become a liability in Indiana. By the early 
1850s this was made worse by national trends. Michael Holt has observed that 
the demand for government investment declined as access to private capital 
increased. The gold rush of 1849 increased money circulation, and the European 
revolutions of 1848 diverted European investments to the New World. The 
American economy was expanding and there was less need for Whiggish 
economic policies to provide a guiding hand.56 Indiana Democrats could argue 
that the revenue-generating Walker Tariff of 1846 coupled with their hands-off 
policies had been the key to the economic prosperity.57 
 
Even before the 1852 campaign, most Indiana Whigs were pessimistic 
about their party’s future. One prominent Whig asked, “Are not the Whigs of 
Indiana and the free negroes put…substantially on a par? No virtues in the one 
can secure them office; the others are ineligible. What is the difference?” The 
comparison made clear the depths of Whig despair. There was also the Irish 
problem: every “bog trotting Irishman in the land voting—the Whigs in the 
minority by more than 10,000…What can I, what can you, what can any Whig 
hope under such circumstances?”58 It was more than just foreigners. Whigs 
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attempted to run a military general campaign as they had in 1840 and 1848, but 
in 1852 it took more than hard cider and gun powder to excite voters.59 
 
Earlier Whig attempts to pull German voters away from the Democratic 
Party proved just as abortive. The 1852 visit from the liberal Hungarian leader 
Louis Kossuth had highlighted these difficulties.  Kossuth was a foreign political 
leader who enchanted Hoosiers with his efforts to bring American liberal 
democratic values to Europe. While nearly all factions in America admired the 
champion of freedom, German Americans held a special reverence for him.60 
Whigs had hoped to ingratiate themselves to Germans by expressing support for 
Kossuth. Indiana Democrats, however, had seized upon Whig uneasiness over 
foreign entanglement to claim that Whigs did not support Kossuth. Indiana Whigs 
opposed the Hungarian’s call for the United States to support Great Britain in 
Britain’s conflict with Russia. Democrats were able to use this to suggest Whigs 
were secretly hostile to Kossuth.61 
 
The new opposition party tried again to appeal to German Protestants. 
Godlove Orth, an important leader among the Whigs and Hoosier Know 
Nothings, maintained close ties to his family’s German heritage, and often used 
his language skills to campaign in German communities. Orth also cultivated ties 
to the German community by lobbying for public documents to be translated into 
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German.62 In spite of these efforts, Irish and German voters remained leery of the 
social morality preached by the Whigs. In particular, Germans disliked the 
temperance crusades. Although German immigrants tended to share the anti- 
slavery sentiments of most Indiana Whigs, they generally found Democratic 
commitment to social freedom more congenial. 
 
Even without sectional issues, the political situation in the early 1850s was 
volatile. Party loyalties were challenged by temperance and by nativist issues. 
These strains, however, were soon supplanted by even more divisive issues. 
 
*  *  *  * *  *  *  *  *  *  *  * *  *  *  *  *  * *  *  *  *  *  * 
 
 
 
In 1854 Stephen Douglas ripped apart the American political landscape 
when he introduced legislation to organize the land west of Missouri and Iowa. 
Douglas, to be sure, was responding to popular pressures. Many Americans 
wanted new land to settle, but they could not legally move onto the land until it 
was organized and parceled for distribution. Settlers, however, were already 
pushing west regardless of legalities, and this increased the urgency to act. 
Likewise, railroads desired to construct lines to the Pacific West, but this required 
land grants and with the territories unorganized land grants could not be 
distributed. As chairman of the territorial committee, Stephen Douglas believed it 
was essential to American progress to populate the prairies with white Americans 
and build a railroad to the Pacific Ocean. While this plan offered potential political 
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and financial advantages to Douglas personally, certainly he viewed this as a 
means to build a strong, unified nation.63 
 
Organizing the territory was certain to provoke controversy. Attempts in 
1853 to pass necessary legislation had failed in the Senate, as the southern- 
dominated body bottled up the legislation. The Missouri Compromise’s  
prohibition of slavery threatened to kill Douglas’s efforts right from the start. 
Caught between southern demands and northern suspicions of the slave-power, 
Douglas hoped to straddle the two sides by using language similar to the 
Compromise of 1850. On January 4, he proposed the creation of the Nebraska 
territory. The territory “when admitted as a State or States…shall be received into 
the Union with or without slavery, as their constitutions may prescribe at the time 
of their admission.” Southern hard-liners grew concerned that the bill made no 
explicit mention of slavery during the territorial stage. Douglas insisted this was 
merely due to a “clerical error,” and on January 10 amended the bill to include 
that “all questions pertaining to slavery in the Territories, and in the new states to 
be formed therefrom are to be left to the people residing therein, through their 
appropriate representatives.” Southerners still objected, fearing that if the 
Missouri Compromise remained in effect until the creation of a legislature, few 
slaveholders would settle in the new territory. Finally, Douglas again acceded to 
southern demands, and on January 23 he presented a modified Kansas- 
Nebraska Act, which declared the Missouri Compromise “inoperative and void.” 
The bill also created two distinct territories. As Michael Holt noted, “Whatever the 
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reason for this decision, it gave the impression to outraged Northerners that a 
deal had been cut. Kansas was to be given to slave-holders while Nebraska 
would remain free soil.”64 
 
Pierce had initially supported Douglas’s Nebraska bill as he felt it was in 
the same tenor as the Compromise of 1850, but the explicit repeal of the 
Missouri Compromise was a tougher sell. Even Lewis Cass had warned the 
president that repeal would tear the northern Democracy apart. Douglas, on the 
other hand, knew that repealing the Missouri Compromise was the only way to 
gain the southern support essential to passing the bill. The Illinois Senator thus 
gathered a group of southern congressmen to persuade Pierce to back the new 
bill. The president then made it a test of party loyalty, ensuring those who 
supported the bill were rewarded with patronage.65 
 
Bright quickly embraced the Nebraska bill. He shared Douglas’s views 
about economic development and westward expansion, and he had no qualms 
about appeasing southern interests. In addition, supporting the bill allowed Bright 
to cultivate ties with both Douglas and the Pierce administration.66 Hence, Bright 
was determined to make Nebraska a test of party loyalty for the Hoosier 
Democracy. Those who refused to support the Kansas-Nebraska Act would be 
punished and potentially expelled. Distributing patronage and rewarding 
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newspaper editors with government advertisements would allow Bright to use 
Nebraska to enhance his power within the state party. 
 
The Kansas-Nebraska Act immediately injected the debate over slavery’s 
expansion back into American politics. Douglas hoped that it would strengthen 
the Democratic Party by rallying its members around popular sovereignty in the 
face of Whig opposition. Instead, it created a firestorm throughout the North. 
Stephen Douglas would later state, “I could travel from Boston to Chicago by the 
light of my own effigy.”67 Most northerners were furious about the repeal of the 
Missouri Compromise, and the bill had such far reaching consequences that it 
would turn the northern Democratic Party into a political minority for decades to 
come.68 
 
The Kansas-Nebraska Act divided the Democratic Party in Indiana. Some 
saw the repeal of the Missouri Compromise as a blatant appeasement of the 
slave-power that threatened to allow the expansion of slavery. On the other  
hand, it was backed by the national administration and it embraced the principle 
of popular sovereignty. The Indiana State Sentinel, for instance, feared the bill 
would encourage agitation, but it also recognized the importance of the 
legislation to the Pierce administration. Hence, it argued that “postponement” 
would “only delay agitation.” In his support of the administration, Brown defended 
the repeal of the Missouri Compromise on the grounds that the old measure 
lacked sectional balance. The policies enacted during the Compromise of 1850 
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had required that popular sovereignty be applied to southern territories, while 
automatically barring slavery in the North. Brown rationalized that the Nebraska 
bill would bring parity between the two sections.69 
 
The New Albany Ledger, a southern Indiana paper that had been 
ambivalent about the Compromise of 1850, hesitated to support the 1854 bill. 
Like the Sentinel, it did not want a new round of agitation. “If Nebraska is to be 
organized,” the paper suggested, it preferred “to see the Missouri Compromise 
applied to it.”70 A few weeks later the paper reiterated its opposition on the 
grounds that it “renders the Missouri Compromise inoperative.”71   In private, the 
editor insisted the “wholesale denunciation of the opponents of the bill as 
‘abolitionists’ and nigger sympathizers will avail [Douglas] but little, [p]eople are 
not to be frightened from their propriety by such epithets now-a-days, whatever 
may have been their effect a few years since.”72 Chapman’s Chanticleer noted 
that the popular reaction to Douglas’s bill had excited more reaction among the 
local populace than the entire 1850 controversy. For Chapman, the “pro-slavery 
bill” was couched in ambivalent language as the proponents were “too cowardly” 
and “dishonest to acknowledge” their true designs.73 
 
The uncertainty and divisions persisted. Some claimed Democratic 
opposition to the bill was widespread. A pro-Nebraska Democrat lamented, “I find 
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myself rather isolated on this question.”74  Yet another supporter from Rockville 
claimed the “Dems are ten to one for the bill. You may rely upon it, a vote against 
it would be absolutely fatal to any Democrat.”75 A Democrat from the same city 
highlighted this confusion. A friend informed him that “all the Democrats in his 
neighborhood are for the bill…” But he added he had talked with another 
Democrat who “says he is opposed to the bill” along with “all his neighbors.” The 
writer lamented, “It is damned hard to please all.”76 Eventually more Democrats 
came to accept it. One Democrat believed the Douglas bill “sufficient” to be 
accepted by both sections of the country.77 Another claimed “slavery cannot exist 
in those territories without a positive act.” If the “principles of nonintervention” 
were to succeed, there territories would remain free.78 Many Democrats, it 
seems, came to rationalize Kansas-Nebraska as consistent with free-soil 
principles. 
 
Indiana’s Democratic congressmen were pressed to decide how they 
would vote on the bill. Ebenezer Chamberlain tried to assure his constituents that 
“the Indiana delegation in the House at this moment unanimously disapprove of 
the bill in its present form.” 79 Even William English, a Bright ally, initially hedged. 
The southern Indiana representative quibbled over some of the boundary issues, 
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but accepted the bill’s popular sovereignty provisions. While he was content to 
see the Missouri Compromise “superseded” by the Nebraska bill, he was 
opposed to an outright repeal that would make “war upon a lifeless body” by 
“mutilating the slain.”80 From his home district, English heard distressing reports 
that the “popular voice is strong against any & every measure” that would repeal 
the Missouri Compromise. His correspondent added that “While all seem 
perfectly willing to abide in good faith by the acts of 1850, & give the South all of 
its benefits, no one is willing to [have] an additional foot of slave Territory…”81 
 
Bright wrote English that because he was concerned for his “political 
positions and future successes,” he should not “make any committals against the 
bill now in Congress.” The congressman complied.82 While most of Indiana’s 
congressional Democrats initially opposed the measure, the political pressure 
was heavy. In order to run for office in the 1850s, politicians needed the support 
of state parties. These organizations controlled the presses and secured the 
financial resources to run campaigns. Politicians also needed the support of party 
managers such as Bright. With the national administration and Bright applying 
pressure, the Journal estimated that by March at least four of Indiana’s 
Democratic Congressman were in favor of the bill, and two more were leaning 
toward it.83 Though many of his supporters hoped he would oppose it, Indiana 
governor Joseph Wright defended the bill as an “administration measure.”  Just 
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as Democrats had survived Polk’s opposition to the Wilmot Proviso, he reasoned 
they would survive the repeal of the Missouri Compromise.84 
 
As the Kansas Nebraska Act became tied to the national party, and as 
Bright began to demand support for it, Indiana’s Democratic presses fell into line 
as well. The Sentinel became forceful in its support. Douglas’s bill, it claimed,  
was yet another union-saving compromise like those of 1820 and 1850. These 
bills, the paper insisted, were intended to calm the “hatred of one section against 
another” and resume “a fraternal feeling” between the sections.85 The Ledger had 
a change of heart as well. It was surely no coincidence that this occurred just as  
a top Bright lieutenant began directing that advertisements be purchased in the 
New Albany paper.86 While the Ledger’s editor had previously balked at the idea 
that racial demagoguery could work, the paper now asserted that a “mongrel 
whig-abolition ticket” opposed to the bill would “convulse the country with anti- 
slavery agitation” and “dissolve the Union.”87 The paper’s local opposition editor 
noticed both the advertisements and the new stand on the Nebraska bill. It 
mocked: “If you want to know the reason why Mr. Norman ‘jumped Jim Crow’ on 
the Nebraska question, just look at the first and second pages of his paper 
yesterday and you will see a big fat paying Navy advertisement.” The Ledger 
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responded tartly that the advertisement “was sent to us without any solicitation 
on our part.”88 
 
Still, deep divisions remained, and opposition was especially strong in the 
northern half of the state. Congressman Daniel Mace fiercely opposed it on the 
grounds that it opened the door for slavery to enter the free territories. He cared 
little about slaves and their rights, but rather focused on the “enormous outrage 
upon the rights of the people of the non-slaveholding States.” He continued: “no 
poor man desires to live in a slave State, and socially and politically occupy no 
higher position than a slave.”89 Andrew Harlan, another northern Indiana 
Democratic congressman, made the same argument. He objected to seeing 
“slave labor in competition with the free labor and industry of my own race.”90 
 
Others took a different approach to the question of slavery. Speaking on 
the floor of the Senate, John Pettit adopted a pro-slavery position. Once a free- 
soil ally of Joseph Wright, Pettit was now a doughface who used extreme 
arguments to support the Kansas Nebraska Act. Pettit stated that he would not  
be “constrained” by the “dogma” propagated by Thomas Jefferson and the 
Declaration of Independence that “all men are created equal.” In his mind the 
Virginian never intended to suggest that the races had been created equal—even 
if this was the wording of the document. Such an idea, for Pettit, was simply a 
“self-evident lie.” Pettit went further to suggest that intellectual differences were 
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not merely between “the white or the black race,” but among superior and inferior 
whites.91 
 
Pettit’s outspoken support of southern rights was a political blunder. It was 
one thing to oppose the idea of racial equality, but quite another to claim that the 
Declaration of Independence was a “self-evident lie” and to suggest that even 
white men were inherently unequal. When a fellow senator objected to his 
remarks, Pettit tried to explain that “if it had said…that they ought to have been 
created equal, I would have made no issue.”92 In supporting the slave-power, 
Pettit was attacking white man’s democracy. The Journal took full advantage. It 
reprinted of the Declaration of Independence and suggested these were Pettit’s 
“self-evident lies.”93 The Sentinel hoped to shift the focus to the question of 
“popular sovereignty.” This principle, it argued, was embodied in the Declaration 
and it was the same principle that “animated our fathers” in their “protracted 
struggle” against the far off “King of Great Britain.” It was for the cause of popular 
sovereignty that these “patriots of the revolution freely shed their blood and 
expended their treasure.”94 The debate continued, but Pettit suffered badly from 
the speech and was passed over for another candidate when he sought re- 
election in 1855.95 
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The debate became heated with little room for compromise. Democratic 
leaders were peeved when a number of church organizations opposed the bill. At 
one point during the convention state convention, former Congressman John L. 
Robinson blasted Methodist ministers as “3000 Abolitionists sent out of New 
England” as “non-tax-paying itinerant vagabonds.”96 The Sentinel blasted them 
over carrying their political activities “in the name of Almighty God.” The paper 
suggested the “union of the Church with the affairs of State, has proved a most 
terrible engine of despotism, in the world. Its history is traced in blood.”97 The 
Journal seized upon this language and tied it to the slave power arguments when 
it suggested Democrats were at war with the clergy and the freedom of 
individuals of the cloth to “express an opinion.” Democrats “would deny them the 
exercise of the elective franchise if they had the power.”98 The issues of slavery 
and temperance had driven a number of Methodist church members from the 
Democratic Party. Chagrined Democrats worried about fraying party loyalties. 
 
Bright was not active in the Senate debates over the Kansas-Nebraska 
debate. On procedural votes, Pettit consistently voted with Douglas while Bright 
declined to vote. Perhaps he did so because the bill was hardly in danger in the 
Senate, where southerners and a sufficient number of northern Democratic 
senators could carry the day. Bright’s only important vote came on February 6 
when Salmon Chase offered an amendment giving the territorial legislature the 
power to prohibit slavery. Proponents of the Kansas-Nebraska Act opposed this 
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amendment believing it would offend the South, and both Bright and Pettit voted 
against it. Otherwise, Bright failed to vote on the Kansas-Nebraska Act on March 
3 and again on March 25, when the Senate passed the House version. On the 
latter vote, he had already left for Indianapolis to organize the state Democratic 
convention. He was in Indiana to ensure that the Kansas-Nebraska Act was a 
test party loyalty.99 In spite of Bright’s clear stance on the bill, he avoided tough 
political votes. 
 
Ultimately, the core of Indiana’s congressional delegation rallied around 
the bill, even in the face of its widespread unpopularity. On the final vote, seven 
Indiana House Democrats voted for it. Only Mace and Harlan, from northern 
Indiana, did not. As for Ebenezer Chamberlain, the congressman was absent at 
the time of voting because of “family sickness.”100 
 
Bright was instrumental in winning support for the bill in Indiana, and in 
doing so he tightened his grip over the party. By allying with the Pierce 
administration, he gained control of patronage, which he could distribute as he 
saw fit. Newspapers and politicians who had fallen into line behind the Kansas- 
Nebraska Act could expect advertising revenue, appointments, nominations and 
campaign support. Those who refused were brushed aside. By the time of the 
state Democratic convention on May 24, the few anti-Nebraska Democrats who 
were willing to challenge party leadership were decidedly unwelcome. When he 
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arrived in Indianapolis for the convention he set about finding the right men to 
place on the various committees, and the right men were those who had 
endorsed the Kansas Nebraska Act. Most of the delegates, in fact, had  
supported the Act. When Oliver Morton, an anti-Nebraska Democrat pleaded with 
him not to force the issue at the convention, Bright reportedly replied that the 
“Indiana Democracy was strong enough to carry any measure.”101 As president  
of the convention, Bright controlled its proceedings. Before a committee was 
supposed to have been officially selected, the convention clerk inadvertently read 
a list of Bright’s handpicked members. Realizing this blunder, Michael Bright 
hastily interrupted the speaker to the amusement of the wiser delegates.102 At 
least one opposition paper conjured an image of the slaveholder wielding a 
“lash.”103  When it came time to produce a state platform, delegates 
overwhelmingly approved it and denied that Congress had the power to regulate 
slavery.104 The few anti-Nebraska Democrats at the convention felt as if they had 
been read out of the party. Years later, one would claim he had been taunted  
with catcalls to the effect “go and equalize yourselves with niggers.”105 
 
The political shake-up over the Kansas-Nebraska Act continued. A “Free 
Democratic Convention” met shortly after the state convention and passed its 
own set of resolutions. In addition to calling the Kansas-Nebraska Act a “crime 
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against God,” the renegades vowed they would not be “white slaves.”106   One of 
the most prominent Democrats to leave the party was Oliver Morton. The Wayne 
County politician was hardly a radical. He was leery of joining any organization 
that was too closely associated with “Free Soilers” and “abolitionists” whom he 
believed “imperil[ed] the Union by senseless agitation[.]” The renegade Democrat 
had hoped to receive the Democratic nomination for the 5th congressional district. 
He claimed he would only do so if his district produced an anti-Nebraska  
platform. When the district narrowly voted to support the Kansas Nebraska Act, 
Morton abandoned the Democratic Party to find a new political home.107 
 
Bright’s strong-armed tactics made bitter enemies among the bolting 
Democratic leaders and forced some leaders out of the party. Hendricks County 
Democrats who opposed the Kansas Nebraska Act denounced the attempt by 
state party leaders “to bind and sell us to the slave drivers of the South…”108 As 
one historian has noted, it was because the state “convention dictated party 
orthodoxy on the Nebraska question” that many left the party. He further noted, 
“most of them would have returned to the fold when the election was over had” 
the party not made the issue a strict party test.109 
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Anti-Nebraska Democrats met a similar reception at district conventions in 
the state. Thomas Smith, a former congressman, was expelled from the 4th 
district convention, and in the northernmost 11th district Andrew Harlan, who had 
voted against the Douglas bill, was forced to withdraw his name for re- 
nomination. One anti-Nebraska Democrat who avoided expulsion was 
Congressman Ebenezer Chamberlain. Although he had spoken against the 
Kansas-Nebraska Act, he avoided voting on the bill, but he ingratiated himself 
with Bright by declaring the Kansas Nebraska act “final” and opposing its 
repeal.110 This saved him from the party purge, but in the general election he 
found that voters in his district were eager to be rid of him as he lost the 
election.111 
 
*  *  *  * *  *  *  *  *  *  *  * *  *  *  *  *  * *  *  *  *  *  * 
 
 
 
The Hoosier Democracy had grown too southern for northern Indiana. For 
the duration of the 1850s, Democrats were politically dead in that part of the 
state. Jesse Bright used the Kansas-Nebraska battle to impose his will on the 
Indiana party, but he did so at a heavy price. Initially, it seemed that the 
disintegration of the state’s Whig Party would allow Democrats political control of 
the state. But anger at overturning the Missouri Compromise, at what seemed to 
be the pernicious influence of the “slave power,” and the heavy handed way in 
which Bright had demanded unity made possible a sudden fusion of old Whigs, 
anti-Nebraska Democrats, Free Soilers, and Know Nothings. Old-line Whigs 
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sensed the opportunity for a political revival, but they also knew that the “Whig” 
label was too unpopular for renegade Democrats. 
 
Leaders such as John Defrees understood the need for delicate 
maneuvering. He and other Whigs proposed holding a “People’s Convention” to 
form an anti-Nebraska fusionist party. He suggested to Schuyler Colfax that the 
call for a convention should be made by former Democrats or otherwise it “would 
have been set down as a Whig movement.”112 “The Whigs” Godlove Orth 
schemed, “must control that convention without seeming so.”113 The Journal 
proposed that three former Democrats and two former Whigs be nominated for 
state offices. This would “unite all the friends of freedom,” and ensure that there 
would be less jealousy if nominees were roughly equally drawn from the 
“principal political parties.”114 
 
The fusionists, saw themselves as a movement supported by those 
“regardless of former party divisions but resolved to unite now as Freemen.”115 
The convention was held on July 13th, the anniversary of the Northwest 
Ordinance and its promise of “Perpetual Freedom for the North Western States” 
like Indiana.116 This allowed the party to insist it was following “the path in which 
our forefathers trod, when the extension of Freedom, and the Restricting and 
Diminishing of Slavery was the avowed policy and the noble desire of the 
 
 
112 Quoted in Willard Smith, Schuyler Colfax, The Changing Fortunes of a Political Idol 
(Indianapolis: Indiana Historical Bureau, 1952), 50. 
113 Godlove Orth to Schuyer Colfax, July 4, 1854 in “The Letters of Godlove S. Orth, Hoosier 
American,” Indiana Magazine of History 40 (March, 1944), 54. 
114 Indiana Daily Journal, July 10, 1854. 
115 St. Joseph Valley Register, June 29, 1853. 
116 St. Joseph Valley Register, June 29, 1854 
156  
Nation.”117 When the convention met in Indianapolis, between eight and ten 
thousand Hoosiers showed up to observe the proceedings. Many political 
observers were shocked at the number of Democrats among them.118 Even the 
Sentinel was forced to concede that Democrats formed a sizable number of the 
delegates.119 
 
Bright’s enemies were vital to the new party. Chairing the convention was 
none other than Jacob Chapman, who had been the editor of the State Sentinel 
until 1850 when his free-soil editorials ran afoul of Bright.120 Next to him, as 
convention secretary, was Michael Garber, who still bore the wounds from the 
chisel attack that had nearly killed him. 
 
Containment of slavery was the convention’s unifying theme. The platform 
observed that the Northwest Ordinance was clear evidence that it was the “fixed 
policy” of the founders to oppose “the extension of slavery.” The Kansas- 
Nebraska Act, its platform declared, was a “wanton violation of the faith of the 
Union” as “a solemn compact,” as it repealed the Missouri compromise. The 
People’s Convention also offered a gesture to the temperance movement with a 
resolution stating that intemperance was “a legitimate subject of legislation,” and 
that legislation should be made to “effectually suppress the traffic in intoxicating 
liquors as a beverage.” In a reference to earlier attacks by Democrats against 
churches that had been agitating against the Nebraska bill, the convention 
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“utterly condemn[ed] the abusive attacks which have recently been made, from 
various quarters, on the Protestant ministry of the country.”121 
 
Organizers also worked to gain Know Nothing support, but they did this 
without formally allying with the nativist movement.122 Instead, the Know 
Nothings nominated a set of candidates who were then in turn nominated by the 
People’s Party convention. This helped the fusionists gain Know Nothing support 
without repelling those who were opposed to Know Nothing principles.123 
 
Some Democrats considered joining the fusionists cause, but pulled back. 
Lew Wallace was one such example. Years later he wrote that he “had grown 
restive under the dominion of the Southern leaders” over their “arrogant, selfish, 
and inconsiderate of the feelings” toward the North. In opposing the slave power, 
the young Hoosier noted that there were “appeals to my manhood and my pride 
of section.” Yet he was not about to join a revamped Whig Party, nor the “fanatics 
and wild men” among the abolitionists.  “Worse” than some of their peculiar 
beliefs, was the fact that “while enemies of slavery, they were also conspirators 
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against the Union.”124 So long as he perceived the opponents of slavery, with 
their seemingly peculiar attitudes toward race, to be the greatest threats to the 
Union, he would remain a regular Democrat. 
 
Racial prejudice kept some Democrats, such as Wallace, from joining the 
fusionists, but even so the Democrats were losing support. To counteract the 
growing opposition, the party tried to recycle the same arguments used against 
the Wilmot Proviso and for the Compromise of 1850. Slavery, they argued, could 
not exist without positive law. As the Bluffton Banner, a Democratic paper in the 
northern portion of the state, tried to argue, “The moment a slave-holder sets foot 
within the Territory of Nebraska and Kansas with his slaves,” they become free. 
The paper insisted, “Slaves cannot breathe in that Territory. The moment they 
touch that soil, with the consent of their owner…their shackles fall—they are free 
men, and no subsequent legislation can bind them to slavery.”125 Democrats 
insisted that anti-Nebraska sentiment was all humbug. The idea of popular 
sovereignty appealed to their sense of local control. 
 
The turmoil in Kansas undercut Democratic assurances. Democrats might 
dismiss sectional differences as mere abstraction. They might insist that slavery 
could not be introduced into Kansas without positive law. Yet as the Journal 
ominously noted, “ten thousand people” from Missouri were “on the move” in a 
“determined effort” to “introduce slavery into Kansas.” The paper remarked: “And 
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yet we are told by Northern Dough-faces that slavery won’t go into Kansas.”126 
Later it added: “Whether with, or without law, slavery does exist in Kansas 
now….Slave-holders are there with their property, and determined to remain 
there with it at the hazard of their lives.”127 
 
During the fall canvassing, Democrats sensed doom. While many 
Democrats would loyally support the party-line, even to the point of repealing the 
Missouri Compromise, others would not go along. Lew Wallace was deflated that 
at “the turn of every point” he had to offer “a dodge, a denial, a deprecation, or a 
begging the question.”128 Norman Eddy, who faced a strong challenge from 
Colfax, was despondent about his “pretty fix” over his vote for the Kansas- 
Nebraska Act. It did not help when in arguing for popular sovereignty he was 
forced to admit that he would allow Utah to enter the union with polygamy.129 
 
When all else failed, many hoped to use anti-black sentiment to bludgeon 
the anti-Nebraska fusionists. The New Albany Ledger continued to refer to the 
fusionist ticket as the “mongrel party.”130 Democrats also hoped to hold onto 
immigrant voters by highlighting anti-immigrant elements of the fusionist party. 
The New Albany Ledger continually reminded its readers that the fusionist 
nominees had been secretly selected at the Know Nothing convention. The 
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secret nature of the convention, the Democrats charged, showed they were the 
true threat to American democracy.131 
 
The fusionists, however, blunted this by using anti-Nebraska Democrats in 
the fall campaign. Oliver Morton ridiculed “the silly cry of Abolitionism raised by 
the Slaveites to scare partisans into the ranks…” He “exhorted the North to stand 
together and resist once for all the aggressions of the slave power.” Charles  
Test, a former Democratic Indiana Secretary of State, “brought down the House” 
with a speech in which “he cut the Slaveites with a depth and skill considerably 
enhanced by his acquaintance with them.”132 
 
The fall congressional elections turned into a massive defeat for 
Democrats across the northern United States. Among northern seats in the 
House of Representatives, Democrats went from 93 members to 23. In Indiana, 
Democrats lost eight congressional seats, and won only the two districts 
bordering on Kentucky. In the legislature, fusionists scored massive victories. 
Fusionists claimed a commanding 58-41 majority in the lower house. In the 
Senate, Democrats were able to maintain a slim majority because only about a 
half of the seats were contested, but fusionists won thirteen of the twenty-two 
senate elections.133 
 
Racial demagoguery could only go so far to help Democrats. Godlove 
Orth believed that fusion victory showed “a deep seated feeling in favor of 
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Human Freedom that demagogues cannot quench.” The head of the Know 
Nothings in Indiana, however, also attributed victory to nativism, as he remarked 
that “hereafter none but Americans in principles as well as by birth, shall rule 
America.”134 In the aftermath of defeat, the Sentinel diagnosed their party’s 
problems as a combination of ant-slavery, anti-liquor and anti-immigrant forces 
combined together. It bitterly lamented that such a coalition had triumphed “over 
the doctrine that the people of every State and Territory are the proper judges of 
their own affairs.”135 The Journal attributed their victory to the exact same 
elements. One Democrat later summed up the election: “We were beaten on the 
state ticket, in the legislature, in almost two-thirds of the counties, and if there 
had been anything else to lose we should have lost it.”136 
 
*  *  *  * *  *  *  *  *  *  *  * *  *  *  *  *  * *  *  *  *  *  * 
 
 
 
Two years earlier, Indiana Democrats had seemed poised to form a 
permanent majority. Now, there was fear they could be swept away like the Whig 
Party. Bright battled for control of the Hoosier Democracy. Whig efforts to 
facilitate a permanent split among the Democrats altered the party system and 
unwittingly cleared the way for Bright to solidify power within the Democratic 
Party. The bolting Democrats allowed him to take control and align it with 
southern interests. Yet questions remained whether an Indiana Democratic Party 
could exist for Bright to lead. 
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O Buckingham, now do I play the touch 
To try if thou be current gold indeed 
Young Edward lives: think now what I would say… 
Why, Buckingham, I say, I would be king, 
 
 
-Richard III Act IV Scene II 
 
 
 
Chapter 5 
 
 
 
Jesse Bright: The Doughface Manager, 1855-1856 
 
 
 
In the aftermath of the 1854 congressional elections, the national Democratic 
Party had emerged severely weakened. Democrats were especially wounded in 
the North where the party went from holding 93 seats in the House of 
Representatives to 22 after the 1854 congressional elections.1 While the Whig 
Party had practically dissolved, the Democratic Party maintained a core of 
support in the South, but it had a declining presence in the North. Much of the 
northern opposition to the extension of slavery began to form around the 
Republican Party. Composed of northern Whigs, anti-Nebraska Democrats, and 
free-soilers, the party rallied around the containment of slavery. Democrats faced 
additional challenges from the Know Nothing movement whose voters continued 
to agitate about immigrants. As the Democratic Party cultivated ethnic voters, the 
American Party arose as a powerful source of opposition. 
 
The demoralization of the Democratic Party in the North actually bolstered 
Jesse Bright’s ability to dominate the Indiana party and to assume a major role 
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on the national level. He had ruthlessly tightened his grip over his state party 
through the purging of anti-Nebraska Democrats. Working with like-minded 
doughface Democrats, Bright sought to align Indiana with the interests of the 
South. Many Democratic leaders understood that to win the 1856 presidential 
contest they would need to carry at least a few northern states. Hence Indiana, 
as a northern border-state, would be a key battleground for Democrats. Many 
pro-southern Democrats understood that Bright was among the very few 
northerners who shared their commitment to slavery, and they appreciated his 
ability to wield control over his state party. Thus, Bright became an important 
national political manager. 
 
Bright would play a key role in the 1856 presidential contest. He controlled 
the Democratic Party in one of the nation’s most conservative northern states. 
While most Hoosiers opposed the expansion of slavery, many also detested 
northern agitators and any hint of racial equality. Bright would exploit the fear of 
racial equality to unite Indiana’s Democrats behind James Buchanan in 1856. 
 
*  *  *  * *  *  *  *  *  *  *  * *  *  *  *  *  * *  *  *  *  *  * 
 
 
 
Sectional anger intensified in 1855. Unlike the Compromise of 1850, the 
passage of the Kansas-Nebraska Act did not even temporarily quiet agitation. 
Questions over the fate of slavery in the Kansas territory rested on the outcomes 
of local elections. During the November elections to select delegates to Congress 
in 1854, legitimate Kansas voters, originally from Missouri, outnumbered their 
free-state counterparts. Pro-slavery partisans in Missouri, however, were 
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unwilling to leave the situation to chance. Gathering a force of about 1700 voters, 
pro-slavery Missourians crossed the border into Kansas to elect illegally a pro- 
slavery legislature. 
 
The fraudulent elections of 1854 were not an isolated incident. By the 
spring of 1855, Missouri settlers still outnumbered northerners among legitimate 
Kansas voters. Even so, David Atchison, former Missouri Senator and leader of 
the border ruffians, was still not satisfied. When it came time to elect a territorial 
legislature in March, the Missourian called for 5,000 illegal voters to swarm the 
Kansas elections, declaring it “enough to kill every God-damned abolitionist in  
the Territory.”2 Election fraud was so massive that the number of ballots cast was 
more than twice the territory’s eligible voters. The result was a pro-slavery 
legislature, and when it convened, it secured slavery for the territory. It also 
passed laws that stripped away traditional American rights.  These laws 
prevented opponents of slavery from holding office, speaking against the 
institution or serving on juries in cases involving slavery. Kansans could lose their 
right to vote if they opposed the Fugitive Slave Act and they faced capital 
punishment if they actually aided fugitive slaves.3 While Missourians sought to 
convert Kansas into slave territory, northern free-soilers mobilized to send anti- 
slavery settlers into the region. Armed with new breech loading rifles supplied by 
abolitionist leaders, the free soilers in the autumn of 1855 called for new 
elections. Proponents of slavery, of course, boycotted this new election leading 
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to a competing free soil legislature in Topeka. The volatile situation led to small 
skirmishes of violence that threatened to ignite all out war within the territory.4 In 
May of 1856 the news became grimmer. Under the authority of the Lecompton 
government, a militia of pro-slavery forces was deputized to arrest members of 
the Topeka legislature. These forces arrived at Lawrence with little resistance, 
and proceeded to ransack the city, destroying newspaper offices, homes, stores 
and a hotel.5 
 
Meanwhile, tempers exploded in the halls of Congress. The day after the 
sack of Lawrence, Massachusetts Senator Charles Sumner was beaten 
unconscious with a cane by South Carolinian House member Preston Brooks.  A 
few days earlier, Sumner had made his famous “Crimes against Kansas” speech 
in which he lashed out at slavery and personally attacked southern members of 
congress with bitter ad hominems. In the wake of Brook’s attack, citizens across 
the South cheered the beating as redemption to southern honor, fueling deeper 
suspicions from northerners about the depths of the southern slave-power.6 
 
The situation in Kansas caused much consternation for Indiana 
Democrats. Douglas had intended to end agitation by giving voters control over 
their locality. Instead, local voters were overwhelmed by the southern slave- 
power. Far from ending agitation, Kansas had become an actual battle ground. 
Thus, many Democrats tried to strike a moderate balance. The Sentinel had 
sought to cast blame on both sides for the Kansas troubles. It had conceded the 
4 McPherson, Battle Cry of Freedom, 147-149. 
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“invasion of Kansas by armed men was an undoubted violation of the letter and 
spirit of the Nebraska bill.” Still, it had blamed “Emigrant Aid Societies from New 
England” for rushing “their miserable cargoes to storm the Territory by the force  
of numbers.” The difference between the two groups, legalities apparently aside, 
was that “The Missourians were not so smart; they acted the ruffians out and out” 
while the former acted with “knavery” in winning over Kansas.7 In the aftermath of 
the attack on Charles Sumner, the New Albany Ledger acknowledged its vast 
differences with the Massachusetts Senator, but insisted “when an attempt is 
made by violence to suppress the liberty of speech, it is not the individual  
Senator but the State he represents, and indeed every State, which is insulted.”8 
Among northern states Indiana was particularly resistant to radical anti-slavery 
rhetoric. Yet, while most Hoosiers cared little for radicals, many also objected to 
southern fanatics. When Governor Wright spoke of the situation in Kansas, he 
criticized both sides for enabling a “spirit of propagandism which seems to be 
increasing in the South and the North…”9 Most Indiana Democrats held contempt 
for all agitators. Indeed, an Indiana Democrat living in Kansas expressed 
displeasure for “either Party in Kansas.” While he “could not act with the Free 
State party,” he was at the very least “opposed to Slavery.”10 
 
Occasionally, an Indiana Democrat openly embraced the slave-power 
South. Jeptha Garrigus, former member and door keeper of the state legislature, 
was one Indiana Democrats who had no ambivalence about Bloody Kansas. 
7 Indiana State Sentinel, June 21, 1855 
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Concern about Border Ruffians was a lot of “fuss…about nothing,” Garrigus 
insisted. He thought it better to “kill off all the black party.”11 Most Indiana 
Democrats, however, were not so extreme. They disliked blacks and northern 
fanatics, but most also disliked southern fire-eaters. 
 
Bright, meanwhile, continued to work to control the party machinery and 
its newspapers. He desired editors who would support southern interests. At the 
start of 1856, the Sentinel was owned by John Norman and John Spann. The 
former was editor of the New Albany Ledger, which during the previous years 
had been a reluctant supporter of the 1850 compromise and the Kansas 
Nebraska Act. Spann had previously managed the Sentinel when the paper was 
under the ownership of the free-soil leaning Jacob Chapman. Shortly after taking 
control of the Sentinel, however, Norman found that “he did not like the position 
of ‘party organ’ and returned to New Albany in about six weeks.”12 The reason 
these men no longer cared to control the Sentinel is not clear, but Bright’s 
penchant for pressuring newspaper editors was likely a factor. 
 
By February 1856 the paper was sold to William Larrabee and C.W. 
Cottom and Larrabee assumed editorial duties. Born and educated in Maine, 
Larrabee had been a college instructor in Connecticut and New York. In 1841 he 
had moved to Indiana to teach at Indiana’s Asbury College, and in the early 
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1850s he was appointed state superintendent of education.13 His early 
background does not suggest an especially pro-southern orientation. 
Nonetheless, he took the paper in a blatantly pro-southern direction. This time 
Bright finally had a favorable state organ. The fusionist presses teased that  
Bright had become a “silent partner” as he had “been for some time endeavoring 
to get hold of the Sentinel.” The Sentinel insisted, as it usually did during these 
acquisitions, “Mr. Bright had nothing to do with the change in the Sentinel, and 
knew nothing of it until the whole matter was consummated.” Whatever the  
details of the purchase, the paper began to assert a pro-southern tone. Instead of 
condemning pro-slavery activities in Kansas, it denied many of the abuses and 
suggested that the despotic territorial laws were being “misrepresented.”14 As the 
situation grew worse, its arguments became strained. The Sentinel printed a 
letter from a correspondent named “Hoosier” explaining the situation on the 
ground with disjointed explanations. First, the paper sought to sow doubts about 
the accuracy of the reports suggesting its readers “sift such news thoroughly” as 
“perhaps…not one-tenth part” of the stories out of Kansas were accurate. The 
Democratic partisan also suggested that “three-fourths” of Lawrence residents 
“wanted to resist, but their leaders overruled them” and allowed the attack hoping 
to provoke sympathy and gain political advantage.15 While Wright and many of 
his supporters criticized both radical northerners and southern fire-eaters, Bright 
and his allies desired to keep the focus on northern agitators. 
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Additionally, the Sentinel now defended the slave-power in other ways. 
When a convention in Virginia resolved to engage in a partial boycott of northern 
industry, the Sentinel opposed it as “impractical,” but sympathized that “the 
Abolition agitation, so rife in the North, and the insults heaped on the South, and 
on Southern institutions by Northern fanatics, has tended to induce, among the 
Southern people, a strong disposition to non-intercourse…with the North.”16   On 
the day of the Sumner attack, the Sentinel defended the “flogging” of A.G.  
Patrick, an anti-slavery activist in Kansas. It was against the “true interests” of the 
nation for an anti-slavery agitator to indulge “very freely in his remarks.” The 
Sentinel remarked that had Patrick “governed his tongue, and used respectful 
language, his hide would not have felt the indignant lash of an insulted 
community.”17 Under the new editors, the Sentinel was committed to defending 
the use of the “lash” to support southern interests. 
 
As the situation in Kansas unfolded, Indiana was filled with political 
uncertainties. The old party system was dissolving, and few knew for certain  
what would emerge in its place. Democrats, at times, attempted to make appeals 
for party unity. Now party leaders began to denounce the habit of “friends who 
‘smile and smile,’ and yet carry daggers under their cloaks.”18 Bright even offered 
friendly letters of support to Stephen Douglas, and he went so far as to join the 
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Little Giant in a Minnesota land speculation venture.19 Bright and the Hoosier 
Democracy also found common cause against their anti-Nebraska foes. 
 
The first test of party strength came with the selection for Bright’s junior 
partner in the Senate. With Pettit’s term expiring, Indiana Democrats faced the 
possibility of losing the seat.  The 1854 elections for the state legislature had 
been abysmal for the Indiana Democracy, and they were lucky to hold a slim 
majority in the state senate. Typically, when electing a United States senator, the 
Indiana legislature had met in joint session. This would have given the fusionists 
a twelve-man majority. This practice, however, was not a constitutionally 
mandated procedure. Consequently, Indiana Democrats in the Senate insisted 
on separate votes. Democrats hoped to gain support of old Whiggish elements 
by throwing their support behind Isaac Blackford, a former state Supreme Court 
justice who had made inroads with the more conservative Whigs. Fusionists, 
meanwhile, were divided over their candidates. Hence, the legislature adjourned 
without selecting a senator.20 
 
In the meantime, it remained unclear if the opposition forces to the 
Democratic Party could coalesce into a single party. The American Party, also 
known as the Know Nothings, emphasized nativist issues. A major advantage for 
this faction was their ability to gain southern supporters and build a national 
coalition. But the situation in Kansas had intensified sectional issues. The 
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sacking of Lawrence and the brutal beating of a United States Senator at the 
hands of the slave-power proved decisive events and ensured that the newly 
formed Republican Party, which was dedicated to opposing slavery’s westward 
extension, would become the prime opposition party in the North.21 
 
In Indiana this required a careful balance. Expressing the predominant 
racial and sectional outlook of southern Indiana, one Indiana scholar has noted, 
“A careful investigation of contemporary newspapers and letters reveals that both 
major parties south of the National Road frequently opposed the spread of 
slavery into the territories, disliked association with the Negro…and sought to 
preserve the Union.”22 Indiana fusionists understood the power of this. In order to 
appeal broadly to Hoosier opinion, they sought to frame their opposition to the 
slave-power as a defense of white man’s democracy. In a speech before 
Congress, Colfax displayed an iron ball to represent the shackles used against 
whites in Kansas who violated the territory’s peculiar pro-slavery laws. These 
laws prohibited freedom of expression, and punished transgressions with 
involuntary servitude. Kansas had been so infected by the slave power that it had 
established a system of “WHITE SLAVERY” among those who dared to speak 
out for freedom.23 White man’s democracy was the issue at stake, and Schuyler 
Colfax often emphasized the “monstrous outrages in Kansas” against white 
voters.24 
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*  *  *  * *  *  *  *  *  *  *  * *  *  *  *  *  * *  *  *  *  *  * 
 
 
 
As the 1856 presidential election neared, the old party system was dead. 
The Democratic Party had survived, but in place of the Whig Party, the 
Republicans stood squarely against the expansion of slavery, while the American 
Party was the vehicle for the Know Nothing movement. Because it was the only 
opposition party in the South, the American Party refused to take a decisive 
stand on the slavery fight.25 In Indiana, the People’s Party continued to function, 
but most of these fusionists would support the Republican Party in the 
presidential election. Nativists in southern Indiana chose to support the American 
Party. 
 
In the 1856 campaign, Jesse Bright emerged as a major political operator. 
He worked at the national level to nominate Pennsylvanian James Buchanan, 
and he managed the Indiana campaigns to win electoral votes in the November 
election. In 1856, northern Democrats had to strike a balance between the 
southern wing of the party, while assuring northern constituencies that the party 
was not in the clutches of the slave-power.  Crucial to this strategy was the need 
to carry northern border-state such as Indiana. 
 
There were three main contenders for the nomination in 1856. Franklin 
Pierce hoped for a second term, but he had proven weak and vacillating, and 
Bright did not want him. While Pierce had ultimately aligned with southern 
interests, Bright knew that his involvement in the Kansas Nebraska Act made him 
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un-electable in the North. Stephen Douglas also sought the nomination and 
although he had doughface tendencies, Bright disliked and distrusted him. He 
was too closely aligned with Bright’s enemies in Indiana, and he was a crafty 
midwestern political fighter whose political machinations sometimes conflicted 
with Bright’s. The Senate was not big enough for these two personalities, and 
certainly Bright did not wish to see Douglas controlling presidential patronage. 
Finally, there was James Buchanan, who was a reliable doughface. Additionally, 
he had served as a diplomat abroad during the Kansas-Nebraska Act, and hence 
while he had defended the act, he had not been involved in its passage. 
 
Throughout that spring, the Indiana boss worked behind the scenes to 
build support for James Buchanan. He was joined by John Slidell of Louisiana. 
Slidell had been disappointed by the quality of Buchanan’s managers until he 
learned of Bright’s support. He and other southern Democrats realized that they 
needed to find a candidate who was aligned with their interests, but who could 
appeal to enough northern voters to win some of the northern border-states.26 In 
addition to Bright and Slidell, Judah Benjamin, also of Louisiana, and James 
Bayard of Delaware worked for Buchanan. All of these men dabbled in financial 
pursuits and were closely tied to William Corcoran. As one historian has noted, 
these four senators were “well endowed with the talents necessary for winning 
and holding power in politics” and were “masters…in the operation of political 
machinery.”27 Eventually, the four men running Buchanan’s convention campaign 
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would identify with the Confederacy, but in 1856, they constituted a formidable 
team of skilled and ruthless political managers. 
 
The Buchaneers, as the Buchanan men were called, succeeded first in 
selecting a pro-Buchanan chairman of the convention. They then passed a 
platform endorsing popular sovereignty in order to conciliate Douglas supporters. 
Bright used his skills in dispensing patronage to peel away some of the Douglas 
backers. Other delegates were reminded that Douglas was young and would be  
a viable candidate in 1860. They also exploited factional divisions in various state 
parties to damage Pierce and Douglas. Through all of the balloting, Buchanan 
held at least a plurality of votes, but he held only a simple majority when Pierce 
withdrew and threw his delegates to Douglas. Finally, Douglas’s managers 
conceded the nomination to Buchanan but only after receiving pledges to support 
Douglas in 1860.28 
 
Bright had played a critical role in denying Douglas the nomination. A 
major strategy of the Douglas campaign had been to align the old northwest 
behind the Little Giant. But Lewis Cass denied Douglas Michigan’s votes, and 
Bright did the same with Indiana. Although Douglas was very likely the favored 
candidate among most of Indiana’s Democrats, Bright controlled the state 
machinery and lined up delegates for Buchanan. At the state convention, he had 
played a double-game against Douglas by pledging to have the Indiana 
delegation cast a token first round vote for himself, and then align with Douglas. 
 
 
28 James Rawley, Race & Politics (New York: J.B. Lippincott Co., 1969), 138; Nichols, The 
Disruption of American Democracy, 15-17. 
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Pro-Douglas Democrats within the state had grown concerned when Bright’s 
men had avoided explicit references to Douglas at the state convention. These 
Democrats were generally in the pro-Wright camp. They were either mildly free- 
soil in sentiment, or, at the very least, leery of the slave-power and they saw 
popular sovereignty as a desirable compromise. They knew Bright, and they 
suspected that he intended to support Buchanan. Austin Brown had rightfully 
warned Douglas that Bright was not to be trusted.29 Indeed, Douglas’s advisors 
sent numerous reports indicating Bright intended to betray him to Buchanan.30 
 
At the national convention in Cincinnati, Bright carried the Indiana 
delegation for Buchanan by 16 voters to 10. As the editor of the State Sentinel 
slyly observed, “it is well known that my warmest feelings are with Douglas, but I 
shall feel no mortification if Mr. Buchanan shall be the choice of the 
Convention…Indiana is governed by principles instead of preferences for men.”31 
Bright sent a communication to Douglas that Indiana was for Buchanan “from 
beginning to end.” A Bright loyalist insisted that “39 out of every 40” Hoosiers 
backed Buchanan’s candidacy.32 In truth, however, few found such a statement 
credible. Some Illinois Douglas men were astonished by the intensity of feelings 
when their train stopped in Indiana and they heard: “Damn Buchanan, hurrah for 
 
 
 
 
 
29 State Platforms, 12; William Lynch, “Indiana in the Douglas-Buchanan Contest of 1856,” 
Indiana Magazine of History (June, 1934), 123-124, Philip Crain, “Governor Jo Wright: Hoosier 
Conservative” (Ph.D. diss., Indiana University, 1963), 273. 
30 Johannsen, Stephen A. Douglas, 509-513. 
31 Indiana State Sentinel, June 2, 1856. 
32 Lynch, “Indiana in the Douglas-Buchanan Contest of 1856,” 129; Van Der Weale, “Jesse David 
Bright,” 176; John Pettit to S.A. Douglas, June 10, 1856 quoted in Crain, “Governor Jo Wright,” 
274. 
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Douglas.”33 As Phillip Crain has noted, “Douglas might have had the people, but 
Bright had the organization…”34 As one of Wright’s backers noted, the 
“advocates of slavery” had turned “Honorable men” to support Bright with the 
most “base and dishonorable acts to obtain office and money.”35 Still, with 
Buchanan the nominee, the Indiana party could unite against the newly formed 
Republican Party. 
 
Though Bright had betrayed Douglas at the Cincinnati convention, they 
were still Democrats with a common purpose: beating the Republicans. That 
summer Bright and Douglas visited a number of times while in Washington to 
coordinate the campaign. During that time Bright may have hoped to take the 
sting out of Douglas’s defeat by introducing him to Adele Curtis, and 
recommending her as a suitable wife. Douglas agreed, and they were soon 
married. It did not cause Douglas, however, to forget the events in Cincinnati.36 
 
In Indiana in 1856, the People’s Party fielded its own slate of candidates 
for the state elections in October, but supported John C. Fremont, the 
Republican presidential nominee, in November. In addition, the American Party 
 
33 Isaac R. Diller to S.A. Douglas, June 10, 1856 quoted in Lynch, “Indiana in the Douglas- 
Buchanan Contest of 1856,” 132. 
34 Crain, “Governor Jo Wright,” 276. 
35 John Hunt to Joseph Wright, August 6, 1856, Joseph Wright Papers, Indiana State Library. 
While most of Wright’s supporters had backed Douglas, Wright’s position is harder to determine. 
He had sent letters to Buchanan indicating his support for the Pennsylvanian. The letters, marked 
private, suggest Wright believed Buchanan the most electable candidate in the general election. 
Yet, Wright also sent letters to Douglas indicating support for the Little Giant. Ironically, Wright 
himself was likely concerned about future office. Wright’s gubernatorial term was coming to an 
end and he hoped to either enter the Senate, receive a vice-presidential nomination, or a 
presidential cabinet position. Not knowing the potential nominee, Wright was likely hoping to 
please both candidates. Joseph Wright to James Buchanan, January 14, May 26, 1856, James 
Buchanan Papers (microfilm), University of Kentucky Library; Crain, “Governor Jo Wright,” 264- 
265. 
36 Johannsen, Stephen A. Douglas, 540. 
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operated separately as a smaller third party hoping to elect Millard Fillmore. Both 
parties competed throughout the northern United States. Bright worried about 
Republican strength in the north and in Indiana. He pleaded with vice-presidential 
candidate John C. Breckinridge to campaign in Indiana, noting “If we do not give 
Buchanan and yourself Indiana, you will not get a State North of [the] Masons  
and Dixons Line…”37   For the Democrats to lose Indiana, he thought, would  
mean losing the election to an anti-slavery party. The emotional fervor of the 
Kansas-Nebraska Act, however, had lost some of its potency over time. 
Democrats also had an advantage since their opponents were divided between 
anti-slavery and nativist factions. Many of the old-line Whigs, particularly in 
southern Indiana, remained leery of joining the Republicans. Democrats needed 
to assert that they defended the rights of white men while avoiding association 
with the slave-power. 
 
In the campaign, Bright exploited racial issues to pillory the opposition. 
Democrats insisted that northern “black Republicans” wished to impose racial 
egalitarianism on the nation. The Republican/People’s Party warned of an 
encroaching slave-power bent on destroying white man’s liberty. Democrats cast 
their opponents as radical agitators. They paid a black man to follow the People’s 
Party gubernatorial candidate around the state so as to pretend to be a 
spokesman for the “black Republican” cause.38 Democrats rarely referred to their 
opponents simply as Republicans. They usually attached racial epithet. 
Additionally, one Republican commentator claimed, a Democratic stump speaker 
 
37 Jesse Bright to John C. Breckinridge, July 26, 1856 quoted in Van Der Weale, 184. 
38 St. Joseph Valley Register, June 11, 1857 
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“made a speech here at the same time in which he said Abolition 642 
times…disunion 350 times, sectional 219 times and National Democrats 480 
times.” Such “a speech of about two hours…is a fair sample of the old line 
speeches we have in this section.”39 Even in northern Indiana, the St. Joseph 
County Forum, a local Democratic publication, insisted that it belonged to the 
party of freedom for “the white man,” while castigating its opposition in crude 
racial terms.40 
 
The Democratic campaign in Indiana mirrored the party’s national efforts. 
The Democrats knew they would carry most of the southern states. They 
understood that the upper northern states would likely go to Fremont. In 
concentrating on lower northern and border-states like Pennsylvania, Indiana, 
Illinois, New Jersey and Maryland, they focused on a conservative message. 
Republicans, they claimed, were agitators who would provoke disunion. They 
printed quotes from Republicans such as William Seward (New York) who 
proclaimed there was a “higher law” than the Constitution, and Joshua Giddings 
(Ohio) who advocated a “servile insurrection” and “war of extermination against” 
southern slaveholders.41 Buchanan, meanwhile, was presented as a reasonable 
northern Democrat who would uphold the principles of popular sovereignty. 
 
Recognizing the dangers of appearing as racial egalitarians, Indiana 
fusionists sought to assuage voters that they were merely for protecting white- 
 
39 Samuel Harlan to Henry S. Lane, September 13, 1856 (copy), Henry S. Lane Papers, Lilly 
Library. 
40 Quoted in St. Joseph Valley Register, August 7, 1856. 
41 Quoted in Roy Nichols and Philip Klein, “Election of 1856” in Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., ed., 
History of American Presidential Elections (New York: Chelsea House, 1973), 2:1028. 
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man’s democracy. They did this, in part, by trying to minimize the presence of 
radicals like George Julian.42 They also made racist arguments designed to 
appeal to Indiana voters.  The Rushville Republican, a central Indiana  
publication, framed their agenda as one to preserve the territories “for the use of 
the white man” against the “Negro Oligarchy.”43 The St. Joseph Valley Register 
defended itself with its own racial appeals. Colfax’s paper offered a hypothetical 
conversation between a Republican and Democrat arguing over which party 
properly deserved designation as the “nigger party.” The imaginary Republican 
assailed his Democratic counterpart as they wanted to allow “slaves—the worst 
class of niggers,” to come “into possession of every foot of territory that properly 
belongs to the free white citizens of the country.”44 As a congressman running 
for reelection, Colfax willingly employed racial tactics. Although he had previously 
campaigned for the rights of black Americans, he was quick to realize that 
fusionists were vulnerable to Democrats on the issue. Hence he asserted that 
“Republican institutions” were at stake not “so much” on the question of “whether 
black men shall be slaves, but whether white men shall be free.”45 
 
The People’s Party, meanwhile, sought to cast the Hoosier Democracy as 
a party caught in the clutches of the slave-power. In particular, it took aim at 
Bright. During the campaign Bright, let slip that the election was a “contest 
between the North and South.” The Indiana State Journal suggested that “Mr. 
 
 
 
 
42 Julian, Political Recollections, 154. 
43 Rushville Republican quoted in St. Joseph Valley Register, July 24, 1856. 
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Bright is making the admission…that he and his whole party are for Slavery.” 46 
The State Sentinel insisted that Bright “said nothing of this kind.” Instead, he 
“spoke of the aims and purposes of the Abolitionists—of their sectional views and 
acts… sectional platform and sectional candidates” and “so far as they were 
concerned…the present contest was one between the North and South.”47 
Whatever Bright intended to say, his association with southern slaveholding 
made him a polarizing figure. He gave Republicans fodder for suggesting 
Democrats were pro-slavery. As the St. Joseph Valley Register charged: 
 
Jesse D. Bright is a Slaveholder; he voted to repeal the Missouri 
Compromise; he has voted in every instance with the South in favor 
of the interests of the slaveholder and against the rights and 
interests of the free white laborer of the North; he voted against the 
administration of Kansas as a Free State; he voted to sustain the 
Border Ruffians in the invasions of Kansas, in their carrying the 
elections by fraud and violence, and in their human warfare upon 
the Free State settlers; he voted against the repeal of the infamous 
laws of the fraudulent Missouri-Kansas Legislature; he voted 
against supplies for the Army unless that Army could be used to 
enforce those pretended laws. 
 
It further noted that Bright’s close associate was Graham N. Fitch. “If 
elected” the paper warned, he “will also be a willing tool in the hands of 
the Slave Power.”48 While Bright had actually avoided most of the votes to 
enact the Kansas Nebraska Act, during the summer of 1856 Bright voted 
with most northern dough-face and southern senators to sustain pro- 
slavery measures in Kansas.49 
 
46 Indiana State Journal, September 4, 1856. 
47 Indiana State Sentinel, September 6, 1856. 
48 St. Joseph Valley Register, October 9, 1856. 
49 Govetrack.us. “Congressional Votes Database,” 
http://www.govtrack.us/congress/votes#session=86&chamber=1 (accessed May 28, 2013). 
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Democrats, meanwhile, were careful to deny these associations. The New 
Albany Ledger insisted that the “Abolitionist demagogues” were lying when they 
claimed the Democrats “a slavery-extension party.” It denied the party had any 
connection with the “wild ravings” of the Charleston Mercury, the ultra pro-slavery 
South Carolina paper. The paper further insisted that the Kansas-Nebraska bill 
was never intended to introduce slavery into Kansas. It practically excluded 
slavery while adhering to the “principle adopted by Congress in the compromise 
measures of 1850.”50 
 
One advantage for Bright and his party was the divided state of the 
opposition, which could not even unite under a single name. In 1854 they had run 
as the People’s Party, colloquially known as the fusionists. In 1856 the People’s 
Party ran a slate of state-wide candidates with Oliver Morton the candidate for 
governor. Morton was a former Democrat who had bolted the party in 1854 over 
the Kansas-Nebraska Act. For the presidential election, the opposition threw their 
support behind that Republican Party, but they refused to identify themselves as 
Republicans. Additionally, a smaller contingent of American Know Nothings, 
uncomfortable with the anti-slavery leanings of the Republican Party, formed yet 
another party during the presidential contest.51 
 
 
 
 
 
 
50 New Albany Ledger, September 10, 1856. 
51 Brand, “History of the Know Nothing Party in Indiana,” 277-279. The three delegates who 
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Generally, however, nativism was on the decline. As the situation in 
Kansas deteriorated, the nativist movement lost its momentum. One Republican 
explained: “Neither the Pope nor the foreigners ever can govern the country or 
endanger  its liberties…but the slave-breeders and slave-traders do govern  
it…”52 With the attention of voters focused on slavery rather than temperance and 
nativism, fusionists hoped to appeal to the anti-slavery impulses of Democratic 
voters such as German immigrants. One Indiana fusionist strategist hoped to 
distribute copies of Charles Sumner speeches in German.53 It was estimated that 
Indiana fusionists had gathered 2,000 of these anti-slavery pamphlets.54 
 
The Hoosier Know Nothings generally appealed to conservative Whig 
elements leery of the Republican Party and their People’s Party allies. Indiana 
Americans portrayed themselves as the middle ground between the supposed 
abolitionists of the People’s/Republican Party and the pro-slavery fringes of the 
Democratic Party. Richard Thompson, conservative leader of the Know Nothings, 
blasted both major parties for “weakening the bands that bound together in one 
common brotherhood, this union of states.”55 Another factor that helped 
strengthen the American Party in Indiana was the rumor the Fremont was a 
Catholic. As one fusionist leader lamented, “The infernal Catholic lie prejudices 
[many] against Col. Fremont, and it will be hard to get them to vote for him.”56 
 
 
 
 
52 Quoted in Foner, Free Soil, Free Labor, and Free Men, 234. 
53 J.D. Howland to William Cumback, June 7, 1856 (copy), William Cumback MSS, Lilly Library. 
54 Zimmerman, “The Origin and Rise of the Republican Party in Indiana,” 251. 
55 Terre Haute Express, July 16, 1856 quoted in Roll, 151. 
56 Quote in Tyler Anbinder, Nativism and Slavery: The Northern Know Nothings and the Politics of 
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Bright hoped to exacerbate the divided nature of the opposition by 
encouraging Millard Fillmore’s American Party to draw conservative Whig votes 
away from the fusionists/Republicans. Concerned that “The Fillmore party in 
Ind[iana] is rapidly being absorbed by the Fremont & Abolition party,” Bright 
supported Indiana American Party leader Richard Thompson in a legal case 
against the federal government.57 The case stemmed from Thompson’s role 
representing a group of American Indians who had received a favorable 
judgment for damages caused by their relocation. A disruption in payment to the 
natives from the government meant the old line Whig could not collect on his fee. 
During the summer of 1856, Bright took an unusual interest in Thompson’s 
personal difficulties by speaking of the issue on the floor of the Senate a number 
of times.58 This produced speculation that Bright had pursued a financial 
settlement for Thompson in exchange for Thompson campaigning on behalf of 
Fillmore, which would divide the Democratic opposition. The speculation was 
likely valid. Thompson was usually a conservative opponent of slavery, but in the 
1856 election he noted: “[A] planter has the same right to occupy the Territories 
with his slaves” as “the northern farmer has with his horses.”59 On why he took 
an interest in helping Thompson, Bright insisted, “I [have] never aided a man 
from purer motives than I have Thompson in this case, and have never been so 
spoiled for any act of my life as in this case.”60 Bright, of course, never precisely 
 
57 Jesse Bright to William Corcoran, October 12, 1856, W.W. Corcoran Papers, Library of 
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58 Congressional Globe, July 31, August 1, 4, 8, 34th Congress, 1st Session, 1846-1847, 1883- 
1890, 1901-1903, 1980-1984. 
59 J.O. Jones to Henry S. Lane, June 25, 1856 (copy), Henry S. Lane Papers, Lilly Library. 
60 Jesse Bright to George Ewing, April 17, 1857, Ewing Papers (microfilm), University of Kentucky 
Library. 
184  
explained what he meant by “purer motives.” As one historian observed, “The 
rather sudden enthusiasm exhibited by Jesse Bright for an old Whig enemy is 
difficult to explain. However, this was an age of practical politics and of practical 
men.”61 
 
Most Whigs would eventually join the Republican cause, but some 
southern Indiana Whigs disliked agitation over slavery and feared racial 
egalitarianism.62 Bright reached out to these “old line Whigs” in hopes of bringing 
them over to the Hoosier Democracy. He secured the nomination of Abram 
Hammond for lieutenant governor. Once an old line Whig from Vermont, 
Hammond came to work with Bright, lobbied for Buchanan, and in 1857 would 
favor the Lecompton Constitution. Allen Hamilton was another former Whig who 
allied with Bright to further himself financially and politically.63 
 
These efforts succeeded. When Indiana held its state elections on  
October 14th, Democrats triumphed. In the gubernatorial race, Democrat Ashbel 
Willard was elected over Oliver Morton by 6,000 votes. In the state legislature, 
Democrats took the House by a 63 to 35 margin, although in the state senate, 
fusionists clung to a four seat advantage. The November election proved even 
more successful for Democrats. Buchanan triumphed over Fremont in Indiana by 
118,670 to 94,375. Even with the 22,386 votes that Fillmore received, Democrats 
still received a majority of the votes cast. The gubernatorial race was significantly 
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closer since most of the American Party votes that had gone to Fillmore in the 
presidential race went to Morton, as he was a more conservative anti-slavery 
candidate. This was particularly true in the southern counties where conservative 
old line Whigs did not vote for Fremont.  Some party leaders believed the 
presence of Joseph Wright helped stem the flow of disaffected Democrats from 
supporting the People’s Party tickets, and the presence of Fremont discouraged 
old-line conservative Whigs from supporting the national party.64 
 
The congressional races also went well for Indiana Democrats. The party 
was able to pick up four of the seats it had lost two years earlier, which gave 
them a 6-5 advantage in the state’s congressional delegation. Democrats 
controlled all congressional districts south of Indianapolis, while the opposition 
party won every congressional district to the north of the state capital. 
 
Most importantly, Buchanan won the presidency. He carried all of the 
southern states, and Fremont carried most of the free-states. The difference was 
that Buchanan also carried five northern states. With a third party in the race, 
Indiana was only one of two northern states in which Buchanan pulled a majority. 
He won 50.41% of the vote in Indiana, and 50.14% in his home state of 
Pennsylvania. In Indiana, Bright had successfully maintained the intersectional 
alliance between southern Democrats and conservative northern Democrats. 
 
*  *  *  * *  *  *  *  *  *  *  * *  *  *  *  *  * *  *  *  *  *  * 
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With the election over, and most of his political enemies gone from the 
party, Bright had established himself as Indiana’s most powerful Democratic 
leader. He had the patronage, the power, and the will to dominate the party. He 
had ousted the anti-Nebraska Democrats in 1854, and then in 1856 he had 
fended off the fusionist/People’s Party/Republican challenge. He had also helped 
a northern doughface win the presidency. His hold on the Indiana party seemed 
secure, but this assumed James Buchanan could skillfully navigate the nation’s 
sectional divide. 
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I will converse with iron-witted fools 
And unrespective boys. None are for me 
That look into me with considerate eyes. 
High reaching Buckingham grows circumspect. 
 
Richard III Act IV Scene II 
 
 
 
Chapter 6 
 
 
 
The Lecompton Crisis: Bright and the Hoosier Democracy, 1857-1858 
 
 
 
In 1857 Jesse Bright had reached the height of his power. He reigned as 
the leader of Indiana’s Democracy, and he was an important advisor to James 
Buchanan. Along with John Slidell (Louisiana), Howell Cobb (Georgia), and 
Henry Wise (Virginia), Bright encouraged Buchanan to select a Cabinet of 
southerners or southern-leaning northerners. Bright’s close ties to Buchanan had 
the advantage, of course, of increasing Bright’s access to administration 
patronage.1 
 
Bright hoped Buchanan could resolve the bitter sectional issues. If the 
party could sustain its hold on southern politics and maintain sufficient support in 
northern states such as Indiana, the Democrats believed they could hold power 
and deny it to the reckless Republicans. This path would not be simple. The 
Indiana senator knew that his position as a slaveholder and his sympathies for 
the South were at odds with his fellow Hoosiers, who feared the slave-power. 
The vast majority of Indiana Democrats supported popular sovereignty. They 
wanted white men to control their own destinies. Most did not mind that Bright 
1 Elbert Smith, The Presidency of James Buchanan (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 
1975), 17-19; Roy Nichols, The Disruption of American Democracy (New York: MacMillan Co., 
1948), 56. 
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was a slaveholder per se. But they opposed limiting the rights of white men in 
order to serve the slaveholding interests. 
 
Bright was a conditional unionist. His devotion to the Union was contingent 
upon being able to protect slavery. If this could be accomplished without 
alienating too many northern Democrats, it would strengthen the Democratic 
Party and the Union. Hence Buchanan entered office hoping to quell the agitation 
over slavery. Instead, Buchanan’s actions, and Bright’s staunch support, would 
completely alienate the North. It would draw the nation into a dangerous fight. 
Bright’s efforts to control Indiana became more unyielding, even vicious. The 
coming political storm would also show that there were limits to Bright’s ability to 
shape and manage Indiana politics. 
 
*  *  *  * *  *  *  *  *  *  *  * *  *  *  *  *  * *  *  *  *  *  * 
 
 
 
At the start of 1857 Jesse Bright was a key advisor to James Buchanan 
(but even Buchanan did not always trust the ambitious Bright). Unlike Franklin 
Pierce, Buchanan chose a cabinet entirely aligned with southern interests. The 
cabinet included Robert Walker (Mississippi), Howell Cobb (Georgia), John Floyd 
(Virginia), Aaron Brown (Tennessee) and Jacob Thompson (Mississippi)—all 
from slave states. There were two northerners—Isaac Toucey (Connecticut) and 
Jeremiah Black (Pennsylvania)—but both were doughface Democrats 
sympathetic to the South. Bright may have been offered a cabinet post as well, 
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but he apparently declined in order to stay in the Senate.2 The distribution of 
high-level appointments followed a similar pattern as most were either 
southerners or doughface supporters of Buchanan.3 
 
Buchanan and the Democrats also had reason to be optimistic about their 
party in 1857. In addition to recovering from the Kansas-Nebraska Act and 
winning the 1856 presidential election, Democrats would score off-year election 
victories later in 1857. Republican gains seemed to have stalled as Democratic 
promises to ensure fair Kansas elections had undercut opposition claims.4 
 
The improved political outlook was important for Bright who needed to 
secure his reelection to the Senate in 1857. The other Indiana senate seat also 
remained empty from two years earlier. To Bright’s dismay, Joseph Wright 
desired it. He wanted Graham Fitch. As a Democrat privately observed of the 
senator and his lackey, “neither of them has any principle. Fitch I know has 
none…He would be an abolitionist if it was profitable.”5 To solve the issue, party 
leaders worked out a deal that would allow Bright to select his own nominee for 
the senate seat, and he in return agreed to use his influence to win Wright a 
cabinet position.6 
 
Securing reelection and the election of Fitch required heavy-handed 
political deal-making. Republicans had a slight majority in the state Senate while 
 
2 Wayne Van Der Weele, “Jesse David Bright: Master Politician from the Old Northwest” (Ph.D. 
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3 Smith, The Presidency of James Buchanan, 21-22. 
4 Kenneth Stampp, America in 1857: A Nation on the Brink (New York: Oxford University Press, 
1990), 277 
5 C. Carter to John G. Davis, June, 26, 1857, John G. Davis Papers, Indiana Historical Society. 
6 Indiana State Journal, January 31, 1857. 
190  
Democrats had a solid majority in the House, but overall the Democrats had 
numerical superiority. Hence, Bright and the Democrats now wanted a joint 
legislative session. Setting up headquarters in the Palmer House, Bright had to 
overcome the Republican four-seat advantage in the senate.7 He did this by 
recruiting two nativist senators to his side on procedural matters, which split the 
vote into equal factions. 
 
Bright was now ready to enact his plan. When the legislature met in joint 
session on February 2 to certify the election of the governor and lieutenant 
governor, the Republicans bolted before there could be a vote to elect a United 
States senator. Democrats, however, pressed for an interpretation of the rules 
that required a quorum of both the House and Senate, which meant they needed 
a majority of the combined members present. Upon this basis, Democrats in the 
House and Senate, along with the two Americans, voted 83-2 to elect Jesse 
Bright and Graham Fitch to the United States Senate. Some Democrats privately 
worried about the legitimacy of their actions. Even Michael Bright, Jesse’s older 
brother, privately observed the vote had not been “very formal.” “Even if illegal,” 
he said, with Indiana’s new governor allied with Bright and the United States 
Senate in the hands of Democrats, “there will be no haste in ousting the present 
incumbents.”8 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
7 Indiana State Journal, January 26, 1857. 
8 Michael Bright to George Ewing, February 16, 1857 quoted in Van Der Weale, 201. 
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In the view of some historians the vote was “blatant fraud.”9 And indeed, 
when the U.S. Senate convened in late 1857, both Bright and Fitch faced  
election challenges. After a delay of some months, a senatorial committee  
packed with Democrats issued a report declaring: “Graham N. Fitch and Jesse D. 
Bright…are entitled to the seats which they now hold in the Senate.” The report 
was challenged by Republicans who protested the dubious manner in which the 
Indiana legislature had been convened. Ultimately, the Senate voted 30-23 to 
accept the results, but four Democrats, including Stephen Douglas, voted with  
the Republicans. Most Southern Democrats willingly ignored the irregularities 
because Bright and Fitch appeased southern interests.10 The vote, however, 
revealed the extent of the rift between Bright and Douglas over slavery and 
personal jealousies. Indeed, this was Douglas’s opportunity to return the favor for 
Bright’s betrayal in Cincinnati.11 
 
Bright was now able to push aside Joseph Wright, but as he often did, 
Bright handled this in a way that antagonized many Indiana Democrats. When 
Democrats met to draft a petition for Buchanan to appoint Wright to the cabinet, 
Bright’s men altered the language to recommend a “first class appointment.” 
 
9 Smith, The Presidency of James Buchanan, 103. 
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They justified this revision on the grounds of delicacy, but once the resolution  
had been adopted, Bright’s men secretly attached an addendum specifying they 
desired an appointment for Wright outside of Washington. Bright then 
communicated to the president that he desired Lewis Cass to be appointed to the 
Cabinet instead of Wright. Eventually, Wright was appointed Minister to Prussia, 
a position he reluctantly accepted.12 A giddy Bright noted there were “shouts and 
cheering” from within in his camp. He was now finally “rid of the low 
demagogue.”13 He had rammed through the state legislature not just his own 
reelection but also secured a senate seat for one of his trusted lieutenants. 
Joseph Wright, his long-time nemesis, had been exiled to Prussia. By summer 
Bright exalted to William English: 
 
Everything looks well for our Party in this State. A few Traitors have 
been trying to raise some excitement, but their efforts have proven 
a dead failure. In short, the Wright & Co. concern have failed, and 
in the absence of their cowardly leader, the other Partners have 
gone into liquidation.14 
 
Bright, although more powerful than ever in Indiana, still had to contend 
with a fractious party. The continuing sectional controversy exacerbated personal 
animosities with some party leaders. His handling of Joseph Wright had left many 
Democrats bitter. Gordon Tanner, editor of the Columbus Democrat and an 
outspoken opponent of Bright, denounced Bright’s “political jugglery” of “the last 
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“Upland Southerners,” 237-238. 
13 Jesse Bright to William Corcoran, January 30, 1857, W.W. Corcoran Papers, Library of 
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year or two.” Bright and his loyalists had sold “themselves and their constituency 
for place, and…trade in the offices of the country, to secure political influence 
and power…” Bright had brought “deep disgrace upon our party and our state.” 
The Rockport Democrat noted that “Jesse is not the man to hesitate at any 
meanness, when an object is to be accomplished.”15   Democratic Congressman 
John G. Davis who was an ally of Wright and Douglas, denounced Bright for 
being “abusive of those in the party who differ with him.”16 
 
The insults went back and forth. The Bright mouthpieces used vicious 
racial language to attack critics and dissidents, and his opponents attacked him 
as a slave-master of both black and white men. The Sentinel charged renegade 
Democrats with being in league with the “woolly-head-ed State Journal” out of 
their “Failures to get places under the government.”17 Congressman Davis, it 
claimed, had “the ‘scent of niggerism’ upon him” as a result of his vacillation over 
the Kansas Nebraska Act. The Douglas Democrats shot back by accusing the 
Bright machine of serving the slave power. One of the editors wrote to Bright in 
rage, “The ear-marks of these newspapers show, that instead of being devoted 
to the interests of the Democratic party, they are entirely devoted to your 
personal interests.” The editor added: “They are but servants—slaves—you are 
their master.” He likened Bright to how a “Brazilian planter treats his slaves,” 
being able to “rule the timid and the base” and to turn their “malignant passions 
 
 
 
 
 
15 Quoted in the St. Joseph Valley Register, June 4, 1857. 
16 Indiana State Sentinel, June 16, 1857. 
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194  
of the human breast against your foes.”18 A central Indiana Democrat wrote, 
“There is but one sentiment, and that is d—n J.D. Bright.” Were they to run 
against each other, “Wright would beat Bright [by] 25,000 votes…The people feel 
indignant…Unless Bright exculpates himself…his political star is setting…”19 The 
opposition presses noted that there was “warm opposition to the Bright rule.” 
Hoping to shame the Hoosier Democracy’s pride as free-men one newspaper 
added: “We have no hope…that it will amount to anything more than a refusal of 
the slaves on the farm in Kentucky to work; a touch of the whip will bring all the 
refractory editors and small politicians into the traces as readily as the lash 
subdues the slave on the said farm.”20 
 
*  *  *  * *  *  *  *  *  *  *  * *  *  *  *  *  * *  *  *  *  *  * 
 
 
 
Just as Buchanan began his presidency, the Supreme Court issued its 
landmark decision on slavery, Dred Scott v. Sandford. Buchanan hoped that the 
court might blunt Republican efforts to restrict slavery in the territories. Buchanan 
had gone so far as to inquire with one of the southern Supreme Court Justices 
about the status of the case. It involved a slave, Dred Scott, who had been taken 
by his owner into a territory of the United States where slavery had been 
prohibited. Buchanan was concerned that the case might be settled narrowly 
without deciding the larger question of the constitutionality of slavery in the 
territories. If the Supreme Court declared slaveholding in the territories a 
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constitutional right, Buchanan believed that the slavery issue would cease to 
burden American politics. It was clear that the Court was going to deny Scott his 
freedom, but some of the justices were leery of making a far-reaching decision. 
Realizing that such a decision would need some northern support, Buchanan had 
gone so far as to write Justice Robert Grier, a fellow Pennsylvania Democrat, 
imploring him to join the southern majority. 
 
The Court’s ruling, which in addition to denying citizenship to blacks, 
prohibited Congress from regulating slavery in the territories. The decision cast 
doubts on the constitutionality of Stephen Douglas’s conception of popular 
sovereignty. Both Buchanan and Chief Justice Roger B. Taney, the author of the 
decision, hoped that the court’s ruling would end the agitation over slavery. 
Instead, the decision provoked a political crisis. Buchanan had badly misjudged 
northern opinion. The decision allowed Republicans to claim that Democrats, as 
the stooges of the slave-power, intended to push slavery into the territories, even 
regardless of popular sovereignty. It also created fears that a future ruling might 
even push slavery beyond the territories and into the northern states.21 
 
In Indiana, the Democratic Party sought to minimize the ruling’s impact. It 
generally sidestepped the thorny issue of whether the decision undermined the 
principle of popular sovereignty. The party platform eventually praised the 
decision for preserving constitutional rights, and portrayed those who opposed 
the decision as disloyal Americans who subscribed to “the loathsome doctrine of 
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‘negro equality…”22 The platform, presumably with the blessing of Bright, 
asserted the justness of the ruling by emphasizing its definition of citizenship, 
while avoiding any mention of its consequences for territorial government. The 
Sentinel told its readers that the decision merely affirmed that blacks were not 
citizens and that all other portions of the decision were orbiter dicta. In other 
words, the opinion rejecting popular sovereignty in the territories was not legally 
binding. The organ would continue to argue that the only point of contention 
between supporters and opponents of the decision were on whether “the negro” 
was “politically or socially [equal] with the white race.”23 
 
Most Democrats in Indiana chose to accept the ruling. In part, they did so 
because Stephen Douglas declined to oppose it. Douglas feared that the 
decision threatened his quest for the presidency. On the one hand, it seemed to 
nullify his case for popular sovereignty. If the Constitution guaranteed the right of 
slaveholding in the territories, then local populations, acting through territorial 
legislatures, could no longer outlaw slavery. And yet to oppose the ruling would 
ruin his chances for winning southern support. Hence, Douglas chose to 
embrace the decision. He argued that it not only conformed to popular 
sovereignty, but it was the triumph of the doctrine. By denying that a black man 
could be a citizen, the court, Douglas claimed, had affirmed his long held belief 
that popular sovereignty merely applied to white men. Regarding slavery in the 
territories, Douglas’s arguments grew more strained. He suggested that a 
slaveholder, even while the Missouri Compromise had been in place, had always 
 
22 State Platforms, 14. 
23 Indiana State Sentinel, March 25, June 3, 1857. 
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enjoyed the right of slaveholding in the territories. He argued, however, that it 
had been a “barren and worthless right, unless sustained, protected and 
enforced by appropriate police regulations and local legislation, prescribing 
adequate remedies for its violation.”24 
 
Had Dred Scott been the only controversy of 1857-1858, the northern 
Democratic Party likely could have weathered the furor. Events in Kansas had 
turned the debate over slavery into terms favorable to the northern Democracy. 
Because a majority of Kansas voters desired a free-state, the fight had become 
one between pro-slavery election fraud and fair elections to exclude slavery. 
Hence, popular sovereignty became the stronger anti-slavery-extension position. 
Also, while Dred Scott barred the prohibition of slavery in the territories it was 
generally agreed that an entering state could prohibit slavery.25 Soon, however, 
Kansas erupted again in turmoil over what became known as the Lecompton 
constitution. In June 1857, the pro-slavery Kansas legislature organized elections 
for a constitutional convention as the territory moved toward statehood. 
Distrusting the electoral process, free soil Kansans largely boycotted the election, 
which ensured that the convention was dominated by pro-slavery delegates. 
When the convention insisted on a pro-slavery Lecompton Constitution, national 
Democratic leaders hoped to smooth the issue by encouraging a referendum on 
the question. Instead of sending the entire constitution to the voters for 
ratification, the convention responded by offering a pro-slavery and “anti-slavery” 
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option, with the latter merely outlawing the further importation of slaves and 
allowing slavery to continue indefinitely. Outraged by these choices, free soil 
Kansans boycotted the referendum. This, combined with another 2,720 
fraudulent votes, ensured that the more expansive pro-slavery provisions 
overwhelmingly passed. 
 
James Buchanan now had to make a decision. He had been able to 
appease northern Democrats by insisting that the Lecompton Constitution be 
submitted to the voters for ratification. Originally the Lecompton convention 
sought to send the pro-slavery constitution directly to Congress. Instead, 
moderate Lecompton leaders had been able submit a second constitution to 
voters restricting the further importation of slaves, while protecting existing slave 
property. As far as Buchanan was concerned, this was a reasonable choice. It 
allowed Kansas voters to become a free-state, in a similar manner as years 
before when some northern states had gradually phased out slavery. That 
existing slaveholders should have their slave property protected seemed only 
reasonable to Buchanan. He had run for the presidency as a conservative 
Democrat who intended to end sectional agitation. The issue of Kansas- 
Nebraska had incited sectional agitation over slavery in the territories, and 
Buchanan hoped for no further eruptions. At the same time, Buchanan’s 
decidedly southern sympathies weighed heavily in his decision. Undoubtedly he 
was influenced by his intimate ties to former Vice-President William Rufus King, 
an Alabama slaveholder. Buchanan, moreover, had no qualms about slavery.26 
 
26 Smith, The Presidency of James Buchanan, 15-16; Stampp, America in 1857, 285. 
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In his mind, the voters in Kansas had been offered a fair choice of either allowing 
slavery or restricting it to the few hundred slaves already present. By late 1857, 
he had decided to accept the Lecompton Constitution. Once again, a Democratic 
administration sought to appease southern slaveholders. 
 
As Kenneth Stampp has noted, Buchanan’s decision stood “as one of the 
most tragic miscalculations any President has ever made.”27   Although the Dred 
Scott decision had settled the legal right to slaveholding in the federal territories,  
it had little to say about how a state might organize its local institutions. If popular 
sovereignty meant anything, certainly the people of a state had a right to exclude 
slavery. Instead, President Buchanan decided to take the pro-southern position. 
Though the citizens of Kansas overwhelming opposed the introduction of slavery, 
the administration threw its muscle behind admitting Kansas as a state under the 
pro-slavery Lecompton Constitution. 
 
From the start, the Buchanan administration made Lecompton a test of 
party loyalty. Democrats in Congress had to unite the party behind Lecompton 
much as they had done in 1854. Such a course, Buchanan undoubtedly hoped, 
would stifle dissent and keep the party from tearing itself apart. The 
administration’s chief weapon was its control of patronage. Appointments were 
delayed until views on Lecompton were clearly established. But in addition to 
27 Stampp, America in 1857, 282. 
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patronage, there were bribes in the form of printing contracts to papers that 
agreed to endorse the administration.28 
 
Most northern Democrats, however, would have none of it. It is unknown 
what might have been the southern reaction had Buchanan rejected Lecompton. 
Northern reaction, however, was emphatic. Buchanan did not realize the uproar 
his policy would produce and the result was a northern Democratic disaster. The 
vast majority of rank-and-file northern Democrats, northern Democratic 
newspaper editors, and politicians furiously rejected the Lecompton Constitution. 
It made such a mockery of Douglas’s popular sovereignty that they could no 
longer stomach any more concessions to the slave-power. Stephen Douglas 
understood northern attitudes on this issue. Local populations, most northern 
Democrats believed, should decide the fate of slavery in the territories. Now 
southerners were demanding more, and neither Douglas nor his constituents 
would yield any further. Douglas broke with the president, and vowed to fight him 
in Congress. He did not just oppose Lecompton, but he embraced the fight with 
gusto. Working sixteen-hour days, he took to the Senate floor to fight it at every 
turn.29 In this moment, few northern Democrats, outside of federal appointees 
and office holders, could accept Lecompton.30 
 
There was one northerner Buchanan knew he could count on, and that 
was Bright, who loyally threw his support behind the administration. It is unlikely 
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that Bright, as a master political organizer, did not realize the unpopularity of the 
measure in the North. Indeed, he was remarkably accepting when William 
English, his young protégé, broke ranks to oppose Lecompton. Yet his southern 
attitudes were so rigid that he refused to acquiesce to popular will. His loyalties 
were to slavery, the South, and Buchanan. His bitterest enemy was Douglas. He 
could take no other course but to support Lecompton. Despite Lecompton’s 
unpopularity, Bright likely had the hubris to believe he could drag Indiana with 
him. After all, he had done it before. 
 
Bright, who rarely gave extended remarks on the floor of the Senate and 
who was especially loath to speak out on controversial issues, cast off his 
reticence to defend Buchanan.  And in defending Buchanan, Bright now finally 
exposed the depths of his commitment to the white South. In his speech, he 
repudiated the principle of popular sovereignty and claimed that he had 
previously supported it only out of expediency. The Senator had “never 
entertained a doubt” about the power of Congress to legislate for the territories. 
Bright suggested that with all of the agitation over Lecompton, it was “better” not 
to refer such a question “to the vote of the people.”31 
 
Jesse Bright exposed himself as a man whose commitment to white man’s 
democracy was secondary to securing the institution of slavery. Bright’s speech 
on the Lecompton measure was so peculiar to traditional Democratic ideals that 
Wayne Van Der Weele, in his highly sympathetic dissertation on Bright, was 
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forced to argue: “This type of speech is so far out of character for the Indiana 
Senator that one can legitimately surmise that it represents the ‘official line’ direct 
from the Executive Mansion; and Jesse simply had been chosen to carry the 
message.” Obviously Bright was touting the official administration line, but it was 
also clear that he was no mere lackey taking orders from the administration. 
Bright backed down to no one, and if any northern politician was more 
sympathetic to the South than Buchanan, it was certainly the Indiana senator. As 
one early historian of Indiana more accurately commented on the speech, Bright 
had “drank the pro-slavery cup to its dregs.”32 
 
Graham Fitch likewise defended the administration. Fitch, who was from 
northern Indiana, occasionally pandered to free-soilers. Now he took his orders 
from Bright, who had orchestrated his election to the Senate. As such, he 
objected to allowing the voters of Kansas to vote on the entirety of the 
constitution, noting that popular sovereignty provisions were merely tools used to 
deal with slavery. He acknowledged that the territorial legislature that had 
produced the constitution was not truly representative of Kansas voters, but he 
recognized it as legitimate nonetheless. Ignoring the massive voter fraud, Fitch 
noted there had been election boycotts by free-soilers. He explained, “You  
cannot compel men to vote…If a part…neglect or reject the invitation, and will not 
vote, is the machinery of Government hence to stop, and society to resolve itself 
in anarchy?” The pro-slavery legislature had submitted to the voters two options 
regarding slavery. One accepted slavery. The other barred the further importation 
32 Jacob Dunn and William Kemper, Indiana and Indianans: A History of Aboriginal and Territorial 
and the Century of Statehood, Vol. 2 (Chicago: American Historical Society, 1919), 557. 
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of slaves, but allowed slavery to remain for the foreseeable future. Neither option 
had been agreeable to those who wished to keep slavery out of Kansas, and  
thus they had refused to participate in an election. Fitch ignored this. The senator 
insisted that those who refused to vote had allowed the electoral outcome by 
default.33 
 
Both Bright and Fitch voted along with thirty-one other senators to admit 
Kansas under the Lecompton Constitution. Twenty-five voted no. The Senate 
was always the body that was dominated by pro-southern interests. Although 
rank-and-file northern Democrats overwhelmingly opposed Lecompton, most 
northern Democratic senators, as they were not directly elected by the people, 
aligned with Buchanan and voted for Lecompton. Northern Democrats voted 7-4 
in favor of Lecompton. The twenty-three southern Democrats voted unanimously 
in favor. Consequently, much of the subsequent action, and uncertainty, was in 
the House of Representatives.34 
 
The House of Representatives was harder for the administration to  
control, as members answered directly to the voters. Most importantly, the North 
had a larger population, which gave the House a larger proportion of northern 
members. Bright had a tall order getting northern House Democratic politicians to 
go along. William English, the normally reliable Bright lieutenant, had no desire to 
buck popular opinion by following Buchanan on Lecompton.35 Recognizing his 
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difficult political calculations, Bright assured English “I know you have not sought 
by anything you have said or done, to embarrass or strike at me. It is to be 
regretted that you & I could not have harmonized on this question.” Still he 
implored English “to conform as near as you can, to the views of the great 
Democratic Party, which is now assailed fiercely enough, God knows, by its 
ancient enemies.”36 Bright could count on Fitch in the Senate, and also three 
southern Indiana House members. But three other Democratic members, all from 
districts predominantly south of Indianapolis, refused to support Buchanan. 
 
As things stood in the House, all 75 southern House Democrats backed 
Lecompton. All 92 Republican House members opposed it. Hence, the Buchanan 
administration had to appeal to 53 northern Democratic members. The debate 
was furious. At one point, when the proceedings had stretched late into the night, 
a Pennsylvania Republican House member walked over to the Democratic side  
at 2:00am to confer with some northern Democrats. A bare-footed Laurence Keitt 
of South Carolina shouted for “the Black Republican puppy” to return to his side 
of the chamber. The Republican angrily responded, “No Negro-driver shall crack 
his whip over me!” Tempers quickly snapped and dozens of House members 
converged into a melee of violence. While the physical decrepitness of the 
combatants quickly turned the fight into a farce, few could doubt their raw 
emotions.37 On April 1, the House voted 120 to 112 to defeat the bill through 
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amendment. Northern Democrats voted 31-22 with the administration on 
Lecompton. 
 
The Buchanan administration now had to find a way out of the situation. It 
turned to Indiana’s William English, in part because of his close relationship with 
Bright.  English’s district was decidedly anti-Lecompton, but he also wanted the 
party to save face.38   The congressman offered what became known as the 
English Bill. Instead of admitting Kansas immediately as a slave state, Congress 
would send the Lecompton Constitution back to the territory where the people 
could hold a referendum to accept or reject the document. The bill did this in the 
guise of submitting the constitution to the people on the question of a land grant. 
The original Lecompton constitution requested 23 million acres of federal land. 
Congress thus pared it down to the usual four million acres offered to a new state 
to be accepted or rejected. If rejected, Kansas would remain a territory until it 
reached a population of 90,000.39 
 
English’s bill mostly garnered pro-southern supporters. If Kansans failed to 
endorse the Lecompton Constitution in referendum, at the very least it would 
prevent a free state from entering the union. For some anti-Lecompton 
Democrats, its virtue was that it guaranteed Kansans would have a choice in the 
matter.40 Still, it held the immediate statehood of Kansas hostage to supporting 
Lecompton, and Douglas therefore opposed it. Of Indiana’s three anti-Lecompton 
Democrats, two came to support the bill. John G. Davis, Indiana’s leading anti- 
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Lecompton Democrat, remained in opposition.41 When the compromise came to 
the Senate, Bright supported it, even though it was the kind of retreat that Bright 
was loath to accept.42 There were concerns that allowing the people of Kansas to 
vote on the issue might rally the free-soil elements.43 However rotten the 
compromise might be, he could at least hope that it would end the debate. When 
the Lecompton Constitution reached Kansas voters in August it was soundly 
defeated 11,300 to 1,788. Kansas would remain a territory until 1861 when it 
entered the Union as a free-state.44 
 
*  *  *  * *  *  *  *  *  *  *  * *  *  *  *  *  * *  *  *  *  *  * 
 
 
 
For several years Bright had held political control over the Indiana 
Democratic Party—and by extension the state. His control over the party 
machinery had allowed him to bring the state along on most of the national 
party’s policies to conciliate the South. He had fought the Wilmot Proviso, had 
won support for the Compromise of 1850, and had aligned the state party behind 
the Kansas-Nebraska Act. Each of these actions had weakened the party, yet it 
had still survived. Bright intended to play the same game in 1857 and 1858. 
When it came to placating the slave-power over Lecompton, however, the 
Hoosier Democracy had finally had enough. 
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Early in the Lecompton drama the Sentinel had taken a critical stance. It 
denounced the convention’s actions as “an act of despotism.”45 But when the 
administration came to support Lecompton, the Sentinel attempted to downplay 
the crisis by attacking the lurid reports as rumors. As for the proposed 
constitution, the paper stated, “While we would condemn any attempt to force a 
Constitution upon the people of Kansas, it is wise policy to await their own action 
upon the matter.”46 Ever loyal to Bright and Buchanan, the Sentinel was soon 
defending Lecompton. The difference between Douglas and Buchanan, it 
argued, was merely in the “application of the principle” of popular sovereignty, 
rather than the “principle itself.” Ignoring the massive voter fraud, the Sentinel 
rationalized that the Lecompton legislature should be regarded as “the sense of 
the people.”47 The Register cynically observed that the Sentinel’s malleability on 
popular sovereignty was precipitated by “the powerful influence of a $750 
government advertisement.”48 
 
Even for some of the most conservative Hoosiers, Lecompton was a 
fraud. It made a mockery of popular sovereignty by forcing slavery on a 
population that clearly rejected it. Bright and his Democratic newspapers were 
badly out of step with most of Indiana’s Democrats and the local party presses. 
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Over thirty Democratic newspapers—three-fourths of the total statewide— 
opposed the Lecompton Constitution.49 
 
Most Indiana Democrats rejected the Lecompton swindle. A Democrat 
from Clay County, a more conservative region of western Indiana, observed that 
he had “not seen a Democrat here in favor of admitting Kansas with the 
Lecompton Constitution.” This was because “the people are the sovereign power 
not only in a state but in a Territory. The voice of a majority fairly expressed must 
be supreme.”50   Even in southern Indiana, Democrats opposed the Lecompton 
Constitution where seventeen out of twenty-one newspapers spoke out against 
it.51 The New Albany Ledger was one of the seventeen. It had hoped to maintain 
a working relationship with Bright and the administration, but popular opinion 
forced its hand. The editor noted, 
 
The Democracy of this portion of Indiana care nothing about the 
slavery clause of the Kansas constitution—they care little whether 
Kansas is made a free State or slave State; but they care a great 
deal for the great principle involved in the settlement of the matter, 
they care a great deal for the good name and fame of the 
Democratic party, which has not yet, and we hope never may, 
become a synonym for broken promises.52 
 
 
 
The editor, a federal appointee himself, privately explained to a Bright lieutenant 
that he was acquiescing to popular sentiment. Partly apologizing, he noted, “As 
matters now stand, we know not what to say or do—at least that is my fix.” He 
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hoped that Bright would recognize his “warm friendship” and support for the party 
boss “personally and politically…when occasion shall arise.”53 
 
It is important to understand that what was at stake in the Lecompton 
crisis for Indiana’s Democrats was the issue of popular sovereignty. As Austin 
Brown observed, questions over popular sovereignty were more “fundamental 
than mere [concern for] niggers.”54 Another Democrat, who believed the 
Lecompton Constitution ought to “go to the Devil,” still believed it could become 
an acceptable document should a majority of white voters in Kansas sustain it.55 
 
John Davis, Indiana’s top elected anti-Lecompton Democrat, was 
bombarded with fervent letters opposed to the “Lecompton swindle.”56 It was the 
“only thing that the people seem to talk about” reported a central Indiana 
Democrat.57 In Bright’s hometown of Madison, a correspondent observed that 
“nearly all the Democrats [are] taking sides with Douglas in his opposition to the 
Lecompton Constitution and it is generally thought here by nearly all the 
Democrats that [allowing the measure to pass] will injure our political prospects in 
the state…”58 An “old line Democrat” who had moved to Kansas reluctantly joined 
the free state party suggesting “they are willing to do more than our leaders are 
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willing to acknowledge.” The “fire eaters” had made this association necessary.59 
Many Indiana Democrats who cared little for anti-slavery agitation now turned 
against the slave-power. 
 
As popular opposition mounted, Bright faced a threat to his political power. 
One Democrat called for an end to the senator’s political “dynasty.” Another 
Democrat noted that with exception of an appointed postal agent, all Democrats 
at their local convention opposed Lecompton.60 Those few who supported the 
Lecompton Constitution were either “sly” or low “drunken” fellows.61 Austin Brown 
contemptuously referred to them as Bright’s “slaves.”62 Yet, it was precisely these 
men, appointed office holders and leaders who could keep Bright’s political 
machine afloat in the face of popular opposition. 
 
John L. Robinson, editor of the Rushville Jacksonian, was typical of many 
Bright lieutenants. As a member of Congress, he had supported the Wilmot 
Proviso. Now Robinson was second in command of the Bright machine, and as 
part of the machine, he battled to ensure that slavery would be legal in Kansas. 
As one Democrat sarcastically observed of Robinson, his appointment as a 
United States Marshal “is, perhaps, the governing reason with him.”63 Another 
Bright loyalist was former Senator John Pettit who eventually received a plum 
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appointment from Buchanan. Petit led a group of Tippecanoe County Democrats 
in endorsing Lecompton, which they declared “compatible with the principles of 
the Kansas-Nebraska act.” Implausibly, Petit insisted that the administration’s 
actions did not violate the “great principles of popular sovereignty.”64 
 
With Lecompton now a test of party loyalty, Bright and his men became 
ruthless. Federal appointees were expected support the administration. Prior to 
the Lecompton debate, the administration had tried to reach out to Wright’s 
supporters, but when Lecompton became a test of party loyalty, Wright’s 
followers were vulnerable.65 Postmasters, federal district attorneys, and other 
federal appointees who did not support Lecompton were systematically purged 
and replaced with loyal party members. As one Hoosier privately remarked  
“office Seekers and holders are trembling in their Boots. I do pity Poor Harry it is 
nearly death to him to be muzzled as he is. I advise him to keep Mum and I think 
he will do so.”66 One of the postal officials who had been fired offered some more 
colorful language saying of one administration official, he can “kiss my 
ass…you… asshole of creation. Go ahead Mr. Hewitt put me out of office if you 
can and when you do all you can come up here and draw your teeth and sugar 
your gums and you may kiss my ass.”67 While the “Bright faction are very 
anxious” to quiet the controversy, wrote an Indiana Douglas organizer, they are 
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all the time precipitating it by their harshness and intolerance of any difference of 
opinion.”68 
 
A few Indiana Democrats articulated pro-southern sentiments. One was 
Jeptha Garrigus who claimed to despise Douglas because he was dividing the 
party. The “Black party” was “exulting” over the course of the Little Giant, insisted 
the pro-southern Democrat. For Garrigus, “all of this fuss is about nothing.” The 
former state legislative door keeper thundered, “kill off all the black party…, 
congress better defend our country by killing off all the Mormons and the black 
party in Kansas than to be quarrelling about the Kansas constitution.” He wanted 
a “millstone” wrapped around Douglas’s “neck, and cast in the sea.” For months 
he stewed in a genocidal rage. He would rather “the angel Gabriel stand one foot 
on the land, the other on the sea, and swear that time should be no more” if the 
“black Party” should succeed. Garrigus’s racial designation of the Republican 
Party was not merely for rhetorical effect. In his mind, the Republicans 
threatened to unhinge the slaveholding racial order that kept in place vital racial 
hierarchies. The old line Democrat preferred death to the supposed equalizing 
effects of Republicanism. 69 
 
Garrigus, however, was an exception. The anti-Lecompton, pro-Douglas 
forces grew confident they could gain control of the state party. As the 1858 state 
convention approached, they sought to gain control of the proceedings. One 
 
 
68 Gordon Tanner to John G. Davis, December 22, 1857, John G. Davis Papers, Indiana 
Historical Society. 
69 Jeptha Garrigus to John G. Davis, January 11, 18, February 2, March 3, May 10, 1858, John G. 
Davis Papers, Indiana Historical Society. 
213  
Douglas Democratic leader observed that the county conventions, where state 
convention delegates were selected, seemed to be going well for pro-Douglas 
Democrats.70 A central Indiana Democrat reported nine out of ten Democrats 
were with Douglas and opposed to their slaveholding boss. He concluded, “Bright 
and Fitch are done sold [and] politically damned…I hear the Democrats 
speak…in tones not to be mistaken.”71 Another top leader dreamed, “I begin to 
have hopes, now that the scepter is to depart from Judea, i.e. that the Bright 
dynasty will cease to rule the Democracy of our state soon.” The pro-Douglas 
leaders grew more hopeful when Bright’s men discussed delaying the state 
convention. Nevertheless Austin Brown insisted, “the people will come here on 
the 8th,” and “nothing can or will prevent them.”72 
 
*  *  *  * *  *  *  *  *  *  *  * *  *  *  *  *  * *  *  *  *  *  * 
 
 
 
Few Indiana Democratic state conventions were as important as the one 
that met at the start of 1858. It would elect a slate of statewide candidates. Most 
importantly, however, it would submit a platform that would define the direction of 
the Hoosier Democracy. Bright wanted a platform endorsing Buchanan, while the 
Douglas Democrats hoped to affirm support for Stephen Douglas and popular 
sovereignty. It would decide, for the time being, who would control the state 
party. It pitted the organizing power of Bright against the groundswell of support 
for the Douglas Democrats. The pro-southern politics of the Buchanan 
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administration were noxious to many Indiana Hoosiers. Bright, however, could 
still wield patronage. 
 
When Democrats gathered in Indianapolis on January 8, 1858, they were 
bitterly divided over sectional issues. Bright kept tight control of the proceedings. 
Although Douglas Democrats were numerically strong throughout the state, 
Bright used his power of patronage with devastating effectiveness. Privately, 
Austin Brown grumbled that in spite of nearly all Hoosiers opposing the 
Lecompton, “Post masters, Government officials, and office expectants” were 
loyal “Bright men.”73   The Democratic Pharos called the convention a contest 
“between Washington office-holders and office-seekers…and the 
Representatives of the Democratic masses on the other.” The Lecompton 
advocates were “sustained by the well-drilled satellites of Senator Bright,” while 
the popular sovereignty supporters “desired no favors from that source.”74 Bright 
had packed the convention with his own loyalists, and his strategy was to finesse 
the Lecompton issue by offering a platform that denounced “Black Republicans” 
and rejected any interference with slavery where it existed. It made no mention of 
the Lecompton Constitution, but it declared Buchanan “the first choice of the 
Democracy of Indiana.” It also offered a full throated endorsement of the Dred 
Scott ruling, and its “legal exposition of the doctrines of the Constitution of the 
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United States.” Additionally, the platform lauded how it rejected the “loathsome 
doctrine of ‘negro equality.’”75 The platform was adopted 274 to 186. 
 
The endorsement of Buchanan and the Dred Scott ruling were too much 
for Douglas Democrats who wanted to amend the platform to endorse Stephen 
Douglas and popular sovereignty. When the moment arrived to offer this 
amendment, the delegate designated to introduce it grew timid. Realizing this, a 
thirty-year-old Lew Wallace climbed on top of a desk to gain the recognition of 
the chair. Immediately the convention burst into commotion. When Chairman 
John Pettit ruled him out of order, chaos ensued as a chorus of angry roars 
swept over the convention. (There may have also been a few Republicans in the 
gallery gleefully adding their voices to the uproar.) The young delegate was 
reportedly carried over the floor to confront the chair. After some minutes of 
intense discussions, largely drowned out by the noise from the floor, the 
exhausted men gave up and allowed the proceedings to recess. Later Wallace 
and Bright’s men worked out a resolution which expunged any reference to 
Douglas, but declared “the Doctrine of the Kansas Nebraska Act” was affirmed 
and that “now and hereafter no Territory should be admitted into the Union as a 
State without a fair expression of the will of the people being first had upon the 
constitution...” The amendment was approved 378 to 114. The next day the 
resolution was officially printed without the word “now.” It read, “hereafter no 
Territory should be admitted” without the support of the people. The change was 
slight, but gave the resolution an entirely different meaning. Wallace’s resolution 
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had declared the Lecompton Constitution non grata. Years later, Wallace 
remarked that the culprit could only have been “the brightest, boldest, most 
unscrupulous of them all.”76 
 
Anti-Lecompton Democrats were furious, and charged that the Bright 
machine had turned the resolution into a pro-Lecompton document. Here was 
another example of white man’s Democracy suppressed by the interests of the 
slave-power. They were further angered when the Bright-controlled presses 
dismissed them as minor agitators who comprised only a twentieth of the 
convention.77 They had comprised at least a third of the convention. Indeed, 
outside the smoky halls of party leaders their numbers were much larger. 
 
Another controversy arose over Congressman James Hughes’s full- 
throated endorsement of the Buchanan administration. Throughout his address, 
anti-Lecompton Democrats jeered and interrupted. Finally, the congressman 
grew so frustrated that he threatened: “Governor Wright was not yet confirmed 
Minister to Berlin,” and “he might not be confirmed at all.” John Davis 
immediately took the stage and harangued Hughes for his blundering thuggery. 
As one Hoosier declared, “Jim Hughes made an ass of himself…”78 The Indiana 
State Journal gleefully noted of Hughes’s threats against Wright: “The menace 
[was] so open, so taunting, and… foolish…”79  It was yet another example that 
 
76 Wallace, An Autobiography, 248-251 (emphasis mine); St. Joseph Valley Register, January  
14, 21, 1858. Indiana State Sentinel, January 9, 1858; New Albany Ledger, January 11, 12, 1858. 
In his autobiography Lew Wallace mistakenly claimed this incident occurred during an 1856 
Democratic Convention. Newspaper accounts show it occurred at the 1858 convention. 
77 New Albany Ledger, January 13, 1858. 
78 W.W. Tuley to William English, January, 1858, English Papers, Indiana Historical Society. 
79 Indianapolis Journal, January 8, 1858. 
217  
the slave power, represented by Bright, would stop at no chicanery to achieve its 
ends. The New Albany Ledger, a loyal Bright paper, assured its readers that it 
opposed Lecompton, and characterized Hughes’s speech as “conciliatory” and 
favoring the “doctrine of non-intervention.”80 
 
Many Democrats, however, stewed over what had happened. Anti- 
Lecompton Democrats were stunned to have seen such a “strong hand” of 
“tricks” and “fraud.”81 “Political excitement is quite warm,” reported another 
Democrat. He noted, “the nominations do not take well because there is not 
Douglas men enough among them.”82   Another yearned for a “Moral and Political 
triumph over the despotism of party leaders.”83 They grew angrier when they 
read the published version of the platform, which endorsed the 1856 national 
platform agreed to in Cincinnati. Upon closer inspection, a Democrat noted that it 
carefully talked about “each State” holding power of its realm, but made no 
mention of territories. In fact, “The word territory [was] carefully avoided in all of 
[the planks].”84 
 
The furious anti-Lecompton Democrats were ready to initiate an intraparty 
civil war, and called for a second convention on February 23. The chairman was 
Austin Brown, who with his father had once run the Indiana State Sentinel as a 
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pro-Bright organ. Now Austin Brown was ready to help lead the Douglas 
Democrats to defy the party boss.85 
 
The meeting of about eight hundred was large and enthusiastic. These 
Democrats finally removed their “gloves” and denounced Bright “as a tool of the 
South & of Buchanan.” They vowed not to “follow dictators any longer.” As the 
attacks continued, one convention spectator reported, except for the applause, 
“you could have heard a pin fall, so deep and intense was the interest they took 
in the subject and speaker.” The convention endorsed Stephen Douglas for the 
presidency and popular sovereignty. The delegates also read Jesse Bright and 
the Indiana State Sentinel out of the party. While the Sentinel hoped to downplay 
the numbers of the convention and dismiss it as the work of “Black 
Republicanism,” the Bright machine and its party organ were quickly finding 
themselves overwhelmed by popular opposition.  As one Douglas Democrat 
noted, “The anti Lecompton fever here grows hotter every day, the more 
discussion, the hotter...”86 While the convention opposed the state party 
leadership, no candidates were nominated to challenge the regular Democratic 
slate. The convention was more about building an acceptable platform than 
completely breaking ties with Indiana Democracy. 
 
Not all anti-Lecompton Democrats were willing to join the insurrection. 
Some editors maintained support, albeit qualified, to Bright. The Ledger objected 
to the lack of “union and harmony” shown by many anti-Lecompton leaders. It 
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considered the “resolution in relation to the State Sentinel” in “bad taste.” It 
suspected “there was more of spite” about the convention’s proceedings “than 
anything else.”87 Of course, these editors relied on patronage dispensed by 
Jesse Bright. 
 
*  *  *  * *  *  *  *  *  *  *  * *  *  *  *  *  * *  *  *  *  *  * 
 
 
 
The English bill was critical to ensuring that the Indiana Democratic Party 
was not ripped apart. While it never fully healed the party divisions, it prevented a 
complete collapse of the state party. Generally, rank-and-file Democrats disliked 
the black Republican Party, and found the English bill a palatable alternative to 
Lecompton. Most Indiana Democratic newspaper editors ultimately embraced the 
English bill which helped pull the party back together. Desperate to square the 
differences with their readers and the administration, the compromise did the 
trick. The New Albany Ledger, hoping to mend fences with the Bright leadership, 
claimed that the compromise adhered to the principles of popular sovereignty  
and hence supported it.88 Most of the anti-Lecompton editors who supported the 
English bill did so from a desire to restore party harmony. Pro-Douglas leaders 
lamented that nearly all the anti-Lecompton papers had “gone over to 
Lecompton.” These papers were not “decidedly in its favor,” but accepted “it as 
the best that could be done to save the party.”89 As the Indiana State Sentinel 
insisted, “Lecompton has ceased to be a test of loyalty to the Democracy, and 
 
87 New Albany Ledger, February, 25, 1858. 
88 New Albany Ledger, May 11, 12, 13, 1858; J. Bacherman to William English, May 21, 1858, 
English Papers, Indiana Historical Society. 
89 Austin Brown to John G. Davis, May 12, 1858, John G. Davis Papers, Indiana Historical 
Society. 
220  
the Administration is showing a willingness to receive back to its fold the erring 
members of the flock who strayed into forbidden fields. We hear no more of the 
President’s determination to crush the ‘traitors,’ and see no more heads of 
malcontents struck off by the official ax.”90 A Democrat gave English cautious 
praise when he declared the bill “the best that could be done under the 
circumstances.”91 
 
Not all anti-Lecompton Democrats opposed the English bill. Many had 
previously expressed support for the policy. Several months earlier, Spencer 
County Democrats had met in convention where they had offered praise for 
Stephen Douglas, Joseph Wright and popular sovereignty. Included in their 
platform was an assertion that “Congress should refer back to the people of 
Kansas” the question over “ratification or rejection” of the Lecompton 
Constitution.92 
 
The willingness to close ranks behind the English bill reflected a growing 
desire by rank-and-file Indiana Democrats to compromise. A lead Douglas 
organizer confessed: “Our anti-Lecompton people, who were at first an immense 
majority, seem to prefer adherence to party, and to fear ‘disunion’ above all 
things.”93 Another Democrat was frustrated that most Spencer County Democrats 
agreed with Douglas in principle but still supported Buchanan.94 An Indiana 
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Democrat conceded that “the present position of Douglas may be correct,” but 
added that this was not the time to oppose the administration. The hardnosed 
politico reasoned: “The question is not whether the doctrine of Douglas or 
Buchanan is right and should be sustained but…whether the administration 
should be sustained, or the party divided…”95 
 
Yet, not all anti-Lecompton Democrats were mollified. Bright was not the 
kind of political leader one would desire to cross, and having organized against 
him, these Democrats had no future in a state party that he dominated. Hence, 
they needed the help of Republicans to survive. With English going over to the 
administration, many suspected fraud. An anti-Lecompton leader asked, “Can 
English really stand by Bright or is there money in it?”96 The English bill remained 
suspect as well. Too many Southern Democrats rallied behind it and the bill 
seemingly gave inducements for Kansans to vote for the pro-slavery 
Constitution.97   William Wick also worried about the political impact on northern 
Democracy should Kansas voters choose the Lecompton Constitution rather than 
remain a territory. Democrats had already been worried that many Democrats 
would go over to the Republicans should this happen.98 
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Overall, however, the English Bill undercut much of the anti-Lecompton 
rebellion.  In language indicative of desperation, Austin Brown assured Davis that 
the losses among the anti-administration ranks were of no concern because “We 
have now no cowards in our ranks.” The free-soil-inclined German community 
“remains steadfast, and fights manfully for the right.”99 Brown even led a group of 
Democrats to start the Weekly National Democrat to oppose the administration. 
 
*  *  *  * *  *  *  *  *  *  *  * *  *  *  *  *  * *  *  *  *  *  * 
 
 
 
William English’s Lecompton compromise made possible a legislative 
withdrawal, but it also meant that a divided Democratic Party would face a 
rejuvenated Republican challenge in the 1858 congressional elections. These 
elections would determine whether Bright could control his party and whether the 
party could retain its hold on Indiana politics. Douglas hoped to cultivate anti- 
administration Democrats to build his own alliance of supporters in Congress. 
Meanwhile, Republicans hoped to wrestle the state away from the Indiana 
Democracy. 
 
The major difficulty for Douglas was that Bright still controlled the party 
machinery. The Indiana senator may have been too pro-slavery for the average 
Indiana voter, but these voters were loyal to regular Democratic nominees. So 
long as Bright could control the state and congressional nominations, most 
Indiana Democrats, even those sympathetic to Douglas, would remain loyal to 
the regular Democratic nominee. Hence, the Little Giant needed to mobilize 
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Democrats who were unconditionally loyal to his cause and gain cooperation 
from Republicans in order to elect pro-Douglas congressional candidates. 
 
Sensing an implosion within the Democratic ranks, Hoosier Republicans, 
as they were now officially called, sought an anti-Lecompton coalition with 
Douglas Democrats. While there was talk of merging the two factions into a 
single party, few thought this was practical. On December 14, 1857, only a few 
days after Douglas officially broke from the administration, Schuyler Colfax met 
with the Illinois Senator in a secret meeting. The two long-time political enemies 
now seemed to have a common purpose. Both men were skeptical they could 
form an alliance believing once “this issue was settled right, new issues 
would…divide all again.” They were still inclined to keep their options open 
believing “the future would decide our duties & our positions.”100 As it became 
clear to the public that Colfax was working with Douglas, the Register assured its 
readers of the “maxim” that it was “our first duty…to that which lies nearest to  
us.” Mindful that Douglas had long been seen as the enemy, the paper reasoned, 
“even if his motives are purely personal and selfish, he hazards far more with his 
party by taking his bold stand, than the Republicans hazard, by co-operating with 
him on this single issue...”101 Even after the English bill, Douglas’s Indiana 
supporters and Republicans continued to cooperate as they viewed the 
slaveholding Bright and the administration as the enablers of the slave-power. 
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The deal was not a formal alliance. Both sides agreed that their working 
relationship was only likely to last as long as the issue remained, rather than any 
kind of permanent political realignment. When Republicans organized at their 
state convention, their platform declared “freedom” was “national and slavery 
sectional,” and that “congress has the constitutional power to exclude slavery 
from the national territories.” It then added that the Republican Party “now” 
opposed “its extension into any of the territories” and would “use all proper and 
constitutional means to prevent such extension.”102   Douglas and Colfax were 
keen realists who knew that the Republicans were stronger in the north of the 
state and Democrats in the south. Hence to deny seats to pro-administration 
Democrats, Douglas pressed anti-Lecompton Democrats to support Republican 
candidates in the northern congressional districts, while the Republicans would 
rally around anti-Lecompton Democrats in most of the southern districts.103 
Ultimately, their alliance was an uneasy one. Anti-Lecompton Democrats were 
content to run their own candidates in the congressional races, while maintaining 
loyal support for the state ticket where national issues would be less important.104 
 
One exception to this coordinated effort was in the third congressional 
district, which encompassed the southeastern region of the state along the Ohio 
River. In the wake of the Kansas Nebraska Act, it had gone to a former Whig who 
had run as a fusionist. In the 1856 election, however, Democrats had used race 
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to taint the Republicans, alienate old-line Whigs, and regain the seat. With the 
1860 presidential election in mind, Republicans wanted to know if the Lecompton 
crisis had bolstered their strength in a district that could determine whether 
Republicans could capture the entire state. Therefore, anti-Lecompton and 
administration Democrats each ran their own candidates and the Republicans 
ran their candidate.105 
 
While voters in the third congressional district were opposed to the slave- 
power, they were equally suspicious of racial egalitarianism. To win this seat, 
Democrats had to paint Republicans as egalitarians, and the Republicans had to 
convince voters that they would uphold white supremacy.  While administration 
Democrats insisted that their opponents were “mongrel Black Republicans,” 
Michael Garber’s Courier insisted that the Republican Party “WON’T have them 
in the State, free or slave.” Garber proclaimed, “Nigger! Nigger!! What would Mr. 
Buchanan’s people do without the eternal inevitable nigger?” The Courier hoped 
to blunt Democratic charges by claiming that the Dred Scott decision would open 
the door for blacks to enter the state.106 
 
Even in northern Indiana, Republicans found it necessary to blunt 
Democratic charges of racial equality. Schuyler Colfax’s paper was loath to 
directly engage in racial demagoguery. Instead, the paper copied material from 
other sources that engaged in coarse racial appeals. It reprinted one of Illinois 
Senator Lyman Trumbull’s more racially charged speeches.  In attacking the 
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Dred Scott decision, the speech talked about slaveholders bringing their black 
slaves “with flat noses, think lips, and woolly heads” into the territories. More than 
the mere presence of blacks, slaveholder amalgamation produced slaves “a little 
whiter” with “some of them…so white you can hardly distinguish the negro blood 
in them.” Republicans, on the other hand, stood for “free white men, who do not 
want anything to do with negroes [and] woollyheads.”107 
 
Republicans were also determined to battle for the votes of German 
immigrants. For years these immigrants had identified with the Democratic Party. 
They opposed the moral reform impulses prevalent among Whigs and 
Republicans, but German immigrants had often come to the United States in 
search of universal liberty. Less racist than many native-born Democrats, 
Germans were more receptive to the anti-slavery cause. Most had remained 
leery of Republican nativism. By 1858, however, Republicans had begun to 
downplay these issues and had nominated German candidates for key positions. 
The pro-slavery machinations of Bright also played a role alienating these anti- 
slavery voters. This transition was made all the more poignant when the 
Evansville Volksbote officially switched its allegiance to the Republican Party.108 
 
As Republicans and anti-Lecompton Democrats threatened to undercut 
the pro-Bright Democratic nominees, the Sentinel sought to claim the mantle of 
Douglas as it supported the Bright men. Throughout the fall canvass, the main 
Democratic organ reported on the debates between Douglas and his Republican 
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rival. It reminded its readers that Illinois Republican Senator Lyman Trumbull had 
been stumping the state as a “bitter opponent of popular sovereignty” in his 
efforts to elect Republicans. Not only were “Black Republicans” against Douglas, 
but its “debauched” supporters favored allowing “free negroes to vote.”109 Though 
Bright had become antagonistic to both Douglas and popular sovereignty, the 
party organ sought to profess alignment with the Little Giant. 
 
Going into the congressional elections, Democrats focused much of their 
effort on winning the southern Indiana congressional seats. In the First 
congressional district, in the southwest corner of the state, Democrats either 
disdained anti-slavery agitation or were sympathetic to the South. The regular 
Democrats re-nominated William Niblack. The Bright Democrat had consistently 
voted to admit Kansas under the Lecompton Constitution before eventually 
agreeing to the English bill. At his nominating district convention, administration 
Democrats broadened their support by assuring voters that neither Lecompton 
nor the English bill would be a test of party loyalty. During the campaign, Douglas 
hoped to cobble a coalition of Republicans and loyal Douglas backers to support 
the “Independent, anti-Lecompton Democratic” candidate. With the English bill 
having passed, the first district, likely the most southern oriented district in 
Indiana, felt little need to agitate. The anti-Lecompton Democrat was made 
especially vulnerable as he had been a Whig in his younger years. Ultimately 
Niblack would secure reelection.110 
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In the second district, regular Democrats re-nominated William English, 
who had craftily avoided supporting the Lecompton Constitution while 
maintaining his friendship with Bright. His leadership in providing the face-saving 
compromise bill for the administration boosted his status and gave him an 
opportunity to appeal to his constituents as a principled supporter of popular 
sovereignty. He would easily win reelection.111 
 
In the third district, incumbent pro-Lecompton Democrat James Hughes 
faced a three-way race. Party loyalty was enough for him to garner the bulk of 
Democratic votes. The anti-Lecompton Democrat, however, pulled in a significant 
enough amount of support to split the Democratic vote. Furthermore, 
Republicans had been able to successfully inoculate themselves to charges of 
racial equality.  The Republican candidate, William Dunn, was easily able to carry 
the southern Indiana district. If Democrats could no longer exploit the issue of 
race, they would be in big trouble. 
 
Throughout the northern portions of the state, anti-Lecompton Democrats 
threw their support behind Republicans to easily achieve victory over the regular 
Democratic nominees. The only exception was the sixth congressional district 
where Republicans united with anti-Lecompton Democrats to reelect Douglas 
Democrat John G. Davis. In all, only three regular Indiana Democrats were 
elected to Congress. The congressional elections showed the toll the intraparty 
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divisions had upon the Democrats. In all, Republicans secured seven 
congressional seats, up from five in the previous session.112 
 
The election was a disaster for Indiana Democrats. They won only three 
congressional seats. Douglas Democratic leaders had helped a number of 
Republicans win, but were only able to secure a House seat for one of their own. 
The major winners were the Republicans. The American Party played little role  
as Republicans successfully consolidated much of their support. If they could 
continue their success in two years, Indiana would go against the Democratic 
Party in a presidential election for the first time in decades. Republicans had 
worked hard to shed the stigma of racial egalitarianism. If the national party could 
nominate someone who was careful not to offend the white racial order, he could 
be a threat to the Hoosier Democracy. 
 
Clearly if Bright desired to keep power, he had to adapt. He needed to 
jettison his pro-southern loyalties and show that he was for the party of white  
men un-beholden to the dictates of the slave-power. Bright would have none of it. 
He defiantly wrote, “I have not, nor shall I ever regard a set of men in this  
Country who call themselves ‘anti-Lecompton Democrats,’ in any other light than 
Abolitionists, and most them rotten in every sense of the term.” I would defy 
“every one of them, from the lying hypocritical Demagogical Master Douglas, 
down to the servant puppy in the kennel.”113 
 
 
 
 
112 St. Joseph Valley Register, November 4, 1858; Elbert, “Southern Indiana Politics,” 74. 
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Most Indiana politicians who supported Bright were practical men. Few 
shared his overtly pro-southern attitudes. Bright’s hold on power was based on 
his ability to convince political allies that he was powerful and could brighten their 
political or financial future. His weakness was now exposed and Bright’s position 
as party leader was in serious jeopardy. The senator had weathered many 
political difficulties throughout his career, but now he set his political life upon a 
cast. Even he must have wondered whether he could survive. 
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Slave, I have set my life upon a cast 
And I will stand the hazard of the die. 
I think there be six Richmonds in the field; 
Five have I slain today instead of him. 
Richard III, Act V Scene IV 
 
 
 
Chapter 7 
 
 
 
The Political Downfall of Jesse D. Bright: 1859-1860 
 
 
 
Jesse Bright had managed to hold onto control of the Indiana Democratic 
Party during the 1858 elections, but thereafter his power quickly evaporated. For 
years he had ruled in an uneasy coalition with conservative Democrats. Now 
many of them were his open enemies. The Republicans, meanwhile, were 
threatening to capture the state in the 1860 presidential election. William Seward 
seemed likely to win the Republican nomination, and Stephen Douglas was now 
determined to claim the Democratic nomination that Bright had helped deny him 
in 1856. As far as Bright was concerned, Seward was a “Black Republican” and 
Douglas was nearly the same. As much as he loathed the Republicans, his 
mission was to destroy Douglas. By 1860, Bright was a weakened figure, but he 
was not a man to go quietly. Never burdened by self-doubt, if he were to fail, he 
would do so in spectacular fashion. 
 
*  *  *  * *  *  *  *  *  *  *  * *  *  *  *  *  * *  *  *  *  *  * 
 
 
 
Having lost badly in the 1858 congressional elections, many Indiana 
Democrats realized that they needed to regroup. The Indiana State Sentinel 
observed there was “no time for recrimination—we are free to confess that 
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neither the Lecompton nor the anti-Lecompton faction have manifested sufficient 
forbearance of each other’s peculiarities of opinion.” In language that Bright could 
never accept, the editor insisted that if Democrats were “obliged by a sense of 
duty to oppose [the] Administration on a particular point, [Bright] should respect 
their sincerity and applaud their independence. To exact a rigid conformity to his 
own standard of opinion, would be an excess of tyranny incompatible with the 
spirit of Democratic faith and practice.”1 The New Albany Ledger shared similar 
sentiments. Having recently backed the administration, it was now ready to 
support Stephen Douglas for the 1860 nomination. The paper criticized the 
“unnatural coalition” of doughface Democrats and “black Republicans” who 
sought to “crush” him.2 If these Democrats thought Bright was inclined to follow, 
they were quickly disabused. Fitch, Bright’s junior partner in the Senate, gave an 
early 1859 speech attacking the Little Giant. This prompted the Ledger to sneer 
that the effort was that of a “servant” pleasing “his master.”3 There would be no 
reconciliation. 
 
Both the Democratic presses and ambitious political leaders were now 
asserting their independence from Bright. Thomas Hendricks had served as a 
land commissioner under the Buchanan administration, but he shrewdly 
remained quiet during the Lecompton controversy. During the summer of 1859, 
as he gathered support for a gubernatorial nomination, Hendricks resigned his 
office in an effort to distance himself from Bright and the administration. As one 
 
 
1 Indiana State Sentinel, February 3, 1859. 
2 New Albany Ledger, January 1, 1859. 
3 New Albany Ledger, January 10, 1859. 
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Douglas Democrat observed, those who sought statewide nominations sought to 
show themselves “the peculiar Douglas candidate.” Few desired to show 
“friendship or affinity with Mr. Bright” being that he represented “the setting sun.”4 
 
The Indiana State Sentinel’s soon became outwardly hostile to Bright and 
his cronies. Former congressman John L. Robinson had become Bright’s political 
enforcer, but the Sentinel was no longer taking orders. It declared, “We do not 
think a few men own the party or that it is an organization sustained for their 
particular benefit.” Referring specifically to Robinson, although obliquely to  
Bright, the editors declared that he had become “so dictatorial and overbearing in 
his manners as often to become obsolete.” Indiana Democrats were “disposed to 
do their own thinking, and determine for themselves the policy of the party.”5 By 
the end of 1859 the paper officially supported Douglas for the nomination.6 An 
editor for the New Albany Ledger flatly told a Bright lieutenant that his paper “was 
no man’s organ.” While he denied loyalty to any particular faction, he declared 
that in regard to Lecompton “Douglas was right.”7 
 
The John Brown raid that October caused some excitement in Indiana 
politics but it did little to change the shifting political alignments. Democrats, of 
course, seized upon the raid to suggest that Republican doctrines inevitably led 
to extremism. Republicans gleefully noted that Indiana Governor Ashbel Willard’s 
brother-in-law had participated in the Brown raid. Still, even though Willard tried 
4 Indiana State Sentinel, July 30, 1859. 
5 Indiana State Sentinel, September 26, 1859. 
6 Kenneth Stampp, Indiana Politics During the Civil War (Indianapolis: Indiana Historical Bureau, 
1949), 17, Indiana State Sentinel, December 14, 1859. 
7 J. Bachman to William English, January 25, 1860, William Hayden English Family Papers, 
Indiana Historical Society. 
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to save his wife’s brother from a death sentence, few Indianans believed that the 
pro-Bright governor had been involved in the affair.8 
By the end of 1859 the more serious political question was whether Bright 
could once again dominate the state convention. With control of the party at 
stake, organizing became the chief occupation of the Democratic factions. The 
Douglas Democrats were initially disappointed to learn that the convention was to 
be controlled by selected delegates. In other words, each county would organize 
their own selection of delegates for the state convention. For years Bright had 
been the master at manipulating this process, but now his opponents were 
determined to beat him at his own game.9   Throughout the late summer and fall 
of 1859 as Democrats held county conventions, a consistent pattern developed. 
The pro-Bright conventions usually produced planks praising Buchanan. Some 
also endorsed Joseph Lane for the presidency. Nearly all of the pro-Bright 
platforms lauded the Dred Scott decision as the final arbiter of territorial disputes 
over slavery. While these platforms professed devotion to the 1856 national 
platform, they made no explicit reference to popular sovereignty. The county 
platforms controlled by Douglas Democrats had their own consistent message. 
Most endorsed Stephen Douglas, and they also endorsed popular sovereignty. 
Few mentioned the Dred Scott decision. While most ignored Buchanan, some 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
8 New Albany Ledger, November 4, 1859. 
9 Charles Zimmerman, “The Origin and Rise of the Republican Party in Indiana from 1854 to 
1860” Indiana Magazine of History 13 (September, 1917), 374. 
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condemned his actions regarding Lecompton. The anti-Lecompton Democrats 
also objected to federal mandates regarding slavery in the territories.10 
 
Even in his home county of Jefferson, Bright faced challenges. When his 
supporters packed the delegate selection committee and tried to adjourn, a 
Douglas Democrat objected. The chair ruled him out of order, but the delegates 
overruled the selection committee chair. Douglas Democrats were then able to 
alter the selection process for a later county convention, which allowed the 
Douglas Democrats to wrestle control away from Bright.11 
 
In Lawrence County, where delegates were selected by township 
primaries, the pro-Bright forces were also outnumbered. In arguing that not 
enough delegates had been produced by the township elections, they succeeded 
in having the convention vote to choose delegates. When Bright’s men quickly 
gained the upper hand, the Douglas delegates walked out in disgust, and 
organized a separate convention of their own to elect delegates. In fact, several 
counties sent competing delegations to the state convention.12 
 
Douglas, it was soon clear, had gained the upper hand. Austin Brown 
reported to the Illinoisan, “From information obtained by personal 
interviews…from reports of the action of County Conventions, I am led to believe 
that your friends are at this time, in the majority—sufficiently so to secure them 
 
 
 
 
10 Indiana State Sentinel, July 15, 20, August 6, 24, September 6, 12, October 1, 14, November 7, 
22, 30, December 6, 7, 10, 12, 14, 15, 21, 22, 31, 1859, January 11, 1860. 
11 New Albany Ledger, September 23, 1859. 
12 Indiana State Sentinel, December 22, 1859. 
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the control of the State Convention…”13 As Douglas Democrats gained success 
in the various county conventions, another correspondent wrote, “The press and 
the people are with us. I have no doubt as to the result of the January 
convention.”14 Bright seemed to have understood the political situation as well. 
Sensing his loss of control, he crossed over into Kentucky to lobby their county 
conventions. While Bright personally supported Lane for the nomination, he knew 
many Kentuckians favored their own favorite son, former Secretary of the 
Treasury James Guthrie. The Indiana senator encouraged this sentiment in order 
to stop Douglas.15 
 
When Democrats met at their state convention on January 11, 1860, a 
bitter fight seemed imminent. Jesse Bright arrived at Indianapolis accompanied 
by an official from the Treasury Department. Rumors flared that the old party 
boss intended to bribe enough delegates to get his way. Douglas Democrats 
were confident in their numbers, but they were also nervous that Bright could 
instill enough fear—and make enough bribes—to get his way on the platform and 
the nominations.16 Because of disputes arising at the county level, delegates  
from Hancock, Jackson, Jennings, Laporte, Lawrence, Randolph and Spencer 
counties were initially left unseated as the convention met to elect a temporary 
chairman. The contest pitted Douglas partisans under the leadership of Lew 
Wallace against Bright’s loyalists who were led by John L. Robinson. The 
13 Austin Brown to Stephen Douglas, November 28, 1859 quoted in Wayne Van Der Weele, 
“Jesse David Bright: Master Politician from the Old Northwest” (Ph.D. diss., Indiana University, 
1958), 231. 
14 Gordon Tanner to Stephen Douglas, November 5, 1859 quoted in Van Der Weele, “Jesse 
David Bright,” 231. 
15 Van Der Weele, “Jesse David Bright,” 239. 
16 Indianapolis Daily Journal, January 12, 1860. 
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Douglas forces prevailed by 189 ½ to 174 ½. With victory in hand, the convention 
voted to seat the Douglas delegates from the disputed counties.17 
 
The rest of the convention proceedings signaled the collapse of the Bright 
political machine. While the convention offered token support for the Buchanan 
administration and parroted Stephen Douglas’s finesse on the Dred Scott 
decision, the convention endorsed a resolution emphatically asserting the right of 
popular sovereignty. Bright’s supporters tried to convince the Douglas Democrats 
to accept a “compromise.” They desired to have the delegates pledged to former 
Indianan Joseph Lane of Oregon, or at the very least, leave the Indiana  
delegates unpledged. As one convention spectator observed of these 
maneuvers, “the whole Convention burst out in an uproarious laugh” that lasted 
“for several minutes.” Indiana Democrats were well aware of how Bright had  
used this maneuver in 1856 to deny Douglas at the national convention. Instead, 
they nominated a slate of delegates to the national convention who were 
committed to giving Stephen Douglas the Democratic nomination for presidency. 
As one summed of Bright, “He is dead, and d—d in this state and none so poor 
as to do him rescue.”18 
 
After the convention, some Democratic newspapers tried to soften the 
rebuke. The New Albany Ledger asserted that it was “the misfortune of Senator 
Bright to have many indiscreet friends.” It was these folks who had “deceived” the 
 
 
17 Zimmerman, “The Origin and Rise of the Republican Party,” 375. Indianapolis Daily Journal, 
January 12, 13, 1860. 
18 Ezra Read to John G. Davis, January 15, 1860, John G. Davis Papers, Indiana Historical 
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senator into believing public sentiment was with the administration. It was their 
blundering actions which had caused “many Democrats (and ourselves among 
the number) to speak of him in perhaps too harsh a manner.”19 If this was 
intended to placate the senator, Bright would have none of it. In refusing to 
accept the convention proceedings, he incredulously asserted, “Yes, the State 
Convention did instruct for Douglas,” but the leaders at the convention 
“consented to these instructions without consulting me.”20 
 
Bright, in fact, was now consumed with stopping Douglas. Unable to hold 
Indiana, he focused instead on lobbying the delegations of the other states at the 
Democratic National Convention in Charleston. As he had in 1856, the old party 
boss was assisted by the pro-slavery senators John Slidell of Louisiana and 
James Bayard of Delaware.21 
 
Bright had many local allies in Charleston on whom he could appeal for 
assistance. He and his men quickly established a headquarters in the mansion of 
a wealthy friend. Here the Indiana Senator was in his prime. A contemporary 
described: 
 
The heavy, closely-shaven gentleman, with yellow vest, open, that 
its wearer may have the benefit of the breeze—the gentleman 
leaning against the railing, in his chair, looking like a business man 
more than a Senator (if we may be allowed such a distinction), is 
Jesse D. Bright, who has long been the king caucus of Indiana. Mr. 
Bright’s hatred of Douglas is, perhaps, just now, the strongest 
passion of his soul. Douglas voted to exclude him from the Senate, 
 
19 New Albany Ledger, January 16, 1860. 
20 William Woollen, Biographical and Historical Sketches of Early Indiana (Indinanapolis: 
Hammond & Co., 1883), 230. 
21 Roy Nichols, The Disruption of American Democracy (New York: The Macmillan Company, 
1948), 294. 
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and their relations are those of irreconcilable and deadly hate. It is 
reported that he swears he will stump Indiana, county by county, 
against Douglas, if he should be nominated.22 
 
 
 
Bright’s determination to derail Douglas was more than a personal grudge match. 
He was determined to secure slavery as the United States formed states out of 
the territories. During the convention, William Yancey of Alabama spoke for the 
pro-slavery sentiment against Douglas when he observed that years earlier, an 
“abolitionist” would have been “pelted with rotten eggs” throughout the North. 
Today the abolitionist sentiment “has spread and grown into three bands—the 
Black Republicans, free soilers, and squatter-sovereignty men—all representing 
the common sentiment that slavery is wrong.”23 
 
Bright and his southern compatriots had to find a candidate who could 
protect southern interests without alienating all of the North. Their initial choice 
was Senator Robert Hunter of Virginia, but Hunter lost favor when he made 
overtures to Northern Democrats by supporting the 1856 national platform and its 
popular sovereignty plank. Two other possible candidates who gained favor 
among the southern fire eaters were John Breckinridge and Joseph Lane, who 
were both close allies with Bright.24 
 
Also divisive was the challenge of producing a platform at the Charleston 
convention. Southern fire eaters wanted a plank endorsing congressional 
 
22 Murat Halstead, Caucuses of 1860: A History of the National Political Conventions of the 
National Political Conventions of the Current Presidential Campaign (Columbus: Follett, Foster 
and Co., 1860), 12. 
23 Quoted in James Ford Rhodes, History of the United States from the Compromise of 1850 to 
The McKinley-Bryan Campaign of 1896 vol. 2 (New York: The Macmillan Co., 1920), 404. 
24 Nichols, Disruption of Democracy, 294-295. 
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legislation to guarantee slavery in the territories. The Douglas men, however, 
wanted only to affirm the principles of the 1856 Cincinnati platform. This would 
endorse popular sovereignty without actually referring to the principle by name. 
Many southerners threatened to bolt if the Douglas platform was adopted, but 
Bright wanted to keep them at the convention in order to ensure the defeat of 
Douglas. Hence, he and his allies proposed a platform that required Democrats 
to “abide by the decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States on the 
question of Constitutional law.” By insisting on honoring the Dred Scott decision, 
the party meant to guarantee slavery in the territories in all but explicit language. 
The deep southern delegates, however, had little use for Bright’s cleverness. 
When the platform was adopted, 50 southern delegates bolted the convention.25 
 
If crafting a platform was difficult, agreeing to a nominee proved 
impossible. Through all 57 ballots, Indiana’s Democratic delegates stood firm 
behind Douglas. Bright and his southern colleagues, however, ensured that he 
failed to gain the necessary two-thirds majority. Consequently, the convention 
adjourned to meet six weeks later in Baltimore. Upon reconvening, the 
convention had to decide whether to seat the southern bolters. The Douglas 
forces seated new delegations for Louisiana and Alabama delegations, which 
gave Douglas another advantage. Still, most southern delegates refused to 
support him. Finally, the Bright men sent an ultimatum to Douglas’s floor 
manager demanding that Douglas withdraw in favor of either Georgia’s Howell 
 
 
25 Austin Venable, “The Conflict Between the Douglas and Yancey Forces in the Charleston 
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241  
Cobb or New York’s doughface Democrat Horatio Seymour. Douglas’s men 
believed neither man could win a northern state. When Douglas remained, the 
southern delegates, along with their most loyal northern supporters, bolted. 
Shortly afterward, Douglas received the Baltimore convention’s nomination.26 
 
Southern Democrats were determined to set their own course. The core of 
the southern Democratic Party, as well as a few northern allies, met at a rump 
convention elsewhere in Baltimore. They quickly adopted a platform ensuring 
white citizens had “an equal right to settle with their property in the Territory,” and 
that such property could not be infringed upon by “Congressional or Territorial 
legislation.” In other words, slavery was guaranteed in the territories, and no 
entity, neither congress nor local populations, could infringe upon it. The platform 
additionally stated that it was the “duty of the Federal Government, in all its 
departments, to protect, when necessary,” the rights of slave property in the 
territories. For its presidential ticket, the convention selected two Bright allies: 
John C. Breckinridge and Joseph Lane.27 
 
As the Democrats divided into two sectional parties, the Republicans in 
Indiana sought a candidate who could appeal to the Hoosier electorate. Initially 
Colfax believed Missourian Edward Bates was the best choice. The “main point” 
to rally a winning coalition, he thought, would be the stance that “the U.S. shall 
not extend slavery into any country where they do not find it already 
 
 
 
 
 
26 Nichols, The Disruption of American Democracy, 316-318. 
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established.”28 William Seward, Colfax feared, would be perceived as a radical 
because of his advocacy of rights for blacks. This would “be a heavy dead 
weight” of “unjust” “prejudices” against the New York Senator.29 
 
Abraham Lincoln seemed a slim possibility. The Illinois Republican 
privately urged Colfax to encourage his state to “look beyond our noses” to 
ensure the party created a platform palatable to Republican factions in all parts of 
the North. The implication was that Edward Bates’s conservatism, particularly his 
support for forced colonization, would create problems in many of the 
northeastern states.  In his response, Colfax agreed about the delicacy of the 
situation, offering that such “suggestions” had “already occurred to me.” He 
believed a majority of northerners were willing to support the Republican cause. 
“But it is equally evident” he continued, “that making up this majority, are men of 
all shades & gradations…” Finding a candidate who could unite these men would 
require skill and dexterity “worthier than Napoleon or [Victor] Emanuel (sic).” 30 
The implication was that Lincoln lacked the credentials and political seasoning to 
perform such a delicate task. 
 
The national Republican Party held its convention in May, and chose to 
meet in Chicago, thought to be a neutral site, in order to avoid favoring any of the 
major candidates. Additionally, Republicans hoped to build greater support in the 
old northwest, as this was the key to electoral victory. In addition to Seward and 
 
28 The Diary of Edward Bates 1859-1866 Vol. 4. Howard K. Beale, ed. (Washington: Government 
Printing Office, 1933), 11. 
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Edward Bates, Simon Cameron (Pennsylvania) and Salmon Chase (Ohio) had 
strong support. And soon it became clear that Abraham Lincoln was also an 
acceptable candidate.  He was moderate on slavery who was not known for 
being anti- or pro-nativist. The Indiana delegation was particularly receptive to  
the candidate who had spent his formidable years as a Hoosier. Seward, they 
feared, was too radical and Bates’s nativism made him obnoxious to the state’s 
German population. Hence, from the first ballot onward, the Hoosier Republicans 
backed Lincoln.31 On the first ballot, Seward received 173 ½ votes of the 233 
needed to secure nomination. Lincoln stood at second place with a surprisingly 
strong at 102 votes. On subsequent balloting, Lincoln was able to pull ahead and 
win the nomination. 
 
*  *  *  * *  *  *  *  *  *  *  * *  *  *  *  *  * *  *  *  *  *  * 
 
 
 
With the campaign underway, Bright continued his mission to destroy 
Douglas. He took charge of organizing Indiana for John C. Breckinridge. Bright 
was likely aware that Breckinridge had no chance of winning Indiana. Instead, he 
sought to divide the party and deny Indiana to Douglas. Of the state’s sixty-nine 
Democratic papers, none were initially for Breckinridge. When the editor of the 
Jackson Union declared for him, the paper’s owners had him removed. The 
editor of the Warrick Democrat personally favored Breckinridge, but endorsed 
Douglas as the better alternative to Lincoln.32 
 
 
 
31David Donald, Lincoln (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1995), 249. 
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With the newspapers against him, Bright established his own paper, the 
Old Line Guard. According to one scholar, “there can be no doubt” that Bright  
was the paper’s main financier.33 His choice of editor, A.B. Carlton, drew some 
derision from the pro-Douglas Democrats. As editor of the Bloomington News 
Letter in 1856, Carlton had been a pro-Douglas editor. At the time, he had given 
some perfunctory praise for Bright before boldly stating, “the heart of Indianians 
will leap with one accord to the young Giant of the West—the bold and  
unflinching advocate of the great Democratic principles of popular 
sovereignty…We believe the Democracy of this Union owe the Presidency to 
Stephen A. Douglas.” The Old Line Guard editor innocently explained that he had 
been “highly eulogistic of the Hon. Jesse D. Bright,” and Douglas, Carlton 
insisted, had merely been his second choice. Still, Bright and Carlton were 
practical men. The Indiana senator needed an editor, and as was usually the 
case, he found an editor who needed money.34 
 
On July 31, the pro-Breckinridge Democrats met in Indianapolis for a state 
convention. Bright’s men produced a platform that denied the right of popular 
sovereignty and guaranteed to slave-owners the “equal right to settle in” the 
territories “with whatever property they may legally possess.” It insisted that “the 
real aim of the Republican party” was to “destroy” slavery. The platform seemed 
to indicate the underlying source of Bright’s pro-slavery views. Freedom, the 
platform suggested, would likely “place four million negroes now in this county 
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upon a legal and political equality with the whites, leading to a mixture of races 
and consequent social equality…”35 
 
It was indicative—and revealing—of Bright’s commitment to his cause that 
he stepped out from behind the scenes and took to the stump on behalf of 
Breckinridge to attack Douglas. In part, of course, he did so because he had few 
allies to assist him. His old manager, John L. Robinson, had passed away earlier 
in the year. Graham Fitch and William English remained the only other able 
Bright lieutenants. Initially, English sought to maintain “impenetrable silence” on 
the election, but he eventually backed Breckinridge.36 As Bright toured southern 
Indiana, he pleaded with English, “You must meet us at New Albany on 
Wednesday and Seymour Thursday. I tell you now, it is important that you 
should.”37 
Republicans were largely amused by Bright’s efforts, but Douglas 
Democrats were bitter. The New Albany Ledger noted that the Indiana 
Democracy had been loyal to the Senator for years. It’s “Men [had] voted for him 
who at heart hated him,” but felt “bound to stand by the action of the caucus and 
the wishes of the majority.”38 Now that he was no longer in control, Bright was 
engaged in a suicidal effort to split the vote and deny Douglas Indiana. 
Apparently there were some murmurings that Bright might be lynched along the 
canvas. He confessed “I do not know that I can protect myself against mobs, but 
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I feel physically equal to any…” Throughout the speech Bright likened himself to  
a soldier, as a longtime political veteran “I have seen some service, and shrink 
not from the smoke and perils of the battle.” Likening himself to Macbeth, Bright 
quoted from Shakespeare, “‘Lay on, Macduff!’ I court and defy your hostility, 
whether it comes from speakers or pensioned press.” His martial language  
mostly avoided the political issues. The senator largely spoke of the processes  
by which the parties grew divided, blaming the Douglas supporters as those who 
originally bolted from the Democratic Party. Bright stated explicitly that he wished 
not to offer any “extended argument of the political issues, dividing the various 
parties.” Bright seemed to recognize the sentiments arrayed against his pro- 
slavery candidates. He thus carefully phrased, “however much we may be 
opposed to the institution of slavery—however much we may sympathize with 
those in bondage, while the constitution remains as it is, and while the Supreme 
Court of the U[nited] States…is made the judge of rights arising under that 
Constitution, we must be governed by this decision.” Speaking generally, Bright 
continued, “however much in principle he may be opposed to the decision of the 
Supreme Court, he is bound, nevertheless, to obey and stand by its judgment.”39 
Later when Bright stumped in southern Indiana, he dropped his caveats to  
assert, “There are thousands of honest Democrats deluded by [Douglas], under 
his cry of Popular Sovereignty…but the Popular Sovereignty that you should 
adhere to, is that interpreted by the Supreme Court of the United States.” Popular 
sovereignty had become such a shibboleth that Bright apparently hoped to 
redefine it to mean the right to carry slaves into the territories regardless of local 
39 Old Line Guard, August 9, 1860. 
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popular opinion. Bright insisted that Douglas’s version of the term would 
inherently lead to Republicanism. The Little Giant was “a second edition of 
Sewardism.”40 
While Bright avoided direct references to slavery, his loyal lieutenant 
offered a more candid view of the issues at stake. William English was one of the 
few politicians to remain loyal to the senator. The office seekers and job hunters 
had long moved elsewhere. Speaking as a hardened Bright loyalist, English 
declared earlier on the House floor: “in Republican minds, the freedom of the 
negro is inseparably connected with the idea of his right to be clothed with the 
privileges and immunities of the white man.” For English, this was nonsense. He 
explained, “we have no ‘holy horror’ to express because they are held in a state 
of slavery in the South.” Slavery in the South was essential as “[t]hey are better 
off there than they were in Africa; and, if set free, would be too worthless and 
improvident to take care of themselves, and would become a burden and a curse 
to the white people near whom they might reside.”41 This last remark referred to 
southern Indianans. While English may not have owned slaves, he shared 
Bright’s view that the preservation of slavery in the southern states was essential 
to maintaining race control. 
As Democrats prepared for the election, English hoped to use racial 
antipathy to mobilize support. He wanted to document the ways Republicans 
favored “equalizing the two races.” In a letter to a Massachusetts newspaper 
editor, English inquired about a number of racial issues. He queried whether 
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blacks could freely immigrate, serve on juries, vote, hold office, or engage in 
interracial marriage. English wanted to show that free blacks were fraught with 
“improvidence, immorality, pauperism and crime.” He desired confirmation that 
blacks were only useful when confined to “menial capacities under the eye and 
direction of white persons.”42   By extension, the Bright loyalists hoped to taint 
Douglas with the same stigma of racial equality. A delegation of Orange County 
Democrats refused to support the Little Giant as he had worked in “combination 
with Seward, Chase, Hale and all the other Black Republicans to defeat” 
Buchanan.43 The Old Line Guard was even blunter, declaring its two major 
opponents the “Black Republican and Mulatto-Republican coalition.”44 
 
For most Indiana Democrats, the central issue in the sectional debate had 
always been popular sovereignty. The right of white settlers to determine their 
local institutions was absolute. They were especially bitter that Bright would place 
“slave property upon a higher ground than any other.” The Sentinel argued this 
position was a “dangerous and untenable” for any true Democrat to take.45 
Indiana’s Douglas Democrats portrayed themselves as the true national party. 
While Douglas Democrats were only marginally more competitive than 
Republicans in the South, the Sentinel insisted that Lincoln’s party appealed 
merely to the North, while the Southern Democratic Party appealed mainly to the 
interests of the South. Indiana’s Douglas Democrats believed their popular 
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sovereignty platform appealed broadly in all sections.46 Their opposition to the 
expansion of the slave power was broadly shared by their Republican 
counterparts. The only differences lay in the means of checking the slave power 
and the extent of their prejudice toward blacks. 
 
With Bright drawing some Democrats away from the northern Democratic 
presidential ticket, there was an open question whether they might unite in 
nominating candidates for statewide office. At times, the parties in Indiana would 
divide over a presidential contest, yet close ranks for a state-wide contest. Pro- 
Breckinridge Democrats in Indiana apparently hoped to work in similar fashion as 
they had done with anti-Lecompton Democrats in 1858. W.H. Talbot, the state 
chair of the southern Democratic Party, offered to create a joint statewide ticket. 
Douglas Democrats had already nominated their ticket and had little desire to 
accommodate Bright.47 Humiliated, the pro-Breckinridge Democrats met in 
September to nominate their ticket.  Once gathered, they realized the sober 
reality that such a ticket “would be inexpedient.” As they had no desire to support 
the Douglas men and “kiss the rod which will be used to smite us,” the Bright  
men refused to endorse any statewide ticket.48 
 
Some of Indiana’s pro-Breckinridge supporters also hoped to develop a 
joint electoral ticket with Douglas supporters. They reasoned that they ought to 
unite to ensure that Abraham Lincoln did not win the state’s electoral votes. 
Indiana Democrats would then be pledged to vote for the presidential candidate 
 
46 Indiana State Sentinel, November 6, 1860. 
47 Indiana State Sentinel, August 21, 1860. 
48 Old Line Guard, September 20, 1860. 
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receiving the most electoral votes throughout the Union.49 With Breckinridge  
likely to win most of the South’s votes, and the North divided between Douglas 
and Lincoln, Douglas Democrats had no desire to agree. Many believed that 
Lincoln would be preferable to Breckinridge. As one Democrat observed, several 
Douglas Democrats “have avowed their intention to vote for Lincoln, if a 
compromise ticket should be formed.” He continued: “I doubt very much whether 
a union ticket would save Indiana from Lincoln. I am satisfied it would drive all the 
‘original Douglas men’ into the Republican camp.”50 
 
Bright had no interest in coordinating with Douglas Democrats at either the 
state or presidential level. Indeed, there is even some evidence that he voted 
Republican on the statewide ticket during the October elections. The 
gubernatorial election pitted Democratic nominee Thomas Hendricks against the 
staunch anti-slavery Republican Henry S. Lane. Even though Bright had no 
candidate of his own, a Douglas Democrat who attended one of his speeches on 
the eve of state elections reported Bright saying, “We must beat this anti- 
Lecompton Douglas Democratic party! You may begin tomorrow, if you please; 
but it must be done!”51 Another Democrat alleged that he caught a glimpse of 
Bright’s ballot and claimed he voted for all but one Republican candidate. Shortly 
afterward the senator answered calling the accuser “a liar and a slanderer,” 
claiming he was being “slandered into the support of that traitor to party and to 
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principle, Stephen A. Douglas.”52 In spite of these innocent pleadings, the 
evidence suggests he was willing to do anything—even to vote for the hated 
Republicans—to defeat the Douglas forces. 
In all likelihood, Bright was done with Indiana politics (or perhaps more 
accurately with northern politics). He offered no state-wide alternatives to the 
Douglas candidates, and he likely understood that Breckinridge had no chance to 
carry Indiana. Neither Douglas nor Lincoln were acceptable. With Lincoln and the 
“Black Republicans” winning, the South would more likely bring destruction to a 
Union ruled by northern agitators. Bright observed: “Mr. Lincoln’s doctrine we 
regard as dangerous—as destructive to the peace and quietude of the county.” 
The free soil doctrine “can never be carried out peacefully in this country.” 
Perhaps beginning to recognize the hour, Bright declared: 
The South has guaranteed rights under the Constitution, which she 
claims and will assert, which she ought to assert. Her citizens  
would be unfaithful to the compact their fathers shed their blood for, 
unless they do assert those claims, and so long as they claim only 
what they are entitled to, they will find strong hearts and willing 
hands throughout the Free States to aid them There are some of us 
who never bowed the knee to Baal, and never will. We will march 
with them in defense of their rights so long as they demand no  
more than is their due. 53 
 
Bright was careful to use qualifiers to conceal charges that he was fomenting 
rebellion. Nevertheless, he believed the South had a duty to honor the rights for 
which its fathers had “shed their blood,” and it was a duty “she ought to assert.” 
Few could doubt that Bright was advocating southern rebellion should Lincoln 
win the presidency. He viewed the doctrines of Douglas and Lincoln as nearly 
 
52 Old Line Guard, October 27, 1860. 
53 New York Times, September 17, 1860. (emphasis mine) 
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one in the same. As the election approached, Bright seemed to believe Lincoln 
would more likely provoke the South to do its duty in protecting the institution of 
slavery. There was a general sense among the various Indiana political factions 
that the election of Lincoln would lead to southern secession. Certainly Bright 
believed this would be the result. As Douglas Democrats campaigned against 
Lincoln, they embraced this view as well.54 
In October Indiana held its state-wide and congressional elections. This 
proved ominous for Democrats. Lane, the Republican gubernatorial candidate, 
beat Hendricks by 9,000 votes. In the congressional races, Democrats kept the 
same four of eleven congressional seats they had won two years earlier. 
Republicans carried the other seven, all in central and northern Indiana. At this 
point most political followers realized the likely outcome of the November 
presidential contest. 
On November 6, 1860, for the first time in twenty years, Democrats failed 
to carry Indiana in the presidential contest. Even with a four-way race between 
southern Democrats, northern Democrats, Constitutional Unionists, and 
Republicans, Abraham Lincoln was able to carry the Hoosier State with 51 
percent of the vote. Republicans performed significantly better in southern 
Indiana where the American Party had secured many of the old line Whig votes  
in 1856. Stephen Douglas received slightly more than 42 percent of the vote. The 
Constitutional Union Party only received 2 percent. As for Breckinridge, even 
though Bright threw all of his political muscle into the campaign, the southern 
Democrat received only 4.5 percent of the Indiana vote. He eked out a plurality of 
54 Indiana State Sentinel, November 2, 1860. 
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29 votes over Lincoln in Joseph Lane’s old home in Warrick County, while losing 
all the other Indiana counties. 
 
 
 
*  *  *  * *  *  *  *  *  *  *  * *  *  *  *  *  * *  *  *  *  *  * 
 
 
 
The 1860 presidential election proved to be the most consequential in 
American history. Northerners finally united in overthrowing the southern slave- 
power, and installed a president devoted to keeping slavery contained. After 
more than a decade of sectional turmoil, it proved to be the final spark to ignite 
disunion. Starting with South Carolina, a total of seven southern states would 
declare secession and bolt the Union before Lincoln could take office. The only 
question left was whether it would be a peaceful dismemberment, or war. 
 
By 1860, Bright’s career in northern politics was effectively over. He 
remained a United States Senator, with his term set to expire in 1863. With both 
the Indiana and the national administration controlled by Republicans and a state 
Democratic Party that loathed him, Bright’s influence was nil. In Bright’s mind, the 
Black Republicans were preparing to make war on the South. Thus, he would 
grow increasingly frustrated and reckless. One thing was certain: Bright would  
not quietly serve out the rest of his term. 
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A horse, a horse, my kingdom for a horse! 
Richard III, Act V Scene IV 
 
 
 
Chapter 8 
Epilogue and Conclusion 
 
 
 
In the aftermath of the election, Indiana Democrats of all stripes were 
disappointed. After the campaign, Bright’s newspaper organ changed its name to 
the Indiana State Guard. Its bitterness at the election of Lincoln was primarily 
directed at Douglas.1   As talk of secession grew, the paper took a cautious 
approach. It believed some of the southern states were “a little too fast in their 
movements.” It argued, as did many southern conditional unionists, that the 
South should act only if the incoming administration tried to infringe southern 
rights.2 As secession fever grew, however, the paper became caught up in the 
excitement. When South Carolina declared secession on December 20, the 
Indiana State Guard gleefully announced, “The deed is done!” Commenting on 
the action, the paper called on the United States to offer “concession rather than 
coercion.” The editor explained that the best way to restore the union would be 
for the federal government to guarantee the rights of slaveholders to carry slaves 
into the territories.3 The paper never explicitly advocated secession, but its 
demands for pro-slavery concession, and insistence that the southern states had 
been wronged, left no doubt as to its sympathies. 
 
 
 
1 Indiana State Guard, November 10, 1860. 
2 Indiana State Guard, November 17, 1860. 
3 Indiana State Guard, December 22, 1860. 
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After South Carolina’s action, President Buchanan surprised many when 
he broke with the South and declared secession unconstitutional. The president 
also infuriated Republicans and Douglas Democrats when he declared the 
federal government lacked authority to suppress such illegal actions. Many 
Douglas supporters were frustrated by Buchanan’s course. A Democrat from 
southern Indiana spoke of the “great dishonor” the president had done when he 
made “the cowardly admission that the General Government cannot use force to 
prevent a State from seceding from the Union.” It “almost” amounted to “an ‘overt 
act’ of treason!”4 While Republicans and Douglas Democrats criticized the 
Buchanan administration for not acting forcefully with the secessionists, Bright 
took the opposite view. When in December Buchanan refused to meet with some 
“self-styled Commissioners from South Carolina” who were hoping to gain a 
withdrawal of federal troops stationed in Charleston, Bright condemned him for 
not accepting southern demands.5 
As the Senate neared adjournment in early March, Bright may have been 
filibustering in to prevent debate or other Senate action regarding secession. He 
gave a long-winded and rambling speech opposing the establishment of a 
metropolitan gas company in Washington. Spectators in the galleries had hoped 
to see a more interesting debate. Most Republicans, however, took the filibuster 
in stride, one asked Bright to read a portion of his address again. Laughter 
reigned throughout his address as Republicans offered more irreverent 
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interruptions. Bright seemingly remained serious. One senator alluded to the 
likelihood that Bright was financially interested in its competitor. As time came to 
adjourn, Bright vowed to finish his remarks in the next session, and vowed to kill 
the bill and do “a big job inside of it.”6 
Bright was not entirely alone among those advocating a peaceful 
resolution. Many Hoosiers initially remained skeptical that the union could be 
held together by force. After South Carolina declared secession, the Sentinel 
advocated reconciliation by “honorable concessions.” If such could not be 
procured, it remained skeptical that the Union could “be maintained by blood.”7 
The Indianapolis Journal, a solidly anti-slavery Republican state organ, insisted 
that the government could neither concede ground on slavery nor hold the union 
together by civil war. It was better to be rid of South Carolina and any other slave 
state that might join her, than having “enemies” within the Union.8 Most Indiana 
Republicans, however, believed the Union was indivisible and that force should 
be used to hold it together should it become necessary. The Evansville Journal 
declared that secession was akin to treason and advised that “the penalty of 
treason is death.”9 
Many southern Indiana Democrats gathered in “pro-Unionist” meetings 
across the state. They generally blamed the Republican Party for giving the 
South legitimate grounds for grievances. Some endorsed the Crittenden 
Compromise, a proposal that would restore the Missouri Compromise line and 
 
6 Stephen A. Douglas (New York: Oxford University Press, 1973), 843; Congressional Globe, 37th 
Congress, 2nd Session, March 4, 1861, 1413. 
7 Indiana State Sentinel, December 22, 1860. 
8 Indianapolis Journal, December 7, 1860. 
9 Evansville Journal, December 18, 1860. 
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extend it to the Pacific. As far as the Indiana State Guard was concerned, this 
was not pro-southern enough “by a long shot.” The pro-Bright paper insisted that 
“It only gives such protection to the soil south of the old Missouri line, where the 
climate is too warm for white men to live. It yields all of the rest of the territory 
north of the line to free State advocates.”10 
Some favored calling a national constitutional convention to resolve the 
conflict. If war broke out, some even suggested that Indiana “act, with other 
conservatives States, as a mediator between the contending factions.”11 Some of 
these meetings tended to have a pro-southern tinge. Lew Wallace claimed that 
he attended one of these meetings where a speaker “cautiously” argued that 
Democrats “ought to be in sympathy with the brethren South.” Other speakers, 
the Douglas Democrat remembered years later, offered more explicit statements 
that they would “go with the South.” Southern Indiana Democratic Congressman 
James Cravens wrote to William English, his predecessor, that southern Indiana 
and Illinois ought to break away and form the state of Jackson.12 
For Lew Wallace this was treason. He rebuffed efforts to recruit him to the 
southern cause. “This is my native state,” he later wrote. “I will not leave it to 
serve the South. Down the street yonder is the old cemetery, and my father lies 
there going to dust. If I fight, I tell you it shall be for his bones. In so much I am an 
Indianan.”13  He eventually informed Republican Governor Oliver Morton, himself 
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a former Democrat, that he would serve the in defense of the Union should the 
need arise. On April 12, 1861, Confederate guns opened fire on United States 
forces stationed in Fort Sumter, and President Abraham Lincoln appealed to the 
states to supply 75,000 federal troops to suppress the rebellion. With war finally 
commenced, Governor Morton appointed Wallace adjutant general.14 
At the start of hostilities, Bright seemed to have abandoned Indiana. When 
he was not in Washington or attending business in Indianapolis, he spent his  
time on his Kentucky farm. This provoked concerns in Indianapolis that the  
state’s senator no longer resided within the state. By the spring of 1861 a 
resolution in the Indiana House of Representatives was proposed declaring 
“Bright was no longer an inhabitant of the state…”15 Bright’s absence fueled 
speculation that he had thrown his support to the Confederacy. While most 
Republicans and Douglas Democrats suspected that Bright sympathized with the 
rebel cause, few knew for sure whether he had actively engaged in treason. As 
Bright kept conspicuously quiet on the matter, members of both parties 
demanded an answer. On May 21st the Indiana Senate adopted a resolution 
asking “whether Jesse D. Bright…is a citizen of Indiana; and further, whether he 
can and will represent the people of Indiana…whether his present position on the 
questions now engrossing public attention” is “inconsistent with public interests 
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and public safety.”16 Shortly afterward the Indiana House passed a similar 
resolution asking whether any “Senator or Representative in Congress, feels 
disinclined to give his support to such measures as may be necessary to put 
down treason and rebellion by force and arms.”17 Upon presenting the resolution, 
a member of the legislature stated bluntly, “I want to know how Jesse D. Bright 
stands. It is my business to know.” He wanted to know whether the senator “was 
mean enough to go over to Jeff Davis’ army.”18 
Indiana soon discovered the truth. That August Union forces arrested an 
arms dealer named Thomas Lincoln. He was a confederate supporter attempting 
to cross Union lines. On his person was a March 1, 1861 letter addressed “To his 
Excellency Jefferson Davis, President of the Confederation of States.” Even  
more damning than the salutation was the substance of the letter: 
Allow me to introduce to your acquaintance my friend Thomas B. 
Lincoln, of Texas. He visits your capital mainly to dispose of what 
he regards a great improvement in fire-arms. I recommend him to 
your favorable consideration as a gentleman of the first 
respectability, and reliable in every respect. 
 
It was signed, “Very truly yours, Jesse D. Bright.”19 
 
With these words, Bright’s fate was sealed. On August 23, the New York 
Times  issues an article titled, the “Treason of Senator Bright.” The paper wrote, 
“The case of Mr. Bright is only illustration of the…great conspiracy, and of the 
shameless manner in which the oath of allegiance to the Constitution is habitually 
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violated.”20 Even one of Bright’s closest doughface allies felt betrayed. James 
Buchanan privately wrote, “Whilst I had reason to believe, at the time, that Mr. 
Bright sympathized with the ultras of the Cotton States…I had no idea until I read 
his letter & late speech, that he remained in the same state of feeling after the 
inauguration of the hostile Confederacy.”21 
The demand to know how Bright could explain himself was so great that 
on September 7, the senator offered a public letter. He claimed not to recollect 
writing the letter, but that “if Mr. [Thomas] Lincoln says I did, then I am entirely 
satisfied of the fact.” Bright went on to claim that such letters were common and 
“a matter of course,” suggesting it was innocently sent to “any friend who asked 
for it.” As for his position on policy, the senator stated that he opposed “the entire 
coercive policy of the Government,” and believed it was likely to “render the 
disruption permanent and incurable.” On the question of his loyalty, Bright 
asserted “I am, and always have been, for preserving the integrity of this 
Union.”22 A private letter hinted more closely to his attitude when he wrote, “I 
want no more real estate in a government where the Writ of ‘Habeas Corpus’ is 
ignored by a Military Mob.”23 Later the senator privately declared, “I have not a 
word to say about Indiana politicks (sic), because I do not care a damn as 
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between Abolitionists & Douglasites I shall never vote or coalesce with either 
politically.”24 
On January 21, Bright was unrepentant when he gave a speech to the 
Senate. Even in hindsight, with the actual outbreak of war, Bright still would have 
written the letter of introduction to Thomas Lincoln. Shortly afterward Bright 
realized that his speech was more damning than exculpatory. Consequently he 
sought to suppress the transcript from being delivered to the Congressional 
Globe printer. Republican Senator Orville Browning attempted to locate the 
damning speech, only to discover that Bright “had suppressed it.”25 The 
Congressional Globe simply noted, “The manuscript of the speech referred on 
page 418 was retained by Mr. B.”26 
As the Senate grappled over Bright’s expulsion, the question was whether 
he technically committed treason. Treason is one of the few crimes spelled out  
by the Constitution, and among the definitions is giving “aid and comfort” to the 
nation’s “enemies.” Furthermore, one could only be convicted of treason with “the 
testimony of two witnesses…or on confession in open court.” Bright had openly 
confessed to giving aid and comfort to the Confederacy. Since this was before 
the outbreak of war, could this also be construed as giving aid and comfort to the 
enemy? Most Republicans answered in the affirmative, but some retained 
doubts. Consequently, the Senate opted to try Bright expulsion on the grounds of 
disloyalty. 
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On February 5, Bright gave his final remarks before the vote on expulsion. 
He began by noting, “my main object is to place myself right on the page of 
history.” The senator refrained from stating he would repeat his old actions, but 
sought to portray them as innocently as he could. Bright had “no recollection of 
“ever refusing “a letter of introduction to a friend or acquaintance.” Than manner 
in which he addressed Jefferson Davis was “a matter of courtesy.” Bright further 
noted that his letter had been written on March 1st, more than a month prior to the 
outbreak of war. While the old party boss seemed to have anticipated that the 
Confederate government was in need of arms, Bright insisted he had no idea that 
war could break between the two sides. Emphatically he insisted that he could  
not have had “prophetic knowledge” of the coming conflict. Addressing his 
previous comments that he would repeat his same actions, Bright qualified in, “I 
mean by this just this…that when I gave that letter to Mr. Lincoln, the idea of war 
or of a hostile collision with any one or more southern States never entered my 
mind. It could not; I know it did not.” In language that seems remarkably 
delusional, Bright continued, “If even a gleam of such a suspicion [of war] had 
entered my mind, every instinct of my nature would have deterred me…”27 
For seventeen years Bright had held a seat in the Senate. For many of 
these years he masterfully and shrewdly manipulated and controlled the party 
men of his state. “I know the Senator from Indiana,” Democratic Senator James 
McDougall of California noted. He continued, “[Bright] is a man of business; he is 
a man of system; he is a man of care.” No man could ever accuse Bright of being 
 
 
 
27 Congressional Globe, February 5, 1862, 37th Congress, 2nd Session, 651-654. 
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naïve or thoughtless about his actions.28 In his last gasp in the Senate, Bright 
was willing to throw away his dignity for the slightest scrap of political power. The 
Senate was not persuaded; on February 5, 1862 they voted to expel Bright from 
the Senate. 
For most Hoosiers, the event was cathartic. A Republican wrote to 
Indiana’s new Republican Senator Henry Lane, “I am so grateful at the vote on 
the expulsion of Bright that I must say something or bust. When the Telegraph 
announced the vote I thought ‘I beheld Satan as lightning fall from heaven.’”29 
The New Albany Ledger spoke for most Indiana Democrats when it declared that 
his “follies” had “produced an almost complete alienation of his earliest and best 
friends.” 30 The Madison Courier, a publication that had long waged war with 
Bright, observed: “the actor’s costume fell. The ruined politician sat down, and 
haggard and crushed, contemplated the wreck he had made of his fortunes.”31 
Even Bright’s closest political ally in recent years had turned on him. Former 
President Buchanan bitterly noted that Bright “has got his reward” having been 
“alone of the Northern Senators” to sustain the ultra-southerners in their 
demands.32 As Bright political career came crashing down, his list of political 
enemies was a long one. Buchanan, Douglas Democrats and Republicans all 
immensely disliked the Indiana senator. Certainly personalities were involved. 
Jesse Bright was a man who “booked no opposition, friend or foe,” yet it was 
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more than that. The old party boss had built a powerful party machine that 
worked with all sorts of Democrats willing to give their loyalty to Bright. The 
reality is that his imperious behavior merely exacerbated the underlying 
problems. As a political leader at this critical time, Bright’s pro-slavery attitudes 
simply could not coexist with those of his fellow Hoosiers and northern 
Democrats. 
*  *  *  * *  *  *  *  *  *  *  * *  *  *  *  *  * *  *  *  *  *  * 
 
 
 
With Bright’s expulsion, his political career was essentially over. To add 
further insult, Governor Morton appointed Joseph Wright to take his seat. It was a 
savvy gesture to build support with Democrats, but the governor must have at 
least taken some satisfaction in needling Bright by replacing him with his long- 
time enemy. The old party boss returned home and seemed to divide his time 
between his southern Indiana residence and his Kentucky farm. The Indiana 
home would eventually be confiscated by the governor for use as a military 
hospital. Beyond that, Bright kept himself busy with business affairs. But when 
the Indiana State legislature convened in the fall of 1862, Democrats held a 
majority, Bright made a last effort to restore his honor by regaining the seat. He 
informed English that he still had “a move or two, to be made on the political 
boards.”33 Once again the old party manager found himself in business of  
political organizing. The Logansport Democratic Pharos observed, “No means 
were left untried to secure his return—no efforts but were made to effect his 
object—but his tears and dictation…all failed to influence the Democratic 
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members of the Legislature.”34 Of the eighty-nine members of the legislature’s 
Democratic caucus, Bright received only twelve votes. 
 
The results left Bright both furious and humiliated. His state of mind was 
further enhanced by the recently enacted Emancipation Proclamation. Lincoln’s 
famous military decree exempted slaves owned in Kentucky. With the bulk of 
slaves having been legally emancipated, however, few could imagine slavery 
surviving in Kentucky should the Union win the war. Bright vented with semi- 
coherent venom: 
 
The miserable Dogs who opposed my restoration, both in and out  
of the Legislature were governed by personal malice and envious 
considerations, mainly. Some wanting brain to enable themselves 
to take an elevated view of the principle involved, made committals 
against me in advance, in order to gratify a rotten class of Douglas 
Democrats & Abolitionists, who having neither courage or honesty 
themselves, cannot appreciate such traits of character in others. 
You know that personally I cared nothing about a reelection to the 
Senate. The State would have been more honored in the eyes of all 
just men, than I would have been—I would rather stand upon my 
record as a Democrat and a man of courage, opposed to all the 
damning heresies of such Abolitionists & rotten booring Democrats 
as now have power than to be in power by their favor.35 
 
Bright’s close friend William Corcoran moved across the ocean to 
Paris during the American Civil War. He had joined his son-in-law, a 
secretary under Confederate Commissioner John Slidell. Bright informed 
his friend, “I wish I could sell every ‘Free hold’ interest I have in the U.S. I 
have no desire to be a Tax payer longer here…If we could have peace, I 
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would select a permanent residence in one of the Southern States. I think 
Tennessee…” Bright mostly held to his sanity declaring, “With all the 
Tyranny and wrong practices upon persons and property in this locality…I 
am undisturbed; which is the wonder of many.”36 
 
After the war Bright officially maintained residence in Kentucky. In 
1866 he was elected to the Kentucky legislature. As a state  
representative, Bright seems to have played only a minor role and was 
often absent from proceedings. In 1868 Bright was considered for the 
United States senate. His name remained in contention through nine 
ballots at the Democratic caucus. Bright eventually withdrew his name, as 
he did not appear to have the same desire to keep the fight. He continually 
kept an interest in national politics, but generally from a distance. Certainly 
Bright was concerned about the direction of Reconstruction. On this  
matter Bright remarked, “Support Johnson…he is right in this fight with 
Congress.” The President, of course, resisted congressional efforts to 
promote equal rights for black Americans. The former senator remained 
bitter with Johnson over his support of the Lincoln administration. When it 
came to protecting the white racial order Bright was emphatic, “God knows 
how I hate [Johnson], but I will stand by him in this fight.”37 He would also 
remark around the same time, “If there is any reliable democratic party  
left, within the limits of the U.S., they are only to be found in the Southern 
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Congress. 
37 Woollen, Biographical Sketches, 231. 
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States…I think you showed your sense by determining to get out of In-di- 
a-na.”38 
 
In the aftermath of war, Bright spent the bulk of his time attending 
to business affairs. He had numerous land holdings to manage, and 
began investment in coal mining. By 1871 Bright moved to Covington, 
Kentucky and became president of the Raymond City Coal Company. 
Three years later he moved to Baltimore, Maryland as he continued to 
manage his business enterprises. At the age of 62 on May 20, 1875, 
Bright quietly passed away having suffered a disease of the heart. 
 
*  *  *  * *  *  *  *  *  *  *  * *  *  *  *  *  * *  *  *  *  *  * 
 
 
 
Jesse Bright played a key role in both Indiana and national politics in the 
1840s and 1850s. Southerners, although a numerical minority, enjoyed political 
dominance in national politics up until the election of Abraham Lincoln. This was 
possible, at least in part, by the influence of northern doughface Democrats like 
Bright. While the House of Representatives often supported measures such as 
the Wilmot Proviso or would oppose the Lecompton Constitution, in the Senate 
members such as Bright helped ensure the protection of southern slaveholding 
interests. And among doughfaces, Bright was among the most committed to the 
South. 
Indiana was among the free-states most accepting of doughface 
Democracy. The visceral racism that permeated the state, especially in its 
 
38 Jesse Bright to Phineas Kent, January 10, 1867 quoted in Van Der Weele, “Jesse David 
Bright,” 303. 
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southern half, led most Hoosiers to oppose extreme efforts to attack slavery. Yet, 
even Indiana Democrats had their limits. As southern slave-masters sought 
greater control over the federal government, these Democrats would not be 
dragged any further into serving southern interests. 
Bright entered the Senate just as the sectional issues were beginning to 
divide the nation. He was in 1850 a compromiser aligned with Henry Clay, and in 
1854 with Stephen Douglas to keep the Union together. In 1858, he was a 
blunderer who aligned with Buchanan and the South in an attempt to force 
slavery into Kansas. Finally, he had been a plunderer who used power and graft 
to enrich himself and his friends. Bright could compromise, but with each crisis 
he became more rigid, more intransigent. Ultimately, he helped enable the 
Republicans to win in 1860. Bright could have allied with a more moderate 
Stephen Douglas, but there is little reason to believe that Bright found his 
Freeport Doctrine any more acceptable. Always hungry for plunder, he was 
willing to sacrifice it to fight Douglas and the Republicans. In his mind, they were 
abolitionists and rotten to the core. Defending southern institutions had become 
his overriding objective. 
Bright certainly contributed to the breakdown of American politics in the 
1850s. Indiana politicians and voters need not look only to southern fire-eaters in 
Congress or the Border Ruffians in Kansas to see evidence of the slave-power. 
They had Jesse David Bright ruling the Indiana Democratic Party—and by 
extension the state—with an iron grip. He exploited all of the undemocratic 
features of American politics in the antebellum era—patronage, graft, bribes, and 
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smoke-filled caucuses—to appease the South. Furthermore, he pursued this 
grubby side of politics with gusto and viciousness. This likely contributed to 
Indiana ending up in the Republican column in the 1860 presidential election. 
Perhaps without Bright Indiana Democrats could have united in 1860 and 
Stephen Douglas might have carried the state. It is not clear, however, that the 
results would have been any different in the other states, and hence Abraham 
Lincoln would still have won the election. 
It is not clear that Bright could have easily chosen a different path either. 
Certainly he could have aligned with Douglas, and appeased northern outrage by 
becoming an anti-Lecompton Democrat. But it was simply not in his nature to 
appease the North at the expense of the South. His sympathies were with 
southerners, and he could not and would not change. Ultimately, Jesse Bright 
was both an enabler and a symptom of the forces ripping the nation apart on the 
eve of civil war. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Copyright © John J. Wickre 2013 
270  
 
Bibliography 
 
 
 
Primary Sources 
 
Manuscript Sources 
 
Indiana University, Bloomington Library 
Jesse Bright Papers 
William Cumback MSS 
George Dunn MSS 
Henry S. Lane Papers 
Joseph Lane MSS 
 
 
Indiana State Library 
 
Austin Brown Papers 
Schuyler Colfax MSS 
Joseph Wright Papers 
 
Indiana Historical Society 
John G. Davis Papers 
William English Family Papers 
Allen Hamilton Papers 
John Lyle King Diaries, MSS 
James Whitcomb Papers 
 
Library of Congress 
 
Jesse D. Bright Correspondence 
271  
W.W. Corcoran Papers 
 
Caleb B. Smith MSS (microfilm). 
 
 
 
 
University of Kentucky 
 
James Buchanan Papers (Microfilm) 
Ewing Papers (microfilm) 
William Seward Papers (Microfilm) 
 
 
 
 
Newspapers 
Chapman’s Chanticleer 
Evansville Daily Journal 
Fort Wayne Sentinel 
Fort Wayne Times 
Free Territorial Sentinel 
Goshen Democrat 
Indiana State Guard 
Indiana State Journal 
Indiana State Sentinel, 
Indiana Statesman 
 
The Indiana True Democrat 
Logansport Democratic Pharos 
Logansport Telegraph 
Madison Dailey Banner 
Madison Weekly Courier 
272  
Madisonian 
 
National Intelligencer 
New Albany Democrat. 
New Albany Ledger 
New York Times 
Old Line Guard 
Perrysville Eagle 
St. Joseph Valley Register 
Terre Haute Express 
The Western Republican 
 
 
 
Government Publications 
 
Annals of Congress, Washington, DC. 
 
The Congressional Globe, Washington, DC. 
 
General Laws of the State of Indiana Passed at the Thirty-Fifth Session of the 
General Assembly. Indianapolis: J.P. Chapman, 1851. 
 
Indiana Historical Bureau, “Constitution of 1816.” State of Indiana. 
http://www.in.gov/history/2875.htm (accessed November 3, 2012) 
 
Journal of the House of Representatives of the State of Indiana, During the Thirty 
Third Session. Indianapolis: John Defrees, 1849. 
 
 
 
Journal of the House of Representatives of the State of Indiana. Indianapolis: 
Berry R. Sulgrove, 1861. 
 
Journal of the Indiana State Senate During the Thirty-Seventh Session of the 
General Assembly Commencing January 6, 1853. Indianapolis: J.P. 
Chapman, 1853. 
 
Journal of the Indiana State Senate. Indianapolis: Berry R. Sulgrove, 1861. 
 
Journal of the Senate of the State of Indianan. Indianapolis: Douglass and Noel, 
273  
1839. 
 
Report of the Debates and Proceedings of the Convention for the Revision of the 
Constitution of the State of Indiana. Ed. H. Fowler and Austin Brown. 
Indianapolis: Austin Brown, 1850. 
 
The Revised Laws of Indiana, Adopted and Enacted by the General Assembly at 
their Eighth Session. Corydon: Carpenter and Douglass, 1824. 
 
The Revised Laws of Indiana. Indianapolis: Douglas and Maguire, 1831. 
The Revised Statutes of the State. Indianapolis: Douglas and Noel,1838. 
The Statutes of the State of Indiana. Indianapolis: J.J. Bingham, 1870. 
 
Published Primary 
 
 
 
Autobiography of Peter Cartwright. ed. W.P. Strickland. New York: Carlton & 
Porter, 1857. 
Autobiography of Thurlow Weed. Boston: Houghton, Mifflin and Co., 1884. 
Bright, Jesse. The Albany Ratification Meeting 1848. Washington: Library of 
Congress, 1848. 
 
Coffin, Levi. Reminisces of Levi Coffin. Cincinnati: Western Tract Society, 1876. 
 
The Diary of Edward Bates 1859-1866. ed. Howard K. Beale ed. Washington: 
Government Printing Office, 1933. 
 
The Diary of James Polk. ed. Milo Quaife. Chicago: A.C. McClurg & Co., 1910. 
 
The Diary of Orville Hickman Browning. ed. James G. Randall. Springfield: 
Trustees of the Illinois State Historical Library, 1925. 
 
Ellis, Erastus. “Autobiography of a Noted Pioneer.” Indiana Magazine of History 
10 (March, 1914): 63-73. 
 
Gallatin County Estates: Wills, Administrations, Guardianships and Settlements 
1799-1838. ed. Carl Bogardus. Warsaw, KY: Gallatin County Historical 
Society, 1985. 
 
Govetrack.us. “Congressional Votes Database,” 
http://www.govtrack.us/congress/votes#session=86&chamber=1 
(accessed May 28, 2013). 
274  
 
Indiana Election Returns 1816-1851 ed. Dorothy Riker and Gayle Thornbrough. 
Indianapolis: Indiana Historical Bureau, 1960. 
 
Judicial Cases Concerning American Slavery and the Negro. ed. Helen Tunnicliff 
Catterall. Washington D.C.: Carnegie Institution of Washington, 1937. 
 
The Laws of Indiana Territory, 1801-1809. ed. Francis Philbrick. Springfield: 
Illinois State Historical Society, 1930. 
 
Laws of Indiana Territory, 1809-1816. ed. Louis Ewbank and Dorothy Riker. 
Indianapolis: Indiana Historical Bureau, 1934. 
 
“The Letters of Godlove S. Orth, Hoosier Whig.” ed. J. Herman Schauinger 
Indiana Magazine of History 39 (December, 1943): 365-400. 
 
“The Letters of Godlove S. Orth, Hoosier American.” ed. J. Herman Schauinger 
Indiana Magazine of History 40 (March, 1944): 55-66. 
 
“The Letters of Godlove S. Orth, Radical Republican.” ed. J. Herman Schauinger 
Indiana Magazine of History 40 (June, 1944): 158-178. 
 
Lew Wallace: An Autobiography. New York: Harper & Brothers, 1906. 
 
National Party Platforms of the United States. ed. J.M.H. Frederick. Akron: J.M.H 
Frederick, 1896. 
 
Slavery Petitions and Papers, ed. Jacob Dunn. Indianapolis: The Bowen-Merrill 
Company, 1894. 
 
“Some Letters of Jesse D. Bright to William H. English (1842-1863).” Indiana 
Magazine of History 30 (December, 1934): 370-392. 
 
“Some Letters to John G. Davis, 1857-1860.” Indiana Magazine of History 24, 
(September, 1928): 201-213. 
 
Turpie, David. Sketches of my Own Times. Indianapolis: The Bobbs-Merrill Co., 
1903. 
 
United States Presidential Election 1788-1860: The Official Results by County 
and State. ed. Michael Dubin. London: McFarland & Company, Inc, 2002. 
 
Works of Abraham Lincoln ed. Roy Basler. New Brunswick: Rutgers University 
Press, 1953. 
 
The Works of James Buchanan. ed. James Bassett Moore .Philadelphia: J.B. 
275  
Lippincott Co., 1910. 
 
 
 
Secondary Sources 
 
Adby, Edward. A Journal of a Residence and Tour of the United States of North 
America. London: John Murray, 1835. 
 
Anbinder, Tyler. Nativism and Slavery: The Northern Know Nothings and the 
Politics of the 1850s. New York: Oxford University Press, 1992. 
 
Barnhart, John. “Sources of Southern Migration into the Old Northwest.” 
Mississippi Valley Historical Review 22 (June, 1935): 49-62. 
 
Beeler, Dale. “The Election of 1852 in Indiana.” Indiana Magazine of History 12 
(March, 1916): 34-52. 
 
Bergeron, Paul. Presidency of James K. Polk. Lawrence: University Press of 
Kansas, 1987. 
 
Berwager, Eugene. The Frontier Against Slavery: Western Anti-Negro Prejudice 
and the Slavery Extension Controversy. Urbana: University of Illinois 
Press, 1967. 
 
Brand, Carl. “The History of the Know Nothing Party in Indiana.” Indiana 
Magazine of History 18 (March, 1922), 47-81. 
 
Carter, Kit Carson. “Indiana Voters During the Second Party System, 1836- 
1860.” PhD diss., University of Alabama, 1975. 
 
Childers, Christopher. The Failure of Popular Sovereignty: Slavery, Manifest 
Destiny and the Radicalization of Southern Politics. Lawrence: University 
Press of Kansas, 2012. 
 
Chitwood, Oliver. John Tyler: Champion of the Old South (1939; repr., New York: 
Russell & Russell, 1964. 
 
Cooper, William. The South and the Politics of Slavery, 1828-1856. Baton 
Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1980. 
 
Crain, Philip. “Governor Jo Wright: Hoosier Conservative.” Ph.D. diss., Indiana 
University, 1963. 
 
Donald, David. Charles Sumner and the Coming of the Civil War. New York: 
Fawcett Columbine: 1960. 
 
Donald, David. Lincoln. New York: Simon & Schuster, 1995. 
276  
Elbert, Elmer. “Southern Indiana Politics on the Eve of the Civil War.” Indiana 
University: PhD. diss., 1967. 
 
Elbert, Duane. “Southern Indiana Politics on the Eve of the Civil War, 1858- 
1861.” PhD. diss., Indiana University, 1967. 
 
Esarey, Logan. A History of Indiana from its Exploration to 1850. Indianapolis: 
W.K. Stewart Co., 1915. 
 
Esarey, Logan. A History of Indiana from 1850 to the Present. Indianapolis: B.F. 
Bowen & Co., 1918. 
 
Eyal, Yonatan. The Young America Movement and the Transformation of the 
Democratic Party, 1828-1861. New York: Cambridge University Press, 
2007. 
 
Fehrenbacher, Don. The Dred Scott Case: Its Significance in American Law and 
Politics. New York: Oxford University Press, 1978. 
 
Foner, Eric. Free Soil, Free Labor, Free Men: The Ideology of the Republican 
Party before the Civil War. New York: Oxford University Press, 1971. 
 
Foulke, William Dudley. Life of Oliver P. Morton. Indianapolis: The Bowen Merrill 
Co., 1899. 
 
Fredrickson, George. The Black Image in the White Mind. Hanover, NH: 
Wesleyan University Press, 1971. 
 
Freehling, William. Road to Disunion: Secessionists at Bay, 1776-1854. New 
York: Oxford University Press, 1990. 
 
Freehling, William. Road to Disunion: Secessionists Triumphant. New York: 
Oxford University Press, 2007. 
 
Gara, Larry. The Presidency of Franklin Pierce. Lawrence: University Press of 
Kansas, 1991. 
 
Halstead, Murat. Caucuses of 1860: A History of the National Political 
Conventions of the National Political Conventions of the Current 
Presidential Campaign. Columbus: Follett, Foster and Co., 1860. 
 
Hamilton, Holman. Prologue to Conflict: The Crisis and Compromise of 1850. 
Lexington: University of Kentucky Press, 1966. 
 
Hollister, Ovando. Life of Schuyler Colfax. New York: Funk & Wagnalls, 1886. 
277  
Holloway, William. Indianapolis: A Historical and Statistical Sketch of the Railroad 
City. Indianapolis: Indianapolis Journal Print, 1870. 
 
Holt, Michael. The Fate of their Country: Politicians, Slavery Extension, and the 
Coming of the Civil War. New York: Hill and Wang, 2004. 
 
Holt, Michael. “James K. Polk: 1845-1849.” in The Reader’s Companion to the 
American Presidency editors Alan Brinkley and Davis Dyer. New York: 
Houghton Mifflin Co., 2000. 
 
Holt, Michael. The Political Crisis of the 1850s. New York: W.W. Norton & Co., 
1978. 
 
Holt, Michael. The Rise and Fall of the American Whig Party. New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1999. 
 
Howe, Daniel Walker. What Hath God Wrought: The Transformation of American 
1815-1848. New York: Oxford University Press, 2007. 
 
Huston, James. Stephen Douglas and the Dilemmas of Democratic Equality. 
Plymouth: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2007. 
 
Johannsen, Robert. Stephen A. Douglas. New York: Oxford University Press, 
1973. 
 
Kaestle, Carl. Pillars of the Republic: Common Schools and American Society, 
1780-1860. New York: Hill & Wang, 1983. 
 
Lynch, William. “Anti-Slavery Tendencies of the Democratic Party in the North 
West, 1848-1850.” The Mississippi Valley Historical Review 11 (Dec., 
1924): 319-331. 
 
Lynch, William. “Indiana in the Douglas-Buchanan Contest of 1856.” Indiana 
Magazine of History (June, 1934): 119-132. 
 
 
 
McPherson, James. Battle Cry of Freedom. New York: Oxford University Press, 
1988. 
 
Meerse, David. “James Buchanan, the patronage, and the northern Democratic 
Party, 1857-1858.” Ph.D. Dissertation: University of Illinois, 1969. 
Milton, George. The Eve of Conflict. New York: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1934. 
Morrison, Chaplain. Democratic Politics and Sectionalism: The Wilmot Proviso 
Controversy. Chapel Hill, North Carolina Press, 1967. 
278  
 
Morrison, Michael. Slavery and the American West: The Eclipse of Manifest 
Destiny and the Coming of the Civil War. Chapel Hill: North Carolina 
Press, 1997. 
Murphy, Charles. “Jesse D. Bright.” Ph.D. diss., University of Chicago, 1927. 
Nation, Richard. At Home in the Hoosier Hills. Bloomington: Indiana University 
Press, 2005. 
 
Nevins, Allan. Ordeal of the Union. New York: Scribner, 1947. 
 
Nichols, Roy. The Disruption of American Democracy. New York: The Macmillan 
Company, 1948. 
 
Nichols, Roy. Franklin Pierce: Young Hickory of the Granite Hills. Philadelphia: 
University of Pennsylvania Press, 1931. 
 
Nichols, Roy and Philip Klein. “Election of 1856.” in Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., ed., 
History of American Presidential Elections. New York: Chelsea House, 
1973. 
 
Paul, James. Rift in the Democracy. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania 
Press, 1951. 
 
Peek, Gregory. “Upland Southerners, Indiana Political Culture, and the Coming 
of the Civil War, 1816-1861.” Ph.D. diss., University of Houston, 2010. 
 
Potter, David. The Impending Crisis: 1848-1861. New York: Harper & Rowe, 
1976. 
 
Rawley, James. Race & Politics. New York: J.B. Lippincott Co., 1969. 
 
Remini, Robert. At the Edge of the Precipice: Henry Clay and the Compromise 
that Saved the Union. New York: Basic Books, 2010. 
 
Remini, Robert. The House: The History of the House of Representatives. 
Washington: Library of Congress, 1996. 
 
Rhodes, James Ford. History of the United States from the Compromise of 1850 
to The McKinley-Bryan Campaign of 1896. New York: The Macmillan Co., 
1920. 
 
Riddleberger, Patrick. George Washington Julian: Radical Republican. 
Indianapolis: Indiana Historical Bureau, 1966). 
279  
Schroeder, John. “Annexation or Independence: The Texas Issue in American 
Politics,1836-1845.” Southwestern Historical Quarterly 89 (October, 1985): 
137-164. 
 
Schwarz, Philip. Migrants Against Slavery: Virginians and the Nation. 
Charlottesville: University of Virginia Press, 2001. 
 
Sellers, Charles. James K. Polk Continentalist, 1843-1846. Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 1966. 
 
Sewell, Richard. Ballots for Freedom: Antislavery Politics in the United States 
1837-1860. New York: Oxford University Press, 1976. 
 
Silbey, Joel. The American Political Nation. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 
1994. 
 
Silbey, Joel. The Partisan Imperative: The Dynamics of American Politics before 
the Civil War. New York: Oxford University Press, 1985. 
 
Silbey, Joel. Storm Over Texas: The Annexation Controversy and the Road to 
Civil War. New York: Oxford University Press, 2005. 
 
Smith, Elbert. The Presidency of James Buchanan. Lawrence: University Press 
of Kansas, 1975. 
 
Smith, Theodore. The Liberty and Free Soil Parties of the Northwest. New York: 
Longmans, Green, and Co., 1897. 
 
Smith, Willard. Schuyler Colfax: The Changing Fortunes of a Political Idol. 
Indianapolis: Indiana Historical Society, 1952. 
 
Stephenson, Wendell. The Political Career of James H. Lane. Topeka: Kansas 
State Printing Plant, 1930. 
 
Stoler, Mildred. “Insurgent Democrats of Indiana and Illinois in 1854.” Indiana 
Magazine of History 33 (March, 1937): 1-31. 
 
Stoll, John. History of the Indiana Democracy, 1816-1916. Indianapolis: Indiana 
Democratic Pub. Co., 1917. 
 
Thornbrough, Emma. The Negro in Indiana: A Study of a Minority. Indianapolis: 
Indiana Historical Society, 1957. 
 
Van Bolt, Roger. “Fusion Out of Confusion, 1854.” Indiana Magazine of History 
49 (December 1953): 353-390. 
 
Van Bolt, Roger. “The Hoosiers and the ‘Eternal Agitation,’ 1848-1850.” Indiana 
280  
Magazine of History 48 (December 1952): 331-368. 
 
Van Bolt, Roger. “The Rise of the Republican Party in Indiana 1840-1856.” Ph.D. 
diss., University of Chicago, 1950. 
 
Van Bolt, Roger. “Sectional Aspects of Expansion, 1844-1848.” Indiana 
Magazine of History 28 (June 1952): 119-140. 
 
Van Der Weele, Wayne. “Jesse David Bright: Master Politician from the Old 
Northwest.” Ph.D. diss., Indiana University, 1958. 
 
Venable, Austin. “The Conflict Between the Douglas and Yancey Forces in the 
Charleston Convention.” The Journal of Southern History 8 (May, 1942): 
226-241. 
 
Viola, Henry. “Zachary Taylor and the Indiana Volunteers” The Southwestern 
Historical Quarterly 72 (Jan., 1969): 335-346. 
 
Wilentz, Sean. The Rise of American Democracy: Jefferson to Lincoln. New 
York: W.W. Norton, 2005. 
 
Wiltse, Charles. John C. Calhoun: Sectionalist, 1840-1850. Indianapolis: The 
Bobbs-Merrill Co., 1951. 
 
Woollen, William Wesley. Biographical and Historical Sketches of Early Indiana. 
Indianapolis: Hammond & Co., 1883. 
 
Zimmerman, Charles. “The Origin and Rise of the Republican Party in Indiana 
from 1854 to 1860.” Indiana Magazine of History 13 (September, 1917): 
211-269. 
 
Zimmerman, Charles. “The Origin and Rise of the Republican Party in Indiana 
from 1854 to 1860.” Indiana Magazine of History 13 (December, 1917), 
349-412. 
 
 
 
Zucker, Charles. The Free Negro Question: Race Relations in Ante-Bellum 
Illinois, 1801-1860. Northwestern University: Dissertation, 1972. 
281  
 
 
VITAE 
 
 
 
John J. Wickre 
 
 
 
 
Education 
 
 
 
M.A. University of North Dakota, History, August 2008 
 
Thesis: “William H. Seward’s American Exceptionalism in the Age 
of the Irrepressible Conflict.” (August 2008) 
 
B.A. Willamette University, History and Politics, Spring 2006 
 
Senior Theses 
 
History: “Abraham Lincoln: Liberty, Union and Slavery.” (Fall 
2005) 
 
Politics: “The Great Moral Debate: The role of morality in the 
opposition to slavery and the coming of the Civil War.” 
(Spring 2006) 
 
Publications 
 
"Unlocking Lincoln's Soul: Abraham Lincoln and William Shakespeare" 
Lincoln Herald (Spring 2011) 
 
“Antislavery” The Political Lincoln (October 2008) 
“Seward, William” The Political Lincoln (October 2008) 
“The Slave Trade” Gale Library of Daily Life: Slavery in America 
(November 2007) 
Presentations 
 
“Indiana’s Southern Senator: Jesse Bright and the Hoosier Democracy” 
Blue Grass Symposium, Lexington, KY (February, 2013) 
 
“Wayne County’s Unionism on the Eve of War” Ohio University History 
Graduate Student Association Conference, Athens, OH (April 16, 2011) 
282  
“Wayne County’s National Drive to War” Blue Grass Symposium, 
Lexington, KY (February, 2010) 
 
“Lincoln and Shakespeare: Reading the Bard During the Civil War” Ohio 
Valley History Conference, Richmond, KY (October, 2009) 
 
“Unlocking Lincoln’s Soul: Abraham Lincoln and William Shakespeare” 
Blue Grass Symposium 2009 Lexington, KY (March 2009) 
 
“William Seward: The Conservative Liberal” Phi Alpha Theta History 
Conference, Grand Forks, North Dakota. (March 2008) 
 
“William H. Seward’s American Exceptionalism in the Decade of the 
Irrepressible Conflict” Northern Great Plains History Conference, Duluth, 
MN (October 4, 2007) (Winner of the “Graduate Student Prize” for best 
graduate paper presented) 
 
“Abraham Lincoln and John Brown: Race and Slavery.” Phi Alpha Theta 
History Conference, University of North Dakota. (March 2, 2007) 
 
 
 
Research Assistantship 
 
Advisor: Dr. Eric Burin, University of North Dakota (May 15, 2007-August 
15, 2007) 
 
Teaching Assistantships 
 
 
 
University of Kentucky, (January 2013- May 2013) 
 
University of North Dakota, (August 15, 2006- May 15, 2008) 
 
Related Experience 
 
Special Collections Page, University of Kentucky, (May 2011-Present) 
 
Remote Researcher, (August, 2011-Present) 
283  
